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Abstract  
 
This thesis engages with the debate surrounding the legitimacy of the 
political institution of marriage. Something lacking from this debate is a 
systematic discussion of the nature of the marital relationship. I address this 
omission, by means of a detailed investigation of this relationship in Part 
One. In Western societies the paradigmatic marital relationship is the 
romantic relationship. I consider whether we can define this relationship in 
terms of romantic love. I argue that we cannot do so without appealing to 
the nature of the relationship the love occurs within. We therefore also need 
an account of the relationship itself. I argue in favour of a role-based 
account which defines a relationship in terms of the norms governing that 
relationship. I then provide an account of the role of a romantic partner and 
claim that a romantic relationship is a relationship in which the participants 
play this distinctive role for each other.  
In Western liberal democracies the state directly regulates (it creates a 
distinct corresponding legal category for) the paradigmatic marital 
relationship through the political institution of marriage (the legal marital 
status, rights and duties etc.). Part Two considers whether this is 
appropriate. I consider and reject arguments which object to the state 
recognition of marriage on political liberal grounds. I argue that the state 
recognition of marriage is unproblematic, so long as there are independent 
liberal reasons for the state to directly regulate and recognise the romantic 
relationship. I then identify a complaint underlying each of these arguments: 
the claim that there is no reason for the state to directly regulate the 
romantic relationship. I respond to this complaint by showing that the 
romantic relationship leads to systematic material, physical and 
psychological vulnerability. In virtue of this it warrants some form of direct 
regulation. I conclude by showing just how complex a task it is to determine 
what form that direct regulation should take. 
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Introduction 
The Importance of the Marital Relationship 
Marriage is a wonderful institution, but who wants to live in an institution? 
Groucho Marx 
 
There are two things we refer to when we talk about marriage – the 
institution of marriage, and the lived marital relationship between two 
spouses. There has been a distinctive shift in the way that we think the 
institution of marriage should relate to the marital relationship. Before the 
shift, it was generally accepted that the institution of marriage shaped the 
private marital relationship. After the shift, we now expect this same 
institution to be shaped by the marital relationship, as it is understood 
independently of the institution.  
Stephanie Coontz (2006) provides an account of the history of the institution 
which I will utilise in order to demonstrate the reasons for thinking that this 
shift has occurred. Whether or not we accept this historical shift or the 
reasons for it however, it is clear that there are these two distinct ways of 
thinking about the relation that the institution of marriage has to the marital 
relationship. I will go on to explain why I think it is important to notice that 
this is the case. 
I aim to demonstrate that this shift calls for more focus on the nature of the 
marital relationship itself. There is a lack of philosophical work on the 
nature of adult personal relationships in general, and the marital relationship 
in particular. Part One constitutes my contribution to this area. 
I also want to motivate the thought that this focus on the marital relationship 
is called for when we are considering debates that concern the form and 
permissibility of the political institution of marriage (the legal status plus a 
bundle of legal rights and duties) in a Western liberal democracy that 
broadly follows political liberal principles. These debates are current and 
prominent, and are affecting changes in the political institutions of marriage 
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across the globe.1  This focus on the marital relationship is important to note 
and acknowledge in the context of these debates because whilst a number of 
arguments appear to assume that the institution of marriage should be 
shaped by the marital relationship, they do not pay sufficient attention to the 
nature of the relationship when attempting to determine what that public 
institution should look like, or whether it should exist at all. 
There are two central questions that this focus brings to the fore. The first 
concerns which relationships the institution of marriage is meant to be for 
and asks: ‘What is the paradigmatic marital relationship?’ The second 
concerns the relation that the state should bear to these relationships and 
asks: ‘What relation should the state bear to the paradigmatic marital 
relationship?’ The context for both of these questions is a contemporary 
Western liberal state. I explore some preliminary ideas surrounding these 
questions later in this chapter before outlining how they will be more fully 
addressed in Part One and Part Two of this thesis.  
Whilst the focus of this chapter, and thesis, is on the marital relationship and 
the proper relation that the state should bear to it, there are broader 
implications to the inquiry. Much of the current debate surrounding the 
political institution of marriage is based in political liberalism, and framed 
in terms of the public (political)/private (non-political) divide. In asking 
what relation the state should bear to the marital relationship, we could be 
understood as asking what relation a public, political institution should bear 
to a private, non-political relationship. Any answer to this question could 
therefore bear on the more general question of what relation the public, 
political sphere should bear to the private, non-political sphere. For instance, 
the claim that more focus on the marital relationship is required may suggest 
that more focus and understanding of what occurs in the private sphere is 
required when considering what public laws and institutions are appropriate 
within the public sphere (particularly when they relate to the private sphere 
in some important way).  
                                                          
1 The legalisation of same-sex marriage in a number of countries across the 
world is just one example. 
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I highlight how unclear this apparent public/private divide is in Part Two. I 
show that marriage provides a clear case where a clean divide is not 
possible. The marital relationship is both public and private. It appears both 
to require political regulation, and yet to be one of the most private and 
intimate relationships that two people could have. The assumption that there 
is a clean public/private divide in place when discussing marriage ignores 
the complex ways that the relationship and society (including the political 
institution) influence each other. Highlighting the messiness of the divide 
for marriage could have further implications for similar areas of life where 
there seems to be a blurring of the line between public and private. For such 
areas it seems that we should first ask whether the public/private framework 
is appropriate. Such areas may include relationships more broadly, 
education and employment. Whilst the public/private framework has its 
benefits, highlighting the need to respect liberty and to respect the proper 
limits of power, if it becomes apparent that it is unsuitable for many areas of 
life, then the framework as a whole may need to come under further 
scrutiny.   
I do not address these broader implications directly in this thesis, but merely 
wish to highlight the importance and potential relevance of focusing on the 
question of marriage. 
1. The Distinctive Shift  
Stephanie Coontz describes what she terms as a “transformation in the role 
of marriage” in society, and focuses on the differing reasons that people 
now have for marrying, in comparison to the past (2006, p. 4). She wishes to 
highlight how the centrality of love in marriage is a relatively new idea. She 
describes how the reasons for marrying have changed from aiming towards 
“political and economic advancement”, to the desire for an enduring loving 
relationship (p. 7). Where the institution of marriage once provided the 
opportunity to cement political relationships and consolidate and protect 
wealth, it now provides an opportunity for living one’s life in a fulfilling, 
loving relationship. This transformation in the role of the institution of 
marriage, and the associated reasons that individuals have for entering the 
15 
 
institution, highlight a shift in the way that we think that this institution 
should relate to the marital relationship. 
Whilst there has been a huge variety in the exact nature of the institution 
across both time and place, Coontz describes its overall purpose for much of 
history as being concerned with shaping the economic, political and social 
landscape of society. 
For centuries, marriage did much of the work that markets and 
governments do today. It organised the production and distribution 
of goods and people. It set up political, economic, and military 
alliances. It coordinated the division of labour by gender and age. It 
orchestrated people’s personal rights and obligations in everything 
from sexual relations to the inheritance of property. (2006, p. 9) 
In order to do this, the institution required “specific rules about how people 
should arrange their marriages” (Coontz 2006, p. 9).  We can see here that 
the institution would have directly shaped the nature of the marital 
relationship. For instance there would have been strict rules about the 
number of people (two), the duration of the relationship (lifelong) and 
features such as sexual fidelity. Additionally, these rules, and the institution 
itself will have “structure[d] people’s expectations, hopes, and constraints” 
about what the marital relationship would look like (p. 9). For instance, it 
will have influenced views on domestic violence, marital rape and the 
existence of love within the marital relationship.    
Taking love as an example, whilst it may well have been desirable for the 
marital relationship to be a loving one in the past, it certainly wasn’t 
necessary. Love was not considered a good reason for getting married. 
Moreover, the existence (or lack of) love in the marital relationship was of 
little relevance to the structure of the institution. If the institution did not 
foster or provide the opportunity for a fulfilling, happy and loving 
relationship, then this was of little concern.  
This is not the dominant picture of the institution of marriage that we are 
familiar with now. We now take love - and the loving relationship - to be 
central to marriage. The institution of marriage is now concerned with and 
focused on the “personal and private relationship that should fulfil [our] 
16 
 
emotional and sexual desires” (Coontz 2006, pp. 306-307). As a result love 
is viewed as a central reason for marriage.  
How does this affect the way that the institution relates to the marital 
relationship? We have shifted to expecting the marital relationship to shape 
the structure of the institution. If it does not meet the needs of that 
relationship, then it needs to be re-structured. It is now important that the 
institution enables a fulfilling, happy and loving relationship. This cannot be 
ignored in favour of other goals. 
We can describe this distinctive shift in how the institution of marriage is 
viewed in terms of ‘direction of fit’.2 We have gone from a situation where 
the marital relationship fits the institution of marriage, to a situation where 
the institution is meant to fit the relationship. For example, where it would 
once have been the case that the wife’s property would automatically be 
transferred to the husband on marriage, we now think that both parties to a 
marriage should be able to make legal arrangements that best suit the 
individuals involved (for example, prenuptial agreements and wills).  
If we think about this change in the direction of fit within the political 
liberal framework of the public/private divide, then we have moved from 
thinking that the private relationship should fit the public institution, to 
thinking that the public institution should fit the private relationship. This 
opens up questions of how a public institution can and should do this.  
Did this shift actually occur? Coontz provides a clear narrative of how ideas 
surrounding marriage have shifted and notes how people now “expect to 
live their lives in a loving relationship” (2006, p. 10). Whilst they still want 
“socially sanctioned relationships, backed by institutional protections”, they 
do not want to live under “a rigid institution” and would prioritise the 
relationship over the institution if it did not fit (p. 10). 
Coontz describes the reasons that she thinks contributed to this gradual shift 
over the past 150-200 years. She identifies the shift as beginning in the 
                                                          
2 I am borrowing this terminology from the philosophical literature on 
beliefs and desires. It is merely illustrative. Nothing that I say stands or falls 
with this concept or its definition.  
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eighteenth century prompted by the “spread of the market economy and the 
advent of the Enlightenment” (2006, p. 145). By the end of this century the 
norm of arranged marriage had been replaced by the norm of people 
choosing their own partners in marriage, and “individuals were encouraged 
to marry for love” (pp. 145-146). Marriage came to be viewed as a private 
and personal relationship between the spouses and as a place to escape from 
public life. It was in this era that the distinct yet complementary roles of 
husband and wife appeared. The husband was seen as the economic 
provider for the family and the wife as providing moral and emotional 
support. The success of a marriage was now thought to be determined by 
“how well a family met the emotional needs of its individual members” (p. 
146).  
Coontz identifies a key catalyst for the eighteenth century change in attitude 
as “the weakening of the political model upon which marriage had long 
been based” (2006, p. 148). Monarchy and political absolutism were being 
questioned at this time, following on from John Locke’s writings which 
promoted the political model of a “contract between ruler and ruled” and 
had appeared in the late seventeenth century (p. 148). This led to a parallel 
focus on “the mutual obligations required in marriage”, of both husband and 
wife, rather than an acceptance of the “absolute rights of husbands” 
(analogous to the divine right of Kings) (pp. 148-149). It was in this period 
that people like Marquis de Condorcet and Mary Wollstonecraft called for 
complete equality between husband and wife in marriage (p. 149).  
Whilst these ideas emerged in the eighteenth century, it took over one 
hundred years for them to become fully accepted and realised. The ideas 
(particularly surrounding free choice and equality) naturally faced criticism, 
as they called for a radical review of the social, political and moral 
worldview. This takes time, and goes through stages.  
Coontz notes that people recognised that this new way of viewing marriage 
would lead to tensions early on. It allowed for more people to become 
satisfied with their marriage, as a valuable personal relationship, but at the 
same time had the potential to destabilise the institution because it made 
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marriage “optional and fragile” in a way that it had never previously been 
(2006, p. 5). The view suggested that if an individual was not satisfied in 
their marriage that they should be able to leave it: an idea that conflicted in 
particular with the institution’s rules on divorce. These tensions have been 
evident from the eighteenth century onwards as “people surged past the 
barriers that prevented them from achieving marital fulfilment and then 
pulled back, or were pushed back, when the institution of marriage seemed 
to be in jeopardy” (p. 5).  
A notable, and recent, stage of development (where the tension is also 
evident) is that of the 1950s model of marriage where the husband is viewed 
as the breadwinner and the wife as the nurturing housewife.  Coontz views 
this model as one where people “embraced the ideals of love and marital 
companionship without following them to the dangerous conclusion that 
loveless marriages ought to end in divorce or that true marital partnerships 
should be grounded in the equality of men and women” (2006, p. 8).  
We can see that this model is based on the eighteenth century idea of 
complementary roles, and on an idea (which had also emerged earlier) 
which claimed that men and women had unique characters that were not to 
be deemed “superior or inferior” but should be “appreciated on their own, 
completely dissimilar terms” (Coontz 2006, p. 153). Reflecting this view, it 
was thought that “sustaining married love depended on emphasising and 
maintaining the mental, emotional, and practical differences between the 
sexes” – differences that made men and women “dependent upon each other 
for ‘marital bliss’” (pp. 153-154).  
It was not only ideas that had to change in order for the 1950s model to 
emerge. For example, the idea that husbands should go out to work to 
provide income and wives should stay at home and nurture, which became 
accepted in Europe and America in the nineteenth century, only became 
possible for most people in the mid-twentieth when men’s wages were high 
enough and the division of labour between women and men in society had 
altered so that it was the norm for men to go out to work and women to stay 
at home. (Coontz 2006, pp. 7-8) 
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The 1950s model itself has since come under scrutiny as the ideals of free 
choice, equality and love have become more widely accepted, and the 
implications of these values realised. A loveless marriage is now thought to 
be grounds for divorce, and gender equality now receives far more attention, 
even if it is not fully achieved. The political institution now reflects these 
changes in attitude, highlighting how it has been altered to fit what is 
viewed as the paradigmatic marital relationship.  
It is likely that the exact reasons for the transformation will be up for 
historical debate. However, Coontz’s account provides reasons for us to 
think that the shift has occurred, that the dominant view of marriage is that it 
should be centred on love, and that the institution should be built around the 
central loving relationship. However, even if we disagree with her reasons, 
or even that there has been such a shift in dominant ideas relating to 
marriage, the important point to recognise is that there are two distinct ways 
of viewing how the institution of marriage should relate to the marital 
relationship, and that this is relevant to debates that consider whether and 
how the state should be involved in this institution.   
Accepting that the shift has occurred does not mean that we cannot 
recognise that there are still people who hold the view that the institution, 
and its purposes, should shape the private marital relationship. The recent 
debates surrounding same-sex marriage in fact provide examples of both 
(pre and post-shift) viewpoints.  
The “conservative” view of marriage, which claims that marriage can only 
be heterosexual, takes a pre-shift viewpoint.   
Marriage should be understood, conservatives argue, not primarily 
as an avenue for personal fulfilment and individual happiness, but as 
an institution that exists first and foremost for the creation and well-
being of children. (Jordan 2013, p. 49) 
The institution’s function is not determined by the character of the 
relationship of those who inhabit institutional roles (husband and wife). 
Rather, the institution’s function is something realised by those who inhabit 
the roles. The marital relationship needs to fit the institution, and so: 
Marriage is a sexual relationship because sex leads to children. 
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Marriage is between exactly two human beings because every 
human being is the genetic offspring of exactly two human beings. 
Marriage is permanent and exclusive because of (i) the unifying 
character of heterosexual intercourse and (ii) the importance of 
parents in their children’s lives. (Jordan 2013, p. 49) 
As such the conservatives argue for legal marriage to only be for 
heterosexuals. Firstly, because this is what they think marriage is by 
definition, and secondly, because they believe it is “best for children” that it 
remains this way (Jordan 2013, pp. 49-50).  
On the other side of the same-sex marriage debate are the liberals who think 
that marriage is “an institution that exists for the sake of married persons” 
(Jordan 2013, p. 50).  This affects how they think the political institution 
should be structured - they argue for the inclusion of same-sex couples in 
legal marriage, because they also have loving relationships of the type that 
‘fit’ the institution, and would benefit from being included within it.  This is 
a post-shift (and the dominant) viewpoint.  
Why highlight these two distinctive ways of viewing the relation between 
the institution of marriage and the marital relationship? Primarily because it 
is important to highlight (as Jordan does) that differing views on marriage 
can have these very different viewpoints as their starting points. This will 
affect the debates that surround these views. Different questions about 
marriage may seem more pertinent or pressing from one starting point than 
another. Answers to particular questions about marriage (for example, about 
the meaning of marriage) might depend on what starting point is held. This 
illustrates the need to be clear about what our starting point is. 
There is of course a debate about which of the viewpoints (‘conservative’ or 
‘liberal’) is correct. This is an interesting debate. Just because one viewpoint 
(the ‘liberal’ viewpoint) has become dominant, does not automatically mean 
it is correct. However I do not want to enter this debate here. For this thesis, 
I am interested in arguments that assume the dominant position (as 
identified) – that the institution should fit the relationship. I am approaching 
the topic of marriage from a political liberal perspective in this thesis and 
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the questions and issues that I want to address are being raised by people 
who take this ‘liberal’ viewpoint of marriage as their starting point. 
Highlighting the alternative (‘conservative’) viewpoint is still important for 
(at least) two reasons. First, because it highlights that when we take the 
proper direction of fit to be that the institution should fit the marital 
relationship we should pay attention to the nature of that marital 
relationship. In order for an institution of marriage to ‘fit’ a marital 
relationship, we need to know what a marital relationship looks like, and 
how an institution of marriage can foster and support it. It should be noted 
that determining the nature of the marital relationship will be a complex 
task. We can no longer look to the institution of marriage in order to define 
what the marital relationship is. It is precisely this complex task which I 
undertake in Part One where I ask – ‘What is the paradigmatic marital 
relationship?’  
The second reason is that it emphasises that there are different ways in 
which an institution of marriage can relate to the marital relationship. We 
can question the status quo. A relevant question to ask, as the current 
literature does, is whether the current institution of marriage is fit for 
purpose. This leads us to two sets of questions. Firstly there are questions 
about the structure of the institution, such as whether there should be 
restricted eligibility. Bearing our liberal starting point in mind looks 
important here: is it the relationship or the institution that demands such 
eligibility restrictions? 
Secondly there are questions about the proper way for the state to relate to 
the marital relationship. These arise in part because currently we have a 
political institution of marriage in most Western liberal democracies – it is 
an institution that is regulated by laws, and which conveys a legal status 
along with legal rights and benefits. As such, the state is currently related to 
the marital relationship in a direct and regulatory manner. It is this relation 
that we may want to question: should the institution of marriage be political 
rather than, for example, religious or cultural? These concerns are 
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considered in Part Two of this thesis, where I focus on the question – ‘What 
relation should the state bear to the paradigmatic marital relationship?’ 
It is interesting to notice that whilst the marital relationship looks as though 
it has changed distinctively over the years, it isn’t clear that the institution of 
marriage has similarly done so. Certainly there have been some dramatic 
changes in the political aspects of the institution. In marital law we have 
seen the abolishment of miscegenation and coverture laws, and the 
legalisation of same-sex marriages. Non-political aspects have also changed. 
Societal norms that assumed distinct yet complementary male and female 
roles have been eroded and the acceptance of divorce has become much 
more widespread. However, the institution of marriage still consists of a 
legal status conferred onto eligible couples (where eligibility is decided by 
the state) which is accompanied by a host of legal rights and obligations. 
There are also still laws of entry and exit, as well as laws that apply 
specifically to individuals who have acquired the marital status. If we think 
that the institution should fit the marital relationship, then it seems like a 
pertinent question to ask whether this traditional, political, structure is 
suitable, especially as we appear to be shoehorning an institution which was 
historically structured for one particular purpose, into a role that it was not 
built, and is not clearly suited for.  
These two questions surrounding the paradigmatic marital relationship are 
particularly important to bring to the fore now, when there are a number of 
debates surrounding the nature and legitimacy of the current political 
institution of marriage in Western liberal democracies. Focusing on the 
nature of the marital relationship and attempting to identify its distinctive 
features will likely have an impact on a number of different discussions. For 
instance, it seems to be extremely relevant to the same-sex marriage debate 
which could be understood as asking whether same-sex adult relationships 
can be considered to be paradigmatic marital relationships. It will bring a 
new perspective to these debates that ensures that the private marital 
relationships between individuals are properly taken into account when 
considering whether and how they should be supported and regulated.  
23 
 
To clarify, I am not suggesting that the marital relationship is the only 
important factor to be considered in these debates. There are other things to 
take into account as well, such as the restrictions a theory of justice might 
place on the role that the state can play in relation to its citizens’ personal 
relationships. The point I wish to emphasise is that questions concerning the 
nature of the marital relationship are relevant to these debates. These 
questions have received some attention, but there is still much more to be 
said. Focusing on them could shed new light on the debates surrounding 
marriage. In particular they could potentially aid us in determining whether 
there should be a political institution of marriage and what that institution 
should look like.  
In the rest of this chapter I will explore in a little more depth some 
preliminary ideas surrounding the two central questions that have been 
identified. I will also outline how they will be more fully addressed in the 
rest of this thesis. 
2. What is the Paradigmatic Marital Relationship?  
This question will be fully addressed in Part One. It is a question about the 
nature of the relationship or relationships that the political institution of 
marriage is meant to be shaped by. Answering it will involve identifying 
which relationship we, as a Western liberal society, consider to warrant or 
require a political institution of marriage. It will also involve identifying 
what distinctive features that marital relationships have. It should be noted 
that I am interested in the relationship between adults exclusively. Although 
traditionally child-rearing has been considered central to the marital 
relationship, it is no longer assumed that all married couples will have 
children. Additionally, the parental relationship is already regulated directly 
(if you are the registered parent of a child, you have legal responsibility for 
that child, unless it has been taken away by the state).3 
To begin the enquiry in to what the paradigmatic marital relationship is, it 
seems important to recognise that there are some relationships that can be 
                                                          
3 See Brake (2012), pp. 145-151 for an argument in favour of separating the 
regulative frameworks for marriage and parenting.  
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easily ruled out. There are relationships that seem to be totally inappropriate 
candidates for the marital relationship, such as many familial relationships, 
and in particular the parent-child relationship.  
There are also relationships that whilst not totally inappropriate, seem not to 
warrant the label of ‘marital’ in virtue of their defining features. For 
instance, the cousin relationship does not seem to warrant the label of 
marital, in virtue of being between cousins. The relationships between 
colleagues or members of associations and institutions also seem unsuitable 
candidates for the marital relationship in a similar way. When the 
relationship is defined by these features, they do not look as though they 
warrant the marital label. However, these relationships do not rule out the 
possibility of a marital relationship - they are compatible with it. For 
example, we think it is perfectly plausible that colleagues could also be 
married to each other. The point is that their relationship as colleagues is not 
what makes their relationship marital. There are also relationships that we 
simply consider not to require or warrant a political institution or any 
regulation at all, such as the relationship you have with an acquaintance you 
rarely see. 
It also seems important to clarify that there are a number of different ways 
that we can differentiate relationships. For the purposes of analytical clarity 
we might use the following four (broad) categories. I do not aim to provide 
a comprehensive list of features under each category here, but merely 
indicate the kinds of things we would consider for each.  
The first category concerns the people involved – their ages, their sex, and 
possibly other ways of describing them (such as ‘member of a particular 
group’). The second concerns the structure of the relationship – how many 
people are involved, the duration of the relationship, whether it is a 
relationship of equality and whether it is voluntary or not.  
The third category concerns the purposes or functions of the relationship. A 
key function of the relationship between an elderly lady and a shopkeeper, 
for instance, will be for the elderly lady to acquire the goods that the 
shopkeeper sells. This relationship might also have a more informal function 
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of keeping the old lady from being lonely by providing someone to talk to 
regularly.  It may be that a relationship does not have a clear overall 
purpose, but we can usually describe a number of different (formal and 
informal) functions that it might have. For example most relationships 
include roles that the people involved typically play for each other. There 
are also rights and obligations that people do or do not have in virtue of 
being in that relationship.  
The fourth category includes the typical things that happen within a 
relationship. For instance, in the relationship between the elderly lady and 
the shopkeeper, the elderly lady typically pays for things the shopkeeper is 
selling, and they chat, but they tend to only interact in the shop, and to only 
spend minimal amounts of time together. 
We can describe particular relationships by describing their features under 
these categories. For instance – the relationship of ‘colleague’. The people 
involved are of working age, can be any sex and can be described as 
‘working for company X’. The structure of the relationship has to involve at 
least one other person, but can involve up to any number of people. The 
duration varies, as it lasts for as long as all parties to the relationship work 
for the same company. It can be a relationship of equals, but equally, there 
can be a hierarchy (your boss is still your colleague). It is an involuntary 
relationship in the sense that you are colleagues with everyone that works in 
the same place as you, whether you agree to it or not. However, it is not 
coercive, in the sense that you have the choice whether or not to work at 
company X, and therefore work with all of the people at company X. It is 
not clear that there is a distinct overall ‘purpose’ for the relationship, 
although it might be thought that a good colleague relationship will enable 
colleagues to work well together. Additionally it seems that people who 
relate to each other as colleagues should treat each other in a certain way. 
The typical things that happen within this relationship are that people work 
together, that they interact in the workplace, that it is a professional (rather 
than a social) relationship, and that it is governed by specific workplace 
rules and general employment laws. 
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As we can see with this example there are some features that the colleague 
relationship will share with other relationships – such as being between any 
sexes. There are also some features that seem to depend on other features. 
For instance, the duration of the relationship depends on the fact that the 
relationship is between people that work in the same place. It also seems 
that some features are more central to defining the nature of the relationship 
than others. For instance, the number of people involved does not seem 
definitive. The fact that it is between people who work together, and some 
of the typical occurrences, such as the fact that it is a professional 
relationship seem to play much more of a defining role. 
It seems likely that it will be the same for the marital relationship. There 
may be some features that we think are irrelevant to the question of the 
paradigmatic marital relationship(s). They are irrelevant in the sense that 
they do not contribute to what makes that relationship distinct from other 
relationships, or distinctly ‘marital’. For instance it may be the case that it 
doesn’t matter how many people are involved, or what sex they are, or how 
long it lasts for. We may also think that some of the features are inter-
dependent. Whilst it may seem at first glance that the number of people is 
irrelevant, we may find that when considering the purpose of the 
relationship, this bears on the question of how many people can be involved.  
This suggests that it will be helpful to identify which features are likely to 
be the most centrally defining features of the marital relationship, and 
therefore which are relevant to the question at hand. Where should we start? 
As it has already been noted, this relationship is no longer defined by the 
political institution of marriage. We cannot look to the structure of the 
institution - its laws and the associated rights and duties - and ask what 
relationship would result. This is the wrong direction of fit. Rather, we need 
to identify the relationship first. 
However, it might be thought that looking to the current relationships that 
occur within the political institution of marriage will still be able to guide us 
in identifying the centrally defining features of the marital relationship, even 
if the institution does not define the relationship itself. At the least, it could 
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suggest features that are worth considering. Although it is unclear how far 
and how well the current political institution of marriage has been shaped by 
the marital relationship, we have already seen that the contemporary 
institution of marriage is paradigmatically meant for those in a loving, 
fulfilling relationship. It might be thought that there are other features of 
typical marriages that should be considered as well. For example, that it is a 
sexual relationship, monogamous, committed, and long-term if not forever. 
However, as noted above, some features seem to depend on others, and it 
seems that this list of features include the type that may well depend on 
more central, defining features. For instance, the duration of the relationship 
seems to depend on the purpose or function of the relationship. The fact that 
it is a loving relationship does, however, seem central.  
Which loving, fulfilling relationship? Whilst there are many different types 
of loving relationship - we can have loving, fulfilling relationships with our 
siblings, our parents, and our friends - it is clear that these are not candidates 
for the paradigmatic marital relationship. The loving relationship that is 
assumed to be marital within our Western society is the stable romantic 
relationship that is expected to be long-standing. There is a whole industry 
based upon this idea, let alone the many novels, films and plays that revolve 
around this ideal. These narratives tell us that once people have found 
romantic love, the natural consequence is for them to get married. Consider 
Romeo and Juliet (the supposed paradigm example of romantic love). They 
meet and fall in love. They (mistakenly) see the obvious consequence of 
their love as marriage. One of the tragedies of their story is the fact that 
within their society, in their era, the relationship was still meant to fit the 
marital institution, and not the other way around.  
Part One explores the idea that the romantic relationship is the paradigmatic 
marital relationship. In order for it to be able to play this role we will need 
to be able to clearly distinguish what a romantic relationship is. The most 
obvious place to start seems to be the love that occurs within a romantic 
relationship. Chapters One and Two consider whether there is a unique type 
of love that occurs in romantic relationships compared to other relationships 
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that also involve love (but are not ‘romantic’) – for instance, long-standing 
close friendships. 
I explore four different accounts of love: love as union with the beloved 
(Union Accounts); love as robust concern for the beloved (Robust Concern 
Accounts); love as valuing the beloved (Valuation Accounts) and; love as an 
emotion (Emotion Accounts). I focus on Union and Robust Concern 
Accounts in Chapter One, and on Valuation and Emotion Accounts in 
Chapter Two.  
I conclude that there is no way to clearly distinguish the love that occurs in 
romantic relationships from the love that occurs in other relationships such 
as close friendships without appealing to the relationship - the patterns of 
behaviour and interaction (as well as the norms that influence them) - that 
the love occurs in. This means that simply focusing on the love alone cannot 
fully illuminate the nature of the romantic relationship. We cannot therefore 
identify paradigmatic marital relationships by picking out those 
relationships that involve a certain type of love. We need to know more. 
The discussion of Chapters One and Two does however point to a way to 
distinguish romantic relationships from close friendships – by focusing on 
the relationship itself. For this, we need an account of the romantic 
relationship. In Chapter Three I argue that we need a role-based account of 
this relationship. In Chapter Four I construct a role-based account and 
propose that the romantic relationship (the paradigmatic marital 
relationship) is one in which the participants play the (distinctive) role of a 
romantic partner for each other.  
3. What Relation Should the State Bear to the Paradigmatic Marital 
Relationship?  
Once we have an idea of what the paradigmatic marital relationship looks 
like, we then need to ask whether the current institution of marriage fits this 
relationship. A key feature of the current institution of marriage is that it is 
political. The state is involved in the institution which conveys a legal status 
as well as legal rights, duties and benefits. This is a direct, regulatory 
relation that the state specifically bears to the paradigmatic marital 
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relationship (i.e. the romantic relationship). In Part Two I consider whether 
this is an appropriate way for the state to relate to the paradigmatic marital 
relationship. Here I put forward some preliminary thoughts and introduce 
the key arguments, authors and ideas that relate to this question. 
My starting point for approaching this question is a number of recent 
arguments from within the political liberal debate surrounding marriage. 
These arguments can be seen as interrogating the state’s relation to the 
marital relationship via the political institution of marriage. They object to 
the state recognition of marriage. They are drawn from the work of 
Elizabeth Brake, Tamara Metz and Clare Chambers. 
Elizabeth Brake (2012) worries that the current political institution of 
marriage is incompatible with political liberal ideals. In particular she is 
concerned that it violates the political liberal principle of public reason and 
that it involves the state in unjustified discrimination. However, she thinks 
that the political institution of marriage can be reformed so that it conforms 
to political liberal principles and ideals. She proposes a system of “minimal 
marriage” which would enable people to pick and choose from the set of 
“rights and responsibilities” that usually attach to marriage, and decide who 
they would like to exchange each right and responsibility with (p. 156).4 
This system would enable individuals to be minimally married to more than 
one person, and to decide for themselves which marital rights and 
responsibilities they will exchange with each person. This could be done 
either “reciprocally or asymmetrically” for each marital right (p. 157). 
Tamara Metz (2010) calls for the abolition of marriage, but proposes an 
alternative political institution for the recognition of certain relationships – 
an Intimate Caregiving Union Status for relationships that involve intimate 
caregiving.5 She thinks that intimate caregiving relationships may or may 
not be marital, but it is not the fact that they are marital that warrants 
recognition. What matters is that they involve intimate caregiving which 
                                                          
4 See Brake (2012), Chapters 7 and 8, for a full discussion of minimal 
marriage. 
5 See Metz (2010), Chapter 5, for an account of her ICGU status.  
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requires state regulation and warrants state recognition. She can be 
understood as thinking that the state should only recognise the marital 
relationship if it is an intimate caregiving relationship, but that it should also 
recognise all other intimate caregiving relationships as well. There is 
nothing special about the marital relationship that warrants the state bearing 
a different relation to it. 
Clare Chambers (2013; 2017) is also a marriage abolitionist. She aims to 
show that any political institution used to regulate personal relationships 
(whether it is a political institution of marriage, of civil union, of intimate 
caregiving unions, or any other status that provides state recognition of adult 
personal relationships) is problematic, and should be abolished. She argues 
that any political institution which provides state recognition of adult 
personal relationships violates key political liberal principles, such as the 
principle of neutrality.6 She can be understood as thinking that the state 
should not bear any special relation to the romantic relationship, let alone 
through a political institution of marriage.   
Chambers argues for a “marriage-free state” (2017) where marriage is still 
permitted but no longer a legal institution.7 She of course recognises that 
there are still vulnerable parties to protect, potential disputes to regulate and 
legal rights and duties to distribute appropriately (p. 115). She proposes that 
the state should directly regulate certain aspects - relationship practices - of 
adult personal relationships through a regulatory framework that is both 
piecemeal and default (so each relationship practice is directly regulated 
separately and on an opt-out basis). As a result, the state may regulate 
certain aspects of relationships that also happen to be marital, but it will not 
be due to the fact that they are marital that warrants state involvement. 
                                                          
6 Chambers is not herself a political liberal (she is a comprehensive liberal) 
but she provides political liberal arguments within her work. She also has 
arguments that focus on issues of equality, but these focus more on the 
claims that marriage is, for example, sexist and heterosexist, than on the 
idea that state involvement with the institution is problematic in itself, 
which is what I am interested in.  
7 See Chambers (2017), Part Two, for her positive argument for a marriage-
free state.  
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Brake, Metz and Chambers all challenge the current relation that the 
political liberal state bears to the marital relationship through the political 
institution of marriage. These arguments are presented from within political 
liberalism. They claim that the political institution of marriage violates 
certain political liberal principles. They raise three levels of concern: first, 
that the current institution is problematic for political liberalism; second, 
that any political institution of marriage is problematic for political 
liberalism; and third that any political institution that recognises a particular 
form of adult personal relationship is problematic for political liberalism. I 
go through each of their arguments in detail in Chapters Five and Six, and 
aim to show that each level of concern can be dismissed. There are no 
violations of political liberal principles evident, and so the political 
institution of marriage does not look problematic for political liberalism.  
The arguments considered, however, involve numerous different claims and 
concepts which makes it unclear as to whether there is a general underlying 
complaint against the political institution of marriage that needs to be 
addressed. In addition they each object to the state recognition of marriage, 
but it is unclear whether they all agree on what state recognition consists in.  
In Chapter Seven I identify three central ideas that can be understood to be 
running through these arguments: personal relationships; the romantic 
relationship; and the distinction between direct and indirect regulation. I go 
on to reframe the anti-marriage side of the debate around these ideas.  
Direct regulation occurs when the state creates a distinct legal category 
corresponding to the thing being regulated. Indirect regulation occurs when 
something is regulated, but there is no distinct corresponding legal category. 
I show that whilst the anti-marriage theorists think some personal 
relationships warrant direct regulation, they do not think that the romantic 
relationship does. Each of their proposals for alternative regulatory 
frameworks would only indirectly regulate the romantic relationship. I 
identify the underlying complaint against the political institution of marriage 
implied by the anti-marriage position as: the political institution of marriage 
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directly regulates the romantic relationship, when it is unwarranted in doing 
so.  
I move on in Chapter Eight to explore how the debate can move forward in 
light of identifying this underlying complaint. It is here that the importance 
of understanding the nature of the romantic relationship becomes apparent. I 
draw on the work of Part One and highlight how the romantic relationship 
does warrant direct regulation because it can uniquely cause systematic 
material, physical, and psychological vulnerability – something which gives 
the state a compelling reason for direct regulation.  
Showing that the romantic relationship warrants direct regulation does not 
address the further question of exactly how the state should directly regulate 
it. There is still the question of whether the current, or any, political 
institution of marriage is the best way of directly regulating the relationship. 
There are also still questions about what the structure of such an institution 
should look like. I do not aim to conclusively answer these questions in this 
thesis, as there is not space to do them justice.  
Instead, in the conclusion, I aim to highlight just how complex a task it is to 
provide answers to these questions, and to present some key considerations 
that need to be kept in mind when embarking on such a project. I do this by 
drawing out insights from the work of Iris Marion Young (1990; 2006) 
which seem particularly relevant to the question of how the state should 
directly regulate the romantic relationship. These insights recommend that 
we pay attention to the political and social structures and norms that are in 
place within the society we are working with. This will include the norms 
surrounding personal relationships (such as those surrounding the role of a 
romantic partner) because these affect what personal relationships look like 
(for example, whether they involve gender roles). It will also include other 
societal structures and norms that influence what issues of justice arise in 
personal relationships. For example, workplace norms influence how 
caregiving is viewed and valued within society.  
It may be the case that the current political institution of marriage is the best 
tool for the job. Or it may need to be altered slightly, dramatically reformed, 
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or even abolished altogether. All I claim, contrary to Brake, Metz, and 
Chambers, is that the state should directly regulate the paradigmatic marital 
relationship (the romantic relationship). The reason for this will be (at least 
in part) because the nature of the romantic relationship warrants it. 
4. One Final Note  
Earlier I noted that this project could have broader implications, particularly 
surrounding the concept of the public/private divide, often utilised within 
political liberalism. I want to just point to what some of these broader 
implications could be here.  
I think the question of how personal relationships, including the romantic 
relationship, should be regulated provides a particularly good example of 
how the public/private divide is complex and messy. It also highlights the 
need for paying more attention to this complex messiness. The public and 
the private interact in interesting and important ways, and we can see this 
when we focus on the regulation of personal relationships.8   
Citizens and their lives (including their relationships) influence what is 
required by the state. If no-one drove cars then there would be no need for 
car licensing and road tax. What the state is concerned with, and how it 
structures society, will also influence citizens, and their lives. By putting 
higher taxes on certain cars, citizens’ car-buying choices are influenced by 
the state. By recognising that there is no clean line between the public and 
private spheres, we can begin to understand these complex interactions more 
clearly. Marriage then becomes not an awkward, complicated case to deal 
with, but simply an instance of all other interactions between citizens and 
the state.  
Theories of justice, such as political liberalism, aim to be action guiding – 
but they also need to be fit for purpose. If there are aspects of human life 
that seem to require regulation of some kind, then this is something that a 
                                                          
8 Others have of course noticed and highlighted this: Metz for instance notes 
that “[m]arriage/state relations serve as a direct road into the heart of liberal 
political theory, to that area where public and private meet, overlap, and 
collide” (2010, pp. 153-154). See Metz (2010), Chapter 6, for further 
discussion. 
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theory of justice needs to take into account. If the regulation of this thing 
seems to be incompatible with that theory of justice, then this suggests we 
need to reconsider our theory of justice (or at least the frameworks that it 
utilises). 
Discussions of the appropriate regulation of marriage may therefore suggest 
the reformation of both the political institution of marriage, and of political 
liberalism as a theory of justice.  
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Part One  
What is the Paradigmatic Marital Relationship? 
 
In the Introduction I identified the central question of Part One as: What is 
the paradigmatic marital relationship? I am asking this question in order to 
identify what relationship the institution of marriage is meant to fit, and to 
determine the nature of this relationship. 
Looking within our society - at the literature, media and culture - one 
relationship stands out as the paradigmatic instance of the marital 
relationship: the romantic relationship that has persisted over some time. 
After all, the movies and fairy tales tell us that it is the couple who are in a 
romantic relationship that get married and (supposedly) live happily ever 
after.9  
So, the institution of marriage is meant to be for the romantic relationship: 
but what is a romantic relationship? Why do we want (or need) an 
institution for it? What justifies a distinctive political institution for it? To 
answer these questions we need to further explore the nature of the romantic 
relationship, and ask what makes it distinctive.  
In order to address these questions I utilise the comparison between 
romantic relationships and close friendships. I use this comparison because 
despite being thought to be distinct relationship types, they are on many 
descriptions, remarkably similar. Identifying the difference between these 
two relationships will therefore (hopefully) enable us to find what is 
distinctive about the romantic relationship, in a way that a comparison with 
relationships that are clearly and markedly different will not. 
We clearly have two different concepts when we come to think about these 
two relationship types, and we can point to different paradigm examples for 
each. In the Harry Potter books (and films) Harry and Hermione are clearly 
                                                          
9 Romantic flings or brief affairs have usually ended before marriage is 
considered: I am not including these other short-term relationships under the 
term romantic relationship.  
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close friends, but Ron’s and Hermione’s close friendship develops into a 
romantic relationship. In the sitcom Friends, Joey and Chandler are always 
close friends, whereas Chandler and Monica come to have a romantic 
relationship. Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet clearly desire, and are in the 
process of developing a romantic relationship; Romeo and Mercutio are 
close friends.  
Yet, the similarities between these two relationships are numerous. Insofar 
as we choose our close friends we also choose our romantic partners. We 
share things with both our friends and our romantic partners – our thoughts, 
desires and ambitions for instance, as well as our experiences. Other 
characteristics also look similar – the relationships are important to their 
members, close, supportive and long-standing. They also both involve love, 
care, and shared activities. What then makes them different?  
The first thing to note about romantic relationships and close friendships is 
that they are both loving relationships. There are two key aspects to loving 
relationships, which whilst often intimately connected and interlinked, can 
be separated. The first is the love that occurs within these relationships (the 
thing that makes them loving relationships). The second is the relationship 
(the thing that makes them a loving relationship). These two aspects can 
come apart – you can have love without a relationship, and a relationship 
without love. When they come together, you get a loving relationship – a 
relationship where love is also present.  
To see that this is the case, consider the following example. Two people 
meet, and start to date. After a few dates they begin to fall in love. 
Unfortunately one of them is due to move abroad for an exciting new job in 
two weeks’ time. This means that the relationship cannot develop due to 
practical matters.10 The two people love each other, but they are not (yet) in 
                                                          
10 It might be pointed out here that long-distance loving relationships are 
possible. In this example however there is no loving relationship already in 
place to maintain (as is the case with the majority of long-distance loving 
relationships), and so the individuals would have to work very hard at 
staying in contact and developing the relationship whilst they were 
separated in order for them to form one. This might be possible, but the 
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a loving relationship. Relationships take time to develop, to enable the 
participants to get to know one another, to develop attitudes of concern for 
each other, and to begin to generate and fulfil expectations for each other. If 
the one person returns, and the love is still there, they could then continue to 
develop their relationship. If they don’t return, then the relationship will 
never develop, whether or not the love lasts.  
Clearly the two aspects of a loving relationship are interlinked and will 
influence each other. It might be thought that a particular type of love will 
lead to (or only occur within) a particular type of relationship. This would 
suggest that we could identify a relationship type by looking at the type of 
love that the participants in that relationship have for each other. In order to 
do this we would need to show that there are distinct types of love. For the 
particular comparison at hand, we would need to show that romantic love is 
distinct from close-friend love. Chapters One and Two explore whether this 
is possible. These chapters consider a number of different accounts of love 
and ask whether we can use them to demarcate romantic love and close-
friend love as distinct types of love. I argue that this is a difficult task, and 
that accounts that do enable us to find a difference between romantic love 
and close-friend love can only do so by appealing to the relationship that the 
love is found in. As such, the proposed method of first identifying the love, 
in order to identify the relationship, fails.  
We therefore cannot look to the love alone to distinguish romantic 
relationships from close friendships. There is more to the difference 
between these two relationships. This leaves the relationship itself – the 
pattern of behaviour and interactions over time between the people that 
participate in the relationship. In what ways could a romantic relationship 
and a close friend relationship be different? In order to answer this question 
we need an account of the romantic relationship itself. In Chapter Three I 
argue that we need a role-based (as opposed to a behaviour-based account).  
                                                          
point still stands that the love and the relationship can come apart, and we 
can think about them separately (at least to an extent).  
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In Chapter Four I construct a role-based account of the romantic 
relationship. This shows that the difference lies in the constitutive norms of 
the romantic partner role. This role involves distinct relationship obligations 
and patterns of required behaviour. I therefore claim that it is in virtue of 
this role that the romantic relationship is distinct and that the paradigmatic 
marital relationship, as a romantic relationship, is one in which the distinct 
role of a romantic partner is being played. 
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Chapter One 
Romantic Love: A Unique Union or Robust Concern?   
 
Over the next two chapters I consider whether it is the love that occurs 
within the paradigmatic marital relationship (understood to be the romantic 
relationship) that makes the relationship distinctive. Is there a unique form 
of love - romantic love - that is present only within romantic relationships, 
influencing the pattern of behaviour and interaction that occurs? Can we use 
this feature to identify and define what a romantic relationship is?  
Love has always (at least since the time of the ancient Greeks) been thought 
to have different forms. The ancient philosophers distinguished between 
eros, agape and philia, and these were thought to be associated with 
different forms of relationship. Eros is characterised as a passionate (often 
sexual) desire for the loved object. Agape is the sort of love that bestows 
value on to the beloved object, and has become associated with Christian, 
God-like love. Philia is often associated with friendship, and is 
characterised as an “affectionate regard or friendly feeling” (Helm 2013, 
Section 1) towards those who are loved in this way.11   
The idea that romantic relationships could involve a distinctive type of love 
seems fairly intuitive. Love is thought to occur in a number of different 
personal relationships – those between family members, and friends as well 
as those between romantic partners. It is often thought that the love that 
occurs in different relationships is different in some way – that there are 
distinct types of love associated with different relationships. We make this 
distinction when we say things like ‘I love him, but like a friend, or a 
brother’.  
That romantic love is one of these distinct forms of love is a fairly common 
view. In particular, it seems right to say that I love my romantic partner in a 
                                                          
11 For a concise explanation of each type of love see Helm (2013), Section 
1. The distinctions between these types of love are debated, and most 
contemporary accounts blur the lines, incorporating aspects of two or three 
of them into their accounts.  
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different way from my family members (children, siblings, grandparents, 
aunts etc.). Romantic love seems to be distinct from familial love. What 
exactly this difference consists in I will not attempt to articulate here as this 
is not the comparison I am utilising, because these familial relationships are 
quite clearly distinct from the paradigmatic marital relationship.  
As explained in the introduction to Part One, the comparison I will utilise is 
between romantic relationships and long-standing close friendships. Whilst 
similar in many respects, it is widely assumed that romantic relationships 
and close friendships are distinct relationships, and that they involve distinct 
forms of love. Intuitively it seems that there is something different about the 
love that we have for our close friend, and the love that we have for our 
romantic partner. We think that Hermione has different relationships with 
Ron and with Harry, and that she loves them in different ways. It is this 
intuition that I will interrogate.  
Where to start? Love is a complex, and a widely (both historically and 
currently) debated concept, even when narrowed down to the love that 
occurs in non-familial personal relationships. Rather than attempting to 
enter into this rich and varied debate directly, I will take as my starting point 
four different accounts (broadly categorised) of love. I will take each 
account in turn, explaining what it takes love to consist in, and then 
considering whether such an account can be used to show that there is a 
distinctive type of romantic love.  
The four accounts that I consider are: accounts that take love to be union 
with the beloved (Union Accounts); accounts that view love as robust 
concern for the beloved (Robust Concern Accounts); accounts that view 
love as a form of valuation, either as an appraisal or bestowal of value 
(Valuation Accounts); and accounts that take love to be either a single 
emotion, or a complex emotional interdependence with the beloved 
(Emotion Accounts).12 I focus on Union Accounts and Robust Concern 
                                                          
12 I utilise the four broad categories found in both Helm (2013) and Heaton 
and Roige Mas (2014). Different accounts may cross these categories or 
include features found in other categories as well, but they are a helpful way 
to demarcate general differences of focus. 
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Accounts in this chapter, and on Valuation Accounts and Emotion Accounts 
in Chapter Two.  
I do not attempt to argue for the primacy of any of these accounts. Nor do I 
aim to provide comprehensive critiques of them. This is in part because I 
think each identifies an important feature that is commonly thought to at 
least be a part of (if not constitutive of) love, and so warrants discussion. It 
is mainly however because my aim in presenting and discussing these 
accounts is to address the question at hand: can it be shown that there is a 
distinctive type of romantic love? I am using these accounts to my own end.  
As such, each of the following sections can be taken to be asking the 
following guiding question: if we accept one (or more) of these accounts, 
can we use that account to demonstrate that there is a unique form of 
romantic love? I argue that the simple answer to this question, for each 
account, is ‘no’. The more complex answer is that these accounts, taken in 
isolation, cannot demonstrate that there is a unique form of romantic love. 
They either fail to identify a distinctive type of romantic love; or they can 
only identify a distinctive type of romantic love by appealing to some 
further aspect of the relationship that the love is found within.13 This implies 
that we need to look further than the love that occurs within the romantic 
relationship in order to find out what makes it distinct. We also need to take 
a closer look at the relationship itself, and as will be shown, the social 
norms surrounding it. Chapters Three and Four undertake this further task. 
1.1 Union Accounts of Love  
The key idea of Union Accounts is that love is constituted by either the 
desire to form, or the actual formation of a significant union with the 
beloved. This significant union is sometimes termed a ‘we’ – when we love 
someone we either desire to, or actually form, a ‘we’ with the person(s) we 
                                                          
13 I leave it as an open question whether we think there actually are (in 
general) distinct types of love, and whether accounts of love should be able 
to demonstrate that there are distinct types of love in close friendships and 
romantic relationships. 
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love. This ‘we’ can either be taken to be literal or metaphorical, and there is 
a fair amount of variation in what this ‘we’ is taken to consist in. 
The idea that love involves a significant union can be traced back (at least) 
as far as Plato. In the Symposium we see, in Aristophanes speech on love, 
the idea of humans searching for their ‘other halves’ to become (re)united 
into one (whole) being in love (2008, pp. 24-30). Aristophanes begins by 
telling his audience that human bodies used to be radically different. They 
used to be “round, with their backs and sides forming a circle” (p. 25). 
These circular beings had “four hands and the same number of legs, and two 
absolutely identical faces on a cylindrical neck” (p. 25). In other words, they 
were ‘double’ what humans are now. These circular humans were powerful 
and ambitious, and challenged the Gods. To punish them, Zeus decided to 
split them in half. Each half missed the other dreadfully, and they searched 
for each other, in order to re-unite. Love, according to Aristophanes, “draws 
our original nature back together; he tries to reintegrate us and heal the split 
in our nature” (p. 27). It is simply the “desire for and pursuit of wholeness” 
(p. 29). When two halves meet “it’s hardly an exaggeration to say that they 
don’t want to spend even a moment apart” (p. 28). They want to unite, and 
become one again. This story has had an impact on numerous accounts of 
love ever since. 
Contemporary Union Accounts come from Robert Nozick (1990) and Neil 
Delaney (1996) who have proposed Union Accounts of love that involve a 
desire for a ‘we’, as well as  Roger Scruton (1986) and Robert Solomon 
(1990) who offer accounts that take love to involve the actual formation of a 
‘we’.  
If we accept a Union Account of love, and understand love to consist in a 
desire for, or an actual formation of, a ‘we’, how could such an account 
show that there is a distinctive type of romantic love? There appear to be 
two (broad) options. The first is that romantic love is the only type of love 
to involve the desire for, or formation of, a ‘we’. The second option would 
grant that other types of love involve a desire for, or formation of, a ‘we’, 
but demonstrate that a unique form of union (a unique ‘we’) is desired or 
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formed in romantic love (with other types of union desired or formed in 
other types of love). I will consider each option in turn.  
1.2 Is Union Unique to Romantic Love? 
This might at first seem like an odd question. If love is taken to be 
constituted by union, then surely all love involves union? This would mean 
that the love that occurs in both close friendships and romantic relationships 
involves (some sort of) union. Asking whether union is unique to romantic 
love would therefore appear to get us no closer to working out whether 
romantic love is distinctive.  
However, within the literature, there is no clear consensus on whether or not 
union is a constitutive feature of all love, or only romantic love. This lack of 
clarity is not only a feature of the contemporary debate. Aristophanes refers 
to the sexual aspect of union (Plato 2008, p. 27) and so it might be assumed 
that he talking about eros, which is often thought to be a part of romantic 
love. Aristotle on the other hand appears to take union to be (a valuable) 
part of friendship (McCabe 2012, p. 65).14 This difference is reflected in the 
accounts of Nozick and Solomon. Nozick (1990) takes the desire for union 
to be a distinctive feature of romantic love (absent from close-friend love) 
whereas Solomon (1990) thinks that close friendship can also involve union. 
The position of others (e.g. Scruton 1986) is less clear. In light of this lack 
of clarity, and Nozick’s claim that romantic love is distinctive in this way, it 
seems that we cannot blindly accept the assumption that all love involves 
union. I shall therefore consider whether Nozick’s account can in fact show 
union to be unique to romantic love.  
We find Nozick’s account of love in his book The Examined Life. He clearly 
begins with the assumption that romantic love is a distinct form of love and 
aims to capture what makes it so. His claim is that the desire to form a ‘we’ 
(a desire for union) is unique to romantic love: “romantic love, is wanting to 
form a we with [a] particular person, feeling or perhaps wanting, that 
                                                          
14 McCabe (2012) claims that Aristotle refers to Aristophanes’ speech in 
Eudemian Ethics VII.12 where it is suggested that we need our friend - our 
other self - in order to be whole (pp. 65-67). 
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particular person to be the right one for you to form a we with, and also 
wanting the other to feel the same way about you” (1990, p. 70). He 
contrasts romantic love with friendships, where the latter involve a desire to 
share things - “food, happy occasions, football games, a concern with 
problems, events to celebrate” - but no desire for union (p. 82). I challenge 
the claim that union is unique to romantic love by looking more closely at 
what is desired on his account. 
Nozick characterises the ‘we’ that is desired as a “new web of relationships 
between [two people] which makes them no longer so separate” (1990, p. 
70). There are three apparent features of this ‘we’: first, it involves the 
pooling of the lovers’ well-being; second it involves pooled autonomy 
between the two individuals; and third, it involves a new, additional, shared 
identity with the other person (pp. 70-71). I challenge the idea that the desire 
for this ‘we’ is unique to romantic love. I argue that each of these features 
(pooled well-being, pooled autonomy and a shared identity) are also 
plausibly desired (and occur) in close-friend love. This leads me to claim 
that Union Accounts (at least in so far as they agree with Nozick) cannot 
show that union is unique to romantic love.   
The first feature of the ‘we’ that is desired on Nozick’s account - pooled 
well-being - involves having your own well-being affected by the beloved’s 
well-being: “As the other fares, so (to some extent) do you … their well-
being is your own” (1990, p. 69). If someone or something you love is 
harmed (or benefitted), then to some extent so are you. This is not merely 
being emotionally affected by the state of someone else’s well-being, as we 
might be when we see a stranger suffering. In such cases our emotions 
might be temporarily affected, but our well-being is not – we won’t be any 
“worse off” (p. 68).  
The idea that love (of all kinds) involves this type of pooled well-being is 
common (and not restricted to Union Accounts). Kolodny’s Valuation 
Account for instance, views all love as involving “emotional vulnerability” 
towards the beloved, which he describes as involving more than a temporary 
effect on one’s emotions: “A may feel content when B is well, elated when 
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B meets with unexpected good luck, anxious when it seems that B may 
come to harm, grief-stricken when B does” (2003, p. 152). Velleman’s 
(1999) Valuation Account and Baier’s (1991) Emotion Account also include 
something similar.  
Even on Nozick’s own account, all love (including love of friends, objects, 
nations, etc.) is characterised as having “[y]our own well-being…tied up 
with that of someone (or something) you love” (1990, p. 68). This aspect of 
the ‘we’ is therefore clearly not unique to romantic love (and Nozick 
acknowledges this). It would also seem odd to claim that whilst this is a 
feature of all types of love, it is only desired in romantic love.15 It is part 
and parcel of what it means to love someone.  
The second feature of Nozick’s desired ‘we’ - pooled autonomy - occurs 
between two individuals when “each transfers some previous rights to make 
certain decisions unilaterally into a joint pool” (1990, p. 71). This isn’t a 
complete giving up of autonomy, claims Nozick, as it is only for a certain 
subset of decisions. This subset will differ in different romantic 
relationships, but Nozick suggests that it might include “where to live, how 
to live, who friends are … whether to have children… [and] where to 
travel” (p. 71). He appears to treat these as plausible pooled-decisions 
because they are decisions that are about “how to be together” and because 
they affect the participants’ well-being (p. 71). He remarks that if your well-
being is pooled, then “it is not surprising that decisions that importantly 
affect well-being … will no longer be made alone” (p. 71). The idea that 
love involves pooled autonomy is not unique to Nozick, but it is 
characteristically only a feature of Union Accounts.16  
It is the link with pooled well-being that calls into question the claim that 
pooled autonomy (and the desire for it) is unique to romantic love. If pooled 
autonomy is (at least in part) explained by pooled well-being, then surely 
                                                          
15 At least in contrast to other non-familial loves. 
16 Helm (2013), Section 2, notes that pooled autonomy also features in 
Union Accounts from M. Fisher (1990) and R. Solomon (1988), and that the 
diminishment of individual autonomy is often an area of criticism for Union 
Accounts.  
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wherever there is pooled well-being, it is reasonable to suggest (in the 
absence of other defeating reasons) that there is some pooled autonomy. If, 
as Nozick claims, all love involves pooled well-being, then why do 
decisions that importantly affect well-being not become joint decisions in 
other forms of love?  
I think it is reasonable to suggest that there is some form of pooled 
autonomy in other forms of love, and that it is desired, precisely because of 
the pooled well-being that occurs. In close friendships the participants love 
each other, they have pooled well-being, and there are certain decisions 
which might be thought to be about being close friends, and which will 
importantly affect each other’s well-being. In light of this, the close friends 
will desire that these particular decisions are jointly made. For example, if 
the close friends decide to live together, then decisions about where to live, 
and having guests to stay might become pooled. Or, if the close friends 
participate in leisure activities together, what new activities to try and who 
to share them with might become joint decisions. 
Perhaps there are certain decisions that are only pooled within romantic 
love. If this is the case then it is the particular union that is desired that is 
unique to romantic love (as considered in the next section) and not union in 
general. However, as Nozick notes, the subset of decisions that are pooled 
will differ from romantic couple to romantic couple, suggesting that it is 
subjective and variable. Additionally, the subset he lists includes decisions 
about living arrangements, friends, children and travelling which could all 
plausibly be decisions that close friends put into the pool, if their close 
friendship involves these things, and their pooled well-being is affected by 
them.17  
My claim is that pooled autonomy, as Nozick describes it, is plausibly both 
present and desired in other types of love. However, there may be further 
ways in which the pooled autonomy could be thought to be distinct. Perhaps 
                                                          
17 It might be objected that close friends don’t typically desire this and may 
experience pooled autonomy as a burden. However, if it is a result of (and 
contributing to) pooled well-being then this seems unlikely.  
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it is accompanied by a unique commitment to uphold it in romantic love, 
which is not present in other forms of love. Whilst this might be the case, 
the location of the difference between romantic love and other forms of love 
does not appear to be a part of the pooled autonomy itself. A commitment to 
uphold pooled autonomy is not an internal feature of that pooled autonomy 
– it is a response to the existence of pooled autonomy. It is not clear that this 
commitment is necessarily a part of the love, rather than a feature of the 
relationship that love is found in, either. To claim that it is a part of the love 
would at least require further argument. I will therefore set this suggestion 
aside. 
Moving on, the third feature of Nozick’s ‘we’ is an additional shared 
identity that those within the ‘we’ come to have (in addition to their 
individual identities). His account of this shared identity isn’t particularly 
clear, but then it is not the type of thing that is easily explained. He writes 
that to “have this new identity is to enter a certain psychological stance; and 
each party in the we has this stance toward the other” (1990, pp. 71-72). It is 
a stance such that “each becomes psychologically part of the other’s 
identity” (p. 72).  
When explaining what it means for someone to become a part of another’s 
identity within a shared identity Nozick suggests that there are two ways 
that we can understand this claim. An individual self will either see the “we 
as a very important aspect of itself” or it will see “itself as a part of the we, 
as contained within it” (p. 73). Whichever way it relates to the ‘we’, there is 
a desire to “possess the other as completely as you do your own identity” (p. 
74), but in a way that does not strip that identity of its independence or 
autonomy (or so Nozick claims).   
Perhaps the most illuminating part of his account is the contrast that he 
makes with friendship. Friends share things - experiences, activities, 
problems, etc. - and want to share these things. They do not however, claims 
Nozick, share an identity. In explaining how we share such things Nozick 
presents the self as “an appropriative mechanism, one that moves from 
reflexive awareness of things to sole possession of them” (1990, p. 83). We 
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can delineate the boundaries between selves by looking at what things are 
solely possessed by a particular self. When things are shared between 
friends, there is not one self that solely possesses that thing: “the very same 
things – experiences, activities, conversations, problems, objects of focus or 
of amusement” are part of each of them (p. 83). Friends jointly possess these 
things, and this makes the boundaries between them “less sharp” because 
they are each “related closely to many things that another person also has an 
equally close relationship to” (p. 83).  
So whilst both romantic love and friendship can alter the “contours and 
boundaries of the self” (Nozick 1990, p. 85), it is only romantic love (on 
Nozick’s account) that involves the desire to form this shared identity with 
another, whereby the whole identity of another person is shared (rather than 
simply certain activities, conversations etc.).  
It is hard to grasp exactly what Nozick means by this. How can we come to 
possess another’s identity in the same way as we possess our own? I possess 
my own identity by participating in all the things that make that identity up 
(the experiences, activities etc.). I would therefore need to know everything 
that makes up the beloved’s identity (a challenge in itself), and somehow 
come to acquire them in a similar way. It is not clear what we should make 
of this sort of idea.  
Margaret Gilbert provides a way of thinking about shared identity, which 
we could use to supplement Nozick’s account. She claims that her account 
of “plural subject formation” can provide a model for the “fusion” (union) 
that is thought to occur in love and loving relationships (1996, p. 220).  
A ‘plural subject’ is formed when two or more people jointly accept a goal, 
value, opinion, or the like. This involves more than two individuals sharing 
the same goal (individually), and is compatible with the individual wills not 
being in alignment with the will of the plural subject (this will be made 
clearer in the example below). This process of jointly accepting something 
achieves a “binding together of a set of individual wills so as to constitute a 
single, ‘plural will’ dedicated to a particular goal” (Gilbert 1990, p. 7). 
There is a sharing of an identity that has this goal.  
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For example, take two parents who say to their son: “We think you should 
be home by midnight” (Gilbert 1996, p. 219). Neither parent individually 
holds this view (one thinks he should come home earlier, the other that he 
doesn’t need a curfew), but they have come to this compromise jointly, and 
it is a view they can appropriately characterise as ‘theirs’. Holding this joint 
view makes it “incumbent upon each one to express ‘their’ view (that is, the 
compromise view) in front of” their son (p. 219). Gilbert emphasises that 
the change that occurs in each individual when they come to hold a joint 
view is not “superficial” (p. 219). They are not merely “pretending 
personally to believe something” but rather now “conceive of themselves as 
the members of a single body (or person) that does believe that thing, a 
status requiring specific behaviour on each individual’s part” - behaviour 
consistent with the view jointly held (p. 219). There is an additional shared 
identity that holds this view, which is formed up of both individuals in the 
‘we’.  
However, if we understand the shared identity in this way - as a plural 
subject - then it does not look unique to romantic love. Consider a football 
team - each individual member is a part of the ‘we’ of the team, they have a 
shared identity with each other member of that team - this team identity is 
additional to each individual identity the participating members have, and is 
shared between each individual member. This shared team identity can have 
joint goals, views and aims. A football team is not an example of a loving 
relationship, and yet it makes sense to talk about it having a shared identity. 
Gilbert in fact thinks that shared identity is something that is “central to 
human social relationships in general” (1996, p. 216) and not exclusive to 
any type of love or relationship.18  
This suggests that the desire for (and formation of) a shared identity can 
occur in many different types of relationship, and that the contrast Nozick 
makes between friends and romantic partners is too strong.  Friends do more 
than jointly possess certain things, such as experiences, activities, 
                                                          
18 Her central example of forming a plural subject in Gilbert (1990) is when 
(any) two people walk together.  
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conversations, problems, objects of focus or amusement. They can also 
share an identity - in the sense that each of them partly constitutes a joint 
identity with someone else - an identity that is additional to their individual 
identity. This further identity can have shared goals, values and opinions.  
Returning to the question at hand, the discussion of plural subjects suggests 
that union is not unique to romantic love (it is not even unique to loving 
relationships in general). We can share an identity, and we can form a ‘we’, 
with close friends, acquaintances, and even complete strangers. However, 
the possibility that there is a unique type of union in romantic love is still 
open. On Gilbert’s account people can be ‘fused’ to different degrees, 
depending on the different joint goals, opinions, etc., how long the fusion 
lasts for, and how stable it is. Two people walking together are ‘fused’ by 
their joint goal of walking together for as long as that walk continues. 
People in romantic relationships might be fused by a larger range of joint 
goals, values, and beliefs etc. for a longer period of time. 
Gilbert acknowledges that marriage (or marriage-like relationships) might 
involve a “special kind of fusion” which is both “intensive” and “long-term” 
(1996, p. 222). Perhaps Nozick (who is clearly attempting to articulate what 
it is about romantic love and relationships that we intuitively take to be 
distinct) could appeal to this idea. He could claim that the ‘we’ desired and 
formed in romantic love is distinct in virtue of the fact that it is the only type 
of union that involves complete fusion – so that the shared identity aligns 
completely with the two individual identities. I shall consider this 
possibility, and whether there is a unique union that is desired in romantic 
love in the next section.  
1.3 Does Romantic Love involve a Unique Union?  
If union (actual or desired) is found in various different types of relationship 
that involve different types of love (or no love at all) then it is not something 
that is unique to romantic love. In order for us to be able to use Union 
Accounts to demonstrate that there is a unique type of love called romantic 
love, they will have to be able to show that the particular ‘we’ desired or 
formed in romantic love is distinct. 
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As stated above, a number of accounts do claim this. They also attempt to 
articulate what this unique ‘we’ consists in. The problem that arises for my 
project is that this romantic ‘we’ appears to be very hard to satisfactorily 
characterise. There is not only disagreement in how it should be 
characterised, but also the concern that in trying to articulate the unique 
nature of the romantic ‘we’ the accounts become implausible. This 
immediately suggests that Union Accounts will not be particularly helpful in 
enabling us to understand the distinctive nature of romantic love and 
romantic relationships as they will only be able to get us so far (claiming 
that a unique union is desired or formed, but unable to satisfactorily 
articulate what that unique union looks like).  
The romantic ‘we’ is characterised in a variety of ways. Nozick (1990), as 
we have seen, sees the union of romantic love as involving a shared identity. 
Solomon (1990) similarly appeals to the notion of a shared identity, but 
views this more as a process of allowing each other to influence and 
redefine the individual identities involved. Whilst clearly linked to the idea 
of sharing an identity, other authors, such as Delaney (1996) and Scruton 
(1986), focus instead on the idea of shared interests. This is linked with the 
idea of being concerned for the other in a way that is analogous to the 
concern I have for myself and my own interests. In this section I aim to 
show that both shared identity and shared interests accounts (a) struggle to 
successfully articulate what a romantic ‘we’ would uniquely look like, and 
(b) begin to look less unique when we try to better articulate what the 
romantic ‘we’ would look like. I then consider, and reject, the idea that 
romantic union exclusively involves physical and sexual union.   
1.3.1 Shared Identity Accounts  
Taking Nozick as an example of a shared identity account, we saw above (in 
section 1.2) that he could be understood to be claiming that romantic love 
uniquely involves the desire to possess the other’s identity completely, as 
one possesses one’s own identity, through an additional, shared identity. As 
I have already suggested, it is difficult to make sense of what this amounts 
to.  
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Nozick describes how individual selves can be demarcated by the things that 
they solely possess. The types of things that a self can possess are 
“experiences, activities, conversations, problems, objects of focus or of 
amusement” (1990, p. 83).  We can identify a particular self by the 
particular set of these things that it possesses. The experiences, activities, 
conversations etc. that I have participated in therefore make up my self (my 
identity) as I now solely possess that set of things.  
How might I come to possess another’s identity as I possess my own? If we 
treat the form of possession that Nozick posits as a kind of epistemic 
condition - knowing all there is to know about a person - then it faces a 
unique set of problems.  
I possess my own identity by participating in all the things that make that 
identity up (the experiences, activities etc.). In order to possess another 
person’s identity in a similar way, it appears that I would need to possess all 
of the things that make up that identity as well, and I would need to come to 
possess them by participating in them. This is impossible. Firstly there is an 
epistemic problem – coming to know all of the experiences, activities, etc. 
that makes up the other person’s identity looks very difficult. It is unclear 
whether we even know all of the things that make up our own identity, as 
presumably it involves a vast list of things from birth onwards. Requiring 
that we come to know our beloved’s identity to this extent seems to go far 
beyond any usual concept of ‘fully knowing’ another person (often seen to 
be an element of love).  
Secondly there is a problem of acquisition. Even if we could acquire this 
type of knowledge of ourselves and of others, it is not clear to me how we 
could come to possess these things, as we possess the things that make up 
our own identity. We have not had all of the same experiences, not 
participated in all of the same activities and not had all of the same 
conversations as the other. It might be easier to picture coming to have the 
same problems or objects of focus, but we cannot come to have these in the 
same way as we have our own problems and objects of focus if they do not 
come about via the same experiences, activities etc. 
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Additionally, the idea that we desire both to possess the other person’s 
identity wholly in the same way that we possess ours, doesn't neatly fit with 
the idea that this occurs via an additional, shared identity with our beloved. 
We do not possess our own identity in this way.  
These worries highlight that Nozick’s account of the ‘we’ desired in 
romantic love is not fully worked out. This makes it difficult to use his 
account to show that there is a distinct form of romantic love, as we cannot 
articulate satisfactorily what this love entails.  
There are however alternative ways to understand how we possess our 
identities. Gilbert’s view, for instance, is more sophisticated and sensitive to 
the practical features of shared identities. Her account of plural subject 
formation might help us to formulate a more satisfactory account of the 
romantic ‘we’. 
Gilbert suggests that marriage-type relationships might involve a special 
kind of plural-subject formation where ‘fusion’ between the participants is 
particularly intensive, long-term, stable and untrammelled. She also 
suggests that this type of fusion quite plausibly “involve[s] something 
worthy of the name ‘love’” (1996, p. 225). Could this type of fusion be 
unique to romantic love?  
Intensive, long-term fusion occurs when the plural subject has a variety of 
joint goals, values, opinions etc. over a substantial period of time. Gilbert 
notes that married couples often 
…have one or more major long-term joint projects, such 
as…creating and maintaining a comfortable home, raising a family, 
and so on. Such projects generate a plethora of smaller joint projects, 
both long- and short-term, such as maintaining a joint bank 
account…and taking the kids to the zoo. (1996, p. 222) 
In addition to this 
…over time negotiations take place and agreements are reached on a 
multitude of issues, major and minor, such as whether [they] can 
afford to buy a house, who is the best babysitter, and how often 
[they] should eat fish. (p. 222) 
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This suggests married couples have a huge number and variety of joint 
goals, values and opinions. This fusion becomes stable when the plural 
subject “continuously sustain[s] certain particular long-term projects, and 
certain particular views, values, and principles” (Gilbert 1996, pp. 222-223). 
Stable fusion becomes untrammelled when personal goals, values, etc. 
become aligned with those of the plural subject, re-enforcing the stability of 
the fusion. This, posits Gilbert, can occur because the “couple’s practices 
may, as a psychological matter, so predominate that the individual has no 
countervailing tendencies any longer” (p. 223).  
It seems reasonable to say that a substantial portion of each individual’s 
identity is now possessed by the other in such a situation as the individual 
identities now align with the joint identity (that each shares). This at least 
looks like one way of spelling out what it means to possess another person’s 
identity, as one possesses one’s own. However, it no longer looks so unique 
to romantic love.  
This type of fusion is different from that which occurs between two 
acquaintances taking a walk together. It does not look as though it would be 
out of place in a long-term close friendship though. Intensive, long-term, 
stable and untrammelled fusion could occur through a variety of long-term 
goals and surrounding a variety of views, values and principles. Close 
friends could be fused in this way.  
A Nozickian might counter that Gilbert’s account doesn’t quite capture what 
Nozick has in mind. Perhaps the ‘we’ that is desired in romantic love is one 
in which all the  goals, values, principles and opinions that make up each 
individual’s identity become fused in a way that is paradigmatically 
intensive, long-term, stable and untrammelled. The two people would in this 
way become ‘one’ person in all important respects.  
The problem with this picture is that it looks fairly implausible and 
undesirable. The concerns put forward by those who object to Union 
Accounts, that it diminishes (if not destroys) personal autonomy, here look 
well founded. If two people become a plural subject in such a complete way 
it seems as though their individual identities have become lost, and this 
55 
 
doesn't look like a good thing. I don't think Nozick would be happy with this 
picture either. He stresses the fact that the shared identity that is desired in 
romantic love is additional to the individuals’ identities, and that personal 
autonomy remains in place. But then this just leads us back to the question 
of how to properly characterise this romantic ‘we’.  
Gilbert’s account might still be able to assist. She suggests that it is the 
nature of the relationship - the pattern of behaviour and interaction - that 
influences, and makes possible, the type of fusion that occurs. This would 
suggest that it is only in certain relationships - with certain features - that 
complete stable and untrammelled fusion could occur. This suggests 
however that in order to understand romantic fusion more fully, we need to 
look at the relationship that it is occurring within as well, as this will 
influence the type of fusion that occurs. This therefore means that we cannot 
use Union Accounts that characterise union as a shared identity on their own 
to show that romantic love is distinct. We need to supplement them with an 
account of a romantic relationship.  
1.3.2 Shared Interest Accounts  
Can shared interest accounts provide a more satisfactory account of the 
romantic ‘we’? Delaney characterises the romantic union as “wanting to 
identify with another, to take another’s needs and interests to be your own 
and to wish that she will do the same” (1996, p. 340). Scruton, who 
proposes an account of love that involves an actual formation of a ‘we’, 
states that love occurs when “reciprocity becomes community: that is, just 
so soon as all distinction between my interests and yours is overcome” 
(1986, p. 229). There are two initial problems with this type of account, 
which revolve around the difficulty of explaining exactly what we mean by 
taking another’s interests to be our own.  
The first problem is noted by Gilbert, who highlights the difficulty of 
characterising union as the taking on of another person’s ideas. If Jack is 
meant to take on Jill’s ideas as his own, whilst also retaining his own, then a 
problem arises. Imagine that Jack is a Democrat whilst Jill is a Republican: 
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Without difficulty Jack himself can hardly be both a Democrat and a 
Republican. If, to avoid generating a whole set of inconsistencies in 
belief, we insist that Jack take on Jill’s ideas while discarding his 
own, and vice versa, there seems to be no more reason to call Jack 
and Jill ‘merged’ than when they had their original ideas. They’ve 
just switched sides. (1996, p. 217)  
A similar problem will surely arise for interests: taking the other’s interests 
on, whilst retaining your own could lead to a conflict of interest; if we 
discard our own interests, and take on the other’s in a reciprocal fashion, 
then we just seem to be swapping interests.  
The swapping of interests certainly doesn’t seem to be what these accounts 
have in mind. The “community of interests” (Scruton 1986, p. 231) that 
occurs in Scruton’s romantic ‘we’ involves each person taking on the 
other’s desires as reasons for himself (in the same way that his desires are 
reasons for him). As such the lover aims at the beloved’s good “in just the 
way that he aims at his own” (p. 230). This doesn’t look like a swapping of 
interests.  
Getting to grips with exactly what sharing interests does entail is difficult. 
This leads us to the second problem, which Delaney highlights. Whilst the 
romantic ‘we’ might involve the desire for the other to “substantially 
incorporate your interests into [their] motivational set” (1996, p. 341), there 
are clearly ways of doing this that are not desirable. The beloved does not 
want their interests to be incorporated in a way that either appropriates them 
(for example, through the lover coming to have exactly the same career 
ambitions as the beloved), or only to the extent that the lover takes their 
“personal well-being to be associated with them” (p. 341) so that the lover’s 
concern is not properly about the beloved. 
In order to provide a more satisfactory and understandable account of 
sharing interests Delaney proposes the following: when someone takes on 
another person’s interests as their own these interests should be appreciated 
and “perceived to be directly connected to the lover’s well-being, in the 
sense that [the] advancement of [the beloved’s] interest in itself constitutes a 
57 
 
good” for the lover (p. 341).19 We want this to be a reciprocal process. As 
well as the other person identifying with us, and taking on our needs and 
interests, we also want to identify with them – to take on their needs and 
interests as well. I think it is something like this idea that Scruton is 
gesturing towards as well.  
The problem with this is that in attempting to better spell out what taking on 
another’s interests amounts to, Delaney’s account no longer looks as though 
it is unique to romantic love. It seems that the desire to take on each other’s 
needs and interests to this extent could also plausibly be a part of close-
friend love. Whilst we might not think that casual friends or acquaintances 
want to take on each other’s needs and interests as their own, it would seem 
strange to claim that close friends do not want to have their needs and 
interests considered in this way. A close friend will be directly affected by 
the other’s well-being, in the sense that the promotion of one close friend’s 
well-being will constitute a good for the other as well (akin to the way that 
Nozick views the well-being of those who love each other to be 
intertwined). 
It seems therefore that Union Accounts struggle to articulate what the 
unique romantic ‘we’ consists in, whether it is construed in terms of a 
shared identity or shared interests. Whilst I have not conclusively 
demonstrated that Union Accounts cannot show that there is a difference 
between the union that occurs in romantic and close-friend love, I have 
shown that demonstrating this difference is extremely difficult, suggesting 
that it will not be fruitful to use these accounts for our project.  
1.3.3 What about Physical and Sexual Union?  
It might seem that I have so far failed to consider crucial aspects of a 
romantic ‘we’ (whether desired or actual): namely that it involves physical 
and sexual union. If the unions (desired or formed) in romantic love and 
close-friend love look similar in the respects already considered (as I have 
                                                          
19 This is similar to Nozick’s idea of pooled well-being. 
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argued) then perhaps the difference lies here. Does romantic love uniquely 
involve a particular form of physical and sexual union? 
The physical and sexual features of union, although acknowledged in Union 
Accounts, tend to be less focused on (and this is true of the other accounts 
of love as well).20 Delaney, for instance, includes a mutual desire for 
“sexual intimacy” as well as a “more sweeping delight in each other’s 
physicality” in his characterisation of the romantic ‘we’, but views this as 
secondary to the desire to identify with the beloved (1996, p. 347). 
In what follows I will consider whether focusing on these features can 
enable us to use Union Accounts to show that romantic love is distinct. I 
will take each feature in turn and aim to show that neither can help us to 
demonstrate that romantic love is unique. This is primarily because both 
physicality and sexuality are not exclusively part of a romantic ‘we’.  
Delaney makes two claims about the non-sexual element of the romantic 
‘we’. First, that when you romantically love someone, “you enjoy 
distinctively pleasurable feelings on seeing or touching your beloved” 
(1996, p. 347). Second, that these feelings “come to transform more intimate 
acts into highly personalised modes of communication” (p. 347).  He is 
referring to the way that romantic couples seem to “both react reflexively to 
each other’s physicality and come to communicate with each other through 
seemingly insignificant visual, verbal, and tactile cues” (p. 347). 
Delaney explicitly claims that there are distinct pleasurable feelings elicited 
by seeing the person you romantically love – and that these are different 
from those “induced by the sight or touch of a good friend” (1996, p. 347). 
He doesn’t explain how they are distinct though. An explanation is needed, 
because the feelings induced by the sight or touch of a good friend look 
similar in two respects. Firstly, the feelings generated by seeing or touching 
a close friend are still pleasurable. We smile when we see a close friend 
                                                          
20 Scruton (1986) is one exception to the rule, although he focuses more on 
arguing that sexual desire is compatible as opposed to antithetical to love.  
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across the room, we are happy and excited when we see them again after a 
long time apart.  
It might be objected that the feelings elicited by the sight or touch of a 
romantic partner are pleasurable in a different way – that they are more 
charged perhaps, or sexual in nature. As an immediate response I do not 
think that we can rule out the possibility that close friends can arouse 
charged, sexual feelings in each other. I will defer a more detailed response 
to the discussion of sexual union below.   
The second reason for thinking that the feelings elicited by the sight and 
touch of a close friend are similar to those elicited by a romantic partner is 
that they also appear to enable personalised communication. I think 
Delaney’s focus is on non-sexual intimate acts when he is talking about the 
communicative nature of visual, verbal and tactile acts. Communicative 
visual, verbal and tactile acts that respond to the physicality of the other 
person however occur both between those who love each other romantically 
and those who love each other as close friends.  
It is not only romantic partners who are sensitive to a slight inflection in the 
voice, indicating disdain; a twitch of the eyebrow that communicates 
amusement; or a gentle nudge on the shoulder to ask you to move away. 
Close friends also pay attention to the physicality of each other, and use 
these type of verbal, visual and tactile cues to communicate with each other. 
The examples just given communicate fairly simple things, but close friends 
can convey much more complex information through these acts as well. 
Consider a case in which a close friend squeezes your hand in a difficult 
situation. There are a multitude of things that can be conveyed by such an 
action; that your friend is there for you, that they empathise with how you 
are feeling, that they know any more physical contact (such as a hug) would 
be unwelcome. You can communicate back, a quick squeeze could say 
‘thank you’, a strong grip could indicate you need their support. Exactly 
what is and can be communicated will depend on the close friends, the 
situation, and other visual, verbal and tactile cues between them. There are 
also spontaneous physical expressions of emotions between close friends: 
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the welcoming hug after time apart; jumping up and down as one (or both) 
receives good news; the high five as a joint endeavour is achieved.  Each act 
communicates that the other feels the same as you (at least).  
It might be objected that there are different, perhaps distinct, communicative 
acts that occur between those who romantically love each other. There are 
things that we typically take to be appropriate within certain relationships, 
that aren’t in others. In contemporary Western societies female friends tend 
to be a lot more tactile than male friends for instance.21 Perhaps there are 
things that we would only do with those we romantically love: stroking their 
hair perhaps, walking hand in hand, or removing a stray eyelash. What we 
take to be appropriate here seems to be a matter of convention, rather than a 
matter of love. There is not much difference in linking arms with a close 
friend, and holding hands with a romantic partner, other than the 
significance we attach to these acts as a matter of social norms and practice. 
The fact that these norms and practices can change over time lends weight 
to this idea.  
Delaney’s account of the physicality of the romantic union appears to be 
struggling to identify it as unique. Both romantic partners and close friends 
feel pleasure at the sight and touch of the other and use physical acts to 
communicate with each other. The unions that both close friends and 
romantic partners desire are therefore likely to both include these features. If 
there is a difference in this respect (regarding what physical actions are 
thought appropriate) then this difference looks like it is located in the 
relationship, and the social norms influencing that relationship (and not in 
the love/union itself).  
What about sex? Delaney includes a desire for sexual intimacy as a feature 
of the romantic ‘we’. There also seems to be a temptation to explain 
differences in the physicality of romantic love and other loves in terms of 
                                                          
21 Thomas (1989) notes that friends bond through physical contact and that 
in the West there is a difference between men and women in relation to this: 
men do “touch … [and] show affection” but not with the “spontaneity … of 
female friendships” (p. 188) as there are more social rules about what is 
acceptable.  
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sex. Perhaps only romantic partners elicit sexually charged pleasurable 
feelings and use sex as a means of communication. If sex and sexual desire 
can be shown to be unique to the union of romantic love, then we might still 
be able to use Union Accounts to show that romantic love is unique.  
Delaney does not elaborate on what this desire for sexual intimacy entails, 
however he is not alone in appealing or referring to the powerful assumption 
that sex, sexual desire and romantic love go together inextricably, nor in his 
failure to provide a fully worked out argument. Nozick for instance 
mentions in passing that sex “mirror[s] and aid[s] the formation of the we” 
(1990, p. 73) and that monogamous sexual desire is “inevitable” (p. 82) 
when the ‘we’ is desired, without providing further argument.  
It is not only Union Accounts that make this assumption. Other accounts of 
love, and of loving relationships also appeal to this connection. James 
Conlon for example states, without argument, that “one cannot love 
romantically without sexual desire” (1995, p. 297). That there is an intimate 
connection between sexual desire and romantic love is however an 
assumption, and one which needs interrogating. Here I focus on the question 
of whether sex and sexual desire can show that the romantic union is 
unique. I consider the more general question of whether the presence of sex 
and sexual desire can show romantic relationships to be distinct in Chapter 
Three (section 3.1.1).  
Whilst we can of course acknowledge that sexual desire is common between 
those who love each other romantically, it is not clear that it is unique to 
romantic love, or as intimately connected as is often assumed. In fact, I want 
to claim that the presence of sexual desire is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the romantic ‘we’. This claim is consistent with 
acknowledging that there is a strong social norm that sexual desire goes 
along with romantic love and that sex occurs within a romantic relationship.  
Let’s take the sufficiency claim first. We can clearly see that the simple 
presence of sexual desire is not a sufficient condition for a romantic union. 
There can be sexual desire without romantic love. If x sexually desires y, 
this does not mean that x desires a romantic union with y (or that x loves y). 
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As Conlon states: “one can certainly desire sexually those one does not 
love” (1995, p. 297). There are clear examples of sexual desire that are 
undoubtedly outside of a romantic union: innocent one night stands and rape 
are two examples on two ends of a spectrum, yet neither is thought to be 
part of (or provide evidence for) a romantic ‘we’.  
It might be objected that this doesn’t quite get to the point. If all love 
involves union of some kind, and we are asking whether there is a distinct 
type of romantic union, there is still the question of whether the presence of 
sexual desire within a loving union is sufficient to make that union a 
romantic one. The examples appealed to previously do not involve any form 
of loving union at all.  
However, very similar examples - one off sexual encounters - still provide 
reasons for thinking that sexual desire cannot be a sufficient condition for a 
romantic union. Consider the case of two close friends, who (I stipulate) 
have (or desire) a loving union with each other. One night the two close 
friends feel sexual desire for each other, and have a ‘one night stand’. 
Intuitively I do not think that we would want to say that this automatically 
makes their love/union romantic. If this is all it takes for close-friend love to 
turn into romantic love then the difference between these two loves is pretty 
thin. It suggests that romantic love can blossom and fade as sexual desire 
comes and goes. This isn’t how we typically think of romantic love: we 
think it is more stable than bouts of sexual lust.  
It might be argued that if these friends then continued to sexually desire 
each other, and to have sex, that their love/union would be transformed into 
a romantic one. I do not agree. Why does the addition of regular sexual 
desire and sex transform the union into a romantic one? Sexual desire is not 
the same as romantic desire and so the mere addition of (reoccurring) sexual 
desire to close-friend love would simply result in a close-friend love plus 
sex (‘friends with benefits’ perhaps). More would need to be said as to why 
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this change - and only this change - is sufficient to transform a close-friend 
union into a romantic one.22  
It is enough to show that sexual desire is not a sufficient condition for a 
romantic ‘we’ in order to claim that the romantic ‘we’ is not unique in 
involving sex or sexual desire. It might still be claimed however that the 
romantic ‘we’ is unique in virtue of requiring the presence of sex or sexual 
desire. In other words, it might be claimed that sex or sexual desire is a 
necessary element of the romantic ‘we’. Again, I do not think that this is the 
case. There can be romantic love without sexual desire.  
Consider the example of an old married couple who no longer have the 
desire for sexual intimacy. It seems that the removal of sexual desire is not 
powerful enough to enable us to say that the couple no longer romantically 
loves each other, especially if all other elements of their union are the same. 
They might still desire physical intimacy (hugs, holding hands etc.), but 
then this type of physical intimacy (and the desire for it) would not look out 
of place in a close friendship. 
It might be objected that their union can only be considered romantic 
because it had a sexual element at some point. The case of asexual couples 
provides a counterexample to this objection. Asexual people are not 
sexually attracted to other people – they do not experience sexual desire. 
They can fall in love and have a romantic relationship.23 If they love each 
other, desire and form a loving union with each other, can the absence of 
sexual desire really allow us to say that their union is not a romantic one? Is 
that really the only difference between romantic unions and other loving 
unions? Intuitively I do not think that it can rest on this distinction alone.24  
Nevertheless if physical and sexual union can be a part of both close-friend 
love and romantic love (because sex and sexual desire are not sufficient for 
romantic love), then it seems that we cannot easily use this feature to show 
                                                          
22 The worry close friends sometimes have, that having sex will alter their 
relationship (in other ways), seems to support this point. 
23 See http://www.whatisasexuality.com/intro/  
24 See Chapter Three, section 3.1.1, for a fuller discussion of why I think 
this is the case.  
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that there is a difference in close-friend union and romantic union. I 
acknowledge that there is a strong social norm to link particular types of 
physicality and sex with romantic love, but then this difference lies in these 
social norms, and it is the norms that we need to look at in more detail (as I 
do in Chapters Three and Four).  
1.4 Summary: Union Accounts  
To conclude the discussion of Union Accounts, I have aimed to show that 
we cannot use Union Accounts of love to demonstrate that there is a unique 
form of romantic love. Union occurs in all forms of love, and it is very 
difficult to demonstrate that the union desired or formed in romantic love is 
unique, whether we characterise it in terms of a shared identity, shared 
interests, or physical and sexual union.  
1.5 Robust Concern Accounts of Love  
The central idea of Robust Concern Accounts is that love is constituted by 
the particular concern we have for the beloved which can be characterised as 
“caring about your beloved for her sake” (Helm 2013, Section 3). It is not 
simply that we are concerned about our beloved’s welfare, but that we are 
concerned about it in a particular, self-less way. Soble defines robust 
concern as follows: “x desires for y that which is good for y, x desires this 
for y’s own sake, and x pursues y’s good for y’s benefit and not for x’s” 
(1997, p. 68). This is sometimes characterised as caring about the beloved’s 
welfare as an end in itself, rather than as a means to another end (for 
instance, to feel good about yourself).  
As Stump (2006) highlights, the idea of robust concern can be found within 
Aquinas’ view of love.25 Aquinas takes love to involve two interrelated 
desires: “(1) the desire for the good of the beloved, and (2) the desire for 
union with the beloved” (Stump 2006, p. 27). The term ‘union’ here 
however is not being used in the same way as it is used in Union Accounts, 
but rather refers to some form of relationship with the beloved.26 In fact it is 
                                                          
25 Caritas in particular, see Stump (2006), p. 27. 
26 See Stump (2006), pp. 30-33. 
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a common criticism of Union Accounts that they cannot accommodate this 
type of concern for the beloved. By emphasising the union between the 
beloved and the lover, it appears that Union Accounts can only explain “x’s 
benevolent concern for y … as a species of x’s natural self-interest, [as] x’s 
concern for himself” (Soble 1997, p. 69).27 
This idea - that love involves robust concern and a desire to be with the 
beloved - is something which modern Robust Concern Accounts also adopt. 
It can be seen in Stump’s (2006) own account for instance, as well as 
Gabriele Taylor’s view which describes love in the following way:   
If x loves y then x wants to benefit and be with y etc., and he has 
these wants (or at least some of them) because he believes y has 
some determinate characteristics Ψ in virtue of which he thinks it 
worthwhile to benefit and be with y. He regards satisfaction of these 
wants as an end and not as a means toward some other end. (1976, p. 
157) 
Taylor’s account is an example of a Robust Concern Account because it 
involves the desire to benefit the beloved (which constitutes a concern for 
her welfare), and the satisfaction of that desire is viewed as an end in itself. 
Can we use Robust Concern Accounts to show that there is a distinct form 
of romantic love? One suggestion might be that this type of robust concern 
only occurs in romantic love. This however goes against our strong intuition 
that close friendships involve love. If love is constituted by robust concern, 
then robust concern occurs in both close friendships and romantic 
relationships. The intuition remains when we consider the characterisation 
of robust concern as caring about the other person’s welfare as an end in 
itself. We care about our close friend’s welfare as an end in itself, and not as 
a means to some other end. We want things to go well for our friends, 
simply for their sakes, and not for any other reason. 
Is there any other way that we can use Robust Concern Accounts to show 
that there is a distinction between close-friend love and romantic love? In 
                                                          
27 Some Union Accounts attempt to accommodate robust concern within 
their accounts (for example, Nozick’s). However, it is not my aim to 
comment on the success of the objection or response here.  
66 
 
what follows I consider whether the desires to both ‘benefit’ and ‘be with’ 
the beloved can be shown to differ in romantic and close-friend love.  
1.6 Benefitting the Beloved  
Whilst both romantic love and close-friend love will involve a desire to 
benefit the beloved (on Robust Concern Accounts) there are three ways in 
which this desire might differ. Firstly there might be a difference in the 
intensity of the desire, in how strongly it is felt. Secondly there might be a 
difference in the importance of the desire, in how important it is that the 
desire is satisfied. Thirdly, there might be a difference in what is taken to 
satisfy this desire. 
Taking the first two possibilities - that the desire could differ in (felt) 
intensity and importance - together, neither of these look like promising 
ways of distinguishing romantic love from close-friend love. It might be 
tempting to say that romantic love will involve more intense desires, and 
view benefitting the beloved as more important. However, we may worry 
about appealing to the degree of intensity and importance as a way to 
distinguish these two types of love. This is because it will be hard to 
measure.  
In order to measure the degree of intensity or importance we would need to 
construct separate scales and establish thresholds (with close-friend levels of 
intensity/importance on one side, and romantic levels of 
intensity/importance on the other). As with any type of scalar account, this 
generates two problems.  
First, we have to pinpoint exactly what the scale is measuring. This is 
particularly difficult when we are dealing with subjective and imprecise 
concepts such as the intensity and importance of desires. Second, we also 
have to establish where on the scale the thresholds lie. It is extremely hard 
to do this without being accused of making ad-hoc divisions. It could always 
be asked why the threshold was not placed a few notches to either side.  
In addition to this, both the intensity of desires, and the degree of 
importance that we attach to desires, are context sensitive. This exacerbates 
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the two problems mentioned above. The intensity and importance of the 
desire to benefit the beloved may well depend on, and alter with external 
factors. For example, the degree of importance someone attaches to 
promoting another’s welfare may well depend on what other loving 
relationships that person also has. If they have a romantic relationship and a 
close friendship, then they may prioritise the romantic relationship, but if 
they don’t, then the degree of importance attached to promoting the close 
friend’s welfare may well be as high as in a romantic relationship. Similarly 
with how intensely the desire to benefit is felt, the existence (or absence) of 
other loving relationships may affect how intensely the desire is felt. This 
suggests that we cannot use the degree of importance or intensity attached to 
this desire, on its own, to demarcate the love involved or (by extension) the 
relationships it occurs in.  
Does the third possibility - that there may be a difference in what is taken to 
satisfy the desire to benefit - look any more promising? Initially it may seem 
so. If there was this sort of difference, then there would be a difference in 
the actions resulting from this desire when we looked at close friendships 
and romantic relationships. However, in order to see this difference we 
would need to look to the relationships themselves, as this is where the 
resulting behaviour would arise.  
Additionally we might think that a difference in what is taken to satisfy this 
desire refers to a difference in the extent to which a close friend will attempt 
to promote the other’s welfare, compared to a romantic partner. If there is a 
difference here however, I think it will again depend on the relationship that 
the love occurs in, and the norms that surround it. What is considered as 
appropriate for satisfying this desire will (at least in part) depend on whether 
the desire occurs in a close friendship or a romantic relationship. For 
example it might be thought to be appropriate for a romantic partner to 
devote a substantial amount of time to benefitting the beloved, whereas we 
wouldn’t expect a friend to do this.  
Focusing on the desire to benefit does therefore appear to provide us with a 
way of using Robust Concern Accounts to show that romantic love is 
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unique. There could be distinct actions, and a distinct level of effort that is 
required to satisfy the desire in romantic love. The only way that we will be 
able to locate these differences and explain what they consist in, however, 
will be by looking at the relationship itself, and the norms influencing it. 
This again suggests that when asking what makes the romantic relationship 
distinct it would be more fruitful to look at the relationship itself, and the 
actions occurring within it, rather than trying to first identify the love that is 
present. 
1.7 The Desire to Be With the Beloved  
Whilst the desire to be with the beloved isn’t strictly a part of robust 
concern, it is commonly a part of Robust Concern Accounts. This isn’t 
particularly surprising, as being with the beloved enables us to come to 
know how to benefit the beloved and provides opportunities to do so. There 
is also the hope that spending time with the beloved will in itself be a good 
for the beloved (and vice versa). Can the inclusion of this desire enable us to 
use Robust Concern Accounts of love to show that there is a distinct type of 
romantic love? It seems unlikely. 
As with the desire to benefit, if love is (partly) constituted by the desire to 
be with the beloved, and both romantic partners and close friends are 
thought to love each other, then both romantic love and close-friend love 
will involve this desire. We can see that this is the case because both close 
friends and romantic partners want to spend time with each other, miss each 
other when they are not around, and arrange their lives so that they can see 
each other. We may make more of an effort to spend time with a romantic 
partner, and we might even think that the ability to spend time with a 
romantic partner - the satisfaction of this desire - is more important in 
keeping romantic love and the romantic relationship alive,28 but 
nevertheless, the same desire is present in love that occurs in both types of 
relationships. As with the desire to benefit, a difference in the degree of 
centrality and importance that the desire to be with typically has in the two 
                                                          
28 The existence of long-distance romantic relationships provides a 
counterexample to this thought. 
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types of love is not going to be easily shown (because it requires 
constructing a scale, identifying thresholds, and will be affected by 
numerous factors), and so it will not enable us to easily differentiate them. 
It might be pointed out here that wanting to be with the other person 
amounts to more than simply spending time with them – it involves wanting 
to have a relationship with them. This also involves wanting to do certain 
activities together, to relate to each other in certain ways, to play certain 
roles for each other, and so on. The desire to have a relationship with the 
other person will be present in both romantic love and close-friend love – 
but the nature of the desired relationship could be different.  
Simon Keller for instance claims that what differentiates romantic love from 
all other types of love is that it “necessarily involves a strong desire to share 
with the beloved a romantic relationship” which is a “loving relationship 
that is intimate, mutual, exclusive, and possibly sexual” and which involves 
spending time with the beloved, “caring whether he loves anyone else” and 
wanting reciprocated love (2000, p. 164).29 The assumption here is that this 
is a unique type of relationship that is desired. When romantic love is 
present, a romantic relationship is desired. When close-friend love is 
present, close friendship is desired.  
If this is the case, then it suggests that we should be primarily looking to the 
relationship, and its features, in order to distinguish romantic relationships 
and close friendships. Looking to the love that occurs in these relationships 
first, and in isolation from the relationship itself, is not going to help us 
define the difference between them. Here, however, I want to note that 
Keller’s characterisation of the romantic relationship doesn’t look 
particularly different from a close friendship (suggesting that it is not these 
types of features that we should be concentrating on).30   
                                                          
29 Keller defends a Properties View of love (that certain properties can 
justify love for a person) but explicitly demarcates romantic love from other 
forms of love in this way. See Chapter Two, sections 2.2 and 2.3, for further 
discussion of the Properties View.  
30 In Chapter Three I argue against behaviour-based accounts of the 
romantic relationship, and in Chapter Four I argue that it is the distinct role 
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Both close friendships and romantic relationships could be described as 
intimate and mutual. They also both involve wanting to spend time together, 
and we can assume that close friends also want their love to be reciprocated. 
I also think it is reasonable to say that close friends care about whether the 
other feels close-friend love for someone else, especially if it was judged 
that the love received or the quality of the relationship shared was 
diminished because others were also loved in the same way. These features 
of a relationship are clearly going to be desired by both close friends and 
romantic partners, and so cannot show the romantic relationship to be 
unique.   
It is Keller’s claim that the romantic relationship is sexual and exclusive that 
might be thought to capture what is distinctive about the romantic 
relationship. However, whilst we don’t usually expect close friends to be 
exclusive, we don’t typically have many close friends, and the reasons for 
this seem to be similar to (at least some of) the reasons for expecting 
exclusivity in romantic relationships – that it just isn’t possible to have a 
romantic relationship or a close friendship with lots of people (it’s too 
demanding). Additionally, there are a number of people who challenge the 
idea that romantic love is exclusive, and defend polyamory as a non-
defective form of romantic love.31  
I don’t think sex can provide the defining element either. As Keller himself 
notes - the romantic relationship is possibly sexual - but it isn’t necessarily 
so. The same can be said for close friendships. There are examples of 
romantic relationships with no sex, and sex outside of romantic 
relationships, so sex is neither necessary nor sufficient for a romantic 
relationship.32 
There may of course be better, more differentiating descriptions of the type 
of relationships desired by both romantic partners and close friends, relating 
to specific activities, feelings, structures and roles. I move on in Chapters 
                                                          
that the participants play for each other that marks these relationships out as 
different.  
31 For example, see Jenkins (2015). 
32 I provide an argument for this position in Chapter Three, section 3.1.1.  
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Three and Four to consider what such a description could be. If there is a 
difference in the type of love that occurs, in virtue of desiring a different 
type of relationship, then we need to look to an account of the relationship 
to find out what that difference amounts to.   
1.8 Summary: Robust Concern Accounts  
To conclude this discussion of Robust Concern Accounts, I have shown that 
we cannot use these accounts to show that there is a distinct type of 
romantic love without appealing to the relationship that it occurs in, and the 
norms that influence that relationship. If there is a difference in what the 
desire to benefit the beloved consists in between romantic love and close-
friend love, then this will depend (and be illuminated by) the relationship 
that the desire occurs in. If there is a difference in the desire to be with the 
beloved (understood as a desire for a particular relationship with the 
beloved) then we need to know what this particular relationship is, before 
we can determine what type of love is present. 
1.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has been guided by the question: what is the paradigmatic 
marital relationship? It has begun to consider what is unique about the prime 
candidate for this role – the romantic relationship. In considering whether it 
is the nature of the love that makes this relationship distinct, this chapter has 
explored whether we could use Union or Robust Concern Accounts of love 
to demonstrate that romantic love is distinct from close-friend love. 
I have argued that we cannot use Union Accounts of love to show that 
romantic love is a unique form of love. Union occurs in all forms of love, 
and it is very difficult to determine whether the union desired or formed in 
romantic love is unique, whether we focus on the idea that it involves shared 
identity, shared interests, or physical and sexual union. 
I have also argued that whilst Robust Concern Accounts can show there to 
be a distinction, they can only do so by appealing to the nature of the 
relationship that the desires to benefit and be with occur in. It is the 
relationship that will determine what the desire to benefit the beloved will 
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amount to, and how this desire can be satisfied. If a particular relationship is 
desired in romantic love, then we need to understand what that relationship 
is before we can identify the love that is associated with it. In order to learn 
what this relationship is however, we will need to look at the relationship 
itself. I turn to this in Chapters Three and Four. Before doing so however I 
will consider whether we can use Valuation and Emotion Accounts of love 
to show romantic love to be distinct, in Chapter Two. 
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Chapter Two  
Romantic Love: A Unique Valuation or Emotion? 
 
This chapter continues to consider whether it is the love that occurs within 
the romantic relationship that makes that relationship unique. It focuses on 
Valuation and Emotion Accounts of love, which view love as a form of 
valuation and a type of emotion respectively. It asks whether we can use 
these accounts to demonstrate that romantic love is a distinct form of love, 
different from the love that is found between close friends. I argue (as was 
the case with Union and Robust Concern Accounts) that neither type of 
account can independently show romantic love to be unique. They either fail 
to enable us to show a distinction, or they can only enable us to demonstrate 
a distinction by appealing to some further aspect of the relationship that the 
love is found within, or the norms that relate to and shape that relationship. 
Whilst this conclusion does not necessarily count against these accounts, it 
does highlight that the single-minded focus on love itself will not reveal the 
distinctive character of romantic relationships. Rather, we should also 
inquire into the other aspects of the romantic relationship. Romantic 
relationships are not distinct simply in virtue of involving a distinct type of 
love. There is more to it than that. 
2.1 Valuation Accounts of Love  
Valuation is commonly taken to be an integral part of love. The people we 
love are particularly valuable to us, and this is linked in some way to our 
loving them. As John Brentlinger notes “all writers on love have argued that 
loving something necessarily implies valuing it” (1989, p. 137). Valuation 
Accounts go one step further. They take love to be constituted by the 
valuation that occurs, and view love as a “distinctive mode of valuing a 
person” (Helm 2013, Section 4). David Velleman for instance views love as 
an arresting “awareness of a value inhering in its object” (1999, p. 360); 
Brentlinger defines it as “intrinsic valuation” (1989, p. 146); and Irving 
Singer states that in “a manner quite special to itself, love affirms the 
goodness of [the beloved object]” (1984, p. 3).  
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There are generally thought to be two different types of Valuation Accounts 
which stand in opposition to each other. The first account states that love 
responds to value already possessed by the beloved. These are Appraised 
Value Accounts. The second claims that love is something that creates or 
bestows value in the beloved. Loving in itself is valuable in these accounts, 
and it is this that creates the additional value in the beloved. These are 
Bestowed Value Accounts. These two different types of Valuation Accounts 
appear to correspond to two traditions of love – Platonic eros and Christian 
agape. Eros is typically characterised as responding to the value found 
within its object and agape is characterised as independently creating and 
bestowing value onto its object in virtue of loving it and regardless of 
whether or not there is any prior value in the object.33  
I will take Appraised Value and Bestowed Value Accounts in turn, and 
consider whether we can use them to show romantic love to be distinct. I 
argue that we cannot, unless we appeal to further details about the 
relationship that the love occurs within.  
2.2 Appraised Value Accounts  
Appraised Value Accounts view love as responding to the value that the 
beloved already possesses. Different accounts see love as responding to 
different valuable things. Velleman (1999) for instance thinks that love 
responds to the value the beloved possesses in virtue of being a (rational) 
human being (the same value that demands Kantian respect). Kolodny 
(2003) claims that love responds to the valuable relationship that the lover 
has with the beloved. A simpler view takes love to be responding to the 
beloved’s valuable qualities, i.e. certain properties that they possess. These 
include things such as physical attractiveness, intelligence and a sense of 
humour to name but a few. Brentlinger expresses this view when he says 
that love (as intrinsic valuation) can arise when “the beloved is thought to be 
                                                          
33 See Soble (1989), xxiii-xxiv. 
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valuable because certain value-making conditions are thought to be fulfilled, 
for example, it is intelligent or beautiful” (1989, p. 145).34 
This idea is exemplified by the ‘Properties View’ of love.35 As presented 
(although not endorsed) by Niko Kolodny, this view states that “the features 
that constitute reasons for loving a person are that person’s lovable 
qualities” (2003, p. 138).36 How might we use this type of account to show 
that romantic love is distinct? I think there are two possibilities. The first 
concerns what is valued in the beloved and the second concerns how the 
beloved is valued. 
Using the Properties View as an example, I first consider whether romantic 
love and close-friend love can be distinguished by the properties that are 
valued in each case. I argue that it is very hard to show there is any 
distinction between the two types of love in this way. I then move on to 
identify what is seen as the characteristic form of valuation in love and 
argue that on such a characteristic view, no distinction between romantic 
love and close-friend love can be found. When we consider the type of 
valuation that occurs in addition to the (characteristic) valuation of love, 
however, a distinction can be found, although this involves an appeal to the 
features of the particular relationship being considered.  
                                                          
34 Brentlinger (1989) claims that love can be either the appraisal or the 
bestowal of value and tries to get clearer on what this distinction really 
means, and how important it really is.  
35 The idea that there are reasons for love, and that a person’s properties 
constitute those reasons, are not exclusive to Appraised Value Accounts 
(they could provide reasons for robust concern for instance). However, the 
Properties View can be understood as an Appraised Value account, or as 
explaining what is valued in Appraised Value accounts, and enables us to 
consider how appraisal might show romantic love to be distinct. There is a 
brief discussion of Velleman’s and Kolodny’s alternative Appraised Value 
Accounts under the subheading ‘Kolodny’s Relationship Theory’ in section 
2.4.3.  
36 There are a number of well-rehearsed objections to the Properties View, 
for example, worries about trading up to a partner with ‘better’ or more 
valuable properties, and worries about the constancy of love in the face of 
changing properties, which I am not concerned with here. See Kolodny 
(2003) for a discussion of these types of objections and Keller (2000) for an 
endorsement of the Properties View and responses to these types of 
objections.  
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2.3 What is Valued in the Beloved?  
On the Properties View love responds to properties in the beloved that are 
taken to be valuable by the lover. Properties such as being beautiful or being 
the person that makes you laugh. Keller characterises the view as follows:  
The properties view says that the question, ‘What justifies your 
choosing to make her the object of your romantic love?’ is a sensible 
question to ask, and that ideal romantic lovers can, in principle, 
answer it by appealing to a set of the beloved’s properties. (2000, p. 
164) 
Keller’s focus is on romantic love, but the same story could be told for 
close-friend love. A close friend could appeal to a set of the other’s 
properties in order to justify their close-friend love, indicating that the love 
is a valuation of and a response to these properties. Can we use this view to 
show that romantic love and close-friend love are distinct, by showing that 
they each respond to different valuable properties (or sets of properties) in 
the beloved? 
The suggestion here is that the valuation (the love) that occurs could be 
different because different things are being valued - certain properties are 
valued in romantic love, and certain other properties are valued in close-
friend love. Consider an example. Hermione is close friends with Harry, and 
in a romantic relationship with Ron. Hermione has her own unique range of 
distinct properties. To make things simple, we shall focus on two – her 
physical attractiveness and her loyalty. The suggestion is that Harry’s close-
friend love might respond to Hermione’s loyalty whereas Ron’s romantic 
love might respond to Hermione’s physical attractiveness. Is this a plausible 
picture, and would it show that the love that occurs in response is different?  
Firstly, the picture does not look all that plausible. It seems reasonable to 
think that the properties which romantic partners and close friends value, 
and which their love responds to, are going to be very similar. For example, 
both romantic partners and close friends are likely to value attractiveness 
and loyalty (as well as things like intelligence and humour). If they value 
the same sorts of things, then this avenue of enquiry is unlikely to identify a 
distinction in the love that is occurring in the two relationships. 
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Secondly, if there are distinctive properties (or sets of properties), it is likely 
that these will be subjective, and will differ among individuals. What one 
person takes to be as a valuable close friend property, or a valuable romantic 
partner property may depend on that individual, and in particular on their 
preferences, their circumstances, the society they live in, their idiosyncratic 
world-view, and so on. It seems likely to be futile to look for one objective 
list of properties corresponding to romantic love and another objective list 
of properties that does not overlap with the first list and that corresponds to 
close-friend love. This suggests that we are unlikely to profit from using the 
Properties View to show that romantic love (as a form of appraisal) is 
distinct from close-friend love.  
2.4 How is the Beloved Valued?  
How do we value someone when we love them? There is a fair amount of 
debate, and confusion over terms, but the common thought is that we should 
value the person for themselves, and not merely for any further valuable 
object or outcome that they might be associated with or bring about. 
Additionally it is generally thought that the reasons for this valuation should 
be things that are integral to that person.  
I utilise Kolodny’s terms to describe how we value someone that we love in 
this chapter. I recognise that his terms and definitions may not fully match 
the customary usage, but his discussion on these topics provides a useful 
structure for what follows, and he covers these two essential aspects of 
valuation with them. The terms he uses are instrumental and non-
instrumental valuation; and final and non-final valuation. We can see how 
he defines three of these terms in the following passage:  
One can value something in different ways. For example, one can 
value X instrumentally - that is, value X as a way of bringing about 
or realizing some distinct Y or some state of affairs involving Y (by 
causing Y, partly constituting Y, or being partly constituted by Y). 
In this case, one values X "nonfinally": one values X, but one sees 
some distinct Y as the source of one's reasons for valuing X … To 
value X "finally," by contrast, is both to value X and to see X as the 
source of one's reasons for valuing X. (2003, p. 150) 
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The fourth term - non-instrumental valuation - can be defined as the lack of 
instrumental valuation, when the beloved is valued for themselves and for 
no further thing that they might bring about.  
Kolodny’s explanation suggests that non-final valuation is always 
instrumental, but he clarifies that this is not the case:  
[N]onfinal valuation need not be instrumental. To take a familiar, if 
morbid, example, consider how we value human remains. We 
believe that we have reasons to treat them with dignity and respect, 
and we are apt to feel anguish or rage when they are mistreated. Our 
valuation is nonfinal insofar as we take the source of our reasons for 
valuing the remains to be not the remains themselves, but rather the 
person whose remains they are. Nevertheless, this valuation is not 
instrumental. We do not view the remains as a way of bringing about 
the person or some state of affairs involving the person. (2003, p. 
150) 
Using these terms the valuation that occurs in love is typically seen as being 
non-instrumental and final: we value our beloved them for themselves (and 
not for some further thing or state of affairs involving that thing) and the 
person in question provides the source of the reason for this valuation 
(rather than the reason being provided by, for example, the relationship).  
We can of course value people in other ways, but these valuations aren’t 
thought to be a part of love. We can value a person both instrumentally and 
non-finally: when we value them for something extra that they bring about 
(such as access to large sums of money), and our reasons for valuing them 
are also explained by some other distinct thing. We can value a person both 
non-instrumentally and non-finally; when we value them for themselves, but 
that person does not provide the reason for doing so. A novel feature of 
Kolodny’s Relationship Theory of love is that it claims this last form of 
valuation is what occurs in love (rather than non-instrumental and final 
valuation), where the relationship (not the person) provides the reason for 
loving someone non-instrumentally.37  
In what follows I will demonstrate that we cannot use Appraised Value 
Accounts, when they take love to involve non-instrumental and final 
                                                          
37 I will consider Kolodny’s account in more detail in section 2.4.3.  
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valuation, to show that romantic love is distinct from close-friend love. I 
will then highlight that when we consider how people are valued 
instrumentally and non-finally within relationships, this can highlight a 
difference in how they are valued in romantic relationships and close 
friendships. This suggests that we should look to other features of these 
relationships, including what we expect of people in these relationships 
(rather than the love in isolation) when trying to determine what makes 
them distinct. However, as noted above, Kolodny’s Relationship Theory of 
love includes non-final valuation as a part of love. I therefore go on to 
consider whether we can use Appraised Value Accounts that include non-
final valuation to show that romantic love is distinct. I argue that we can still 
only do so by appealing to the nature of the relationship that the love occurs 
in.  
2.4.1 Love’s Valuation (Non-Instrumental and Final) 
There are many examples of love being taken to involve non-instrumental 
and final valuation. Brentlinger characterises love as intrinsic (and so non-
instrumental) valuation, where the object of love is valued “in and of itself” 
(1989, p. 137). On Keller’s (2000) account it is the person that is loved, and 
therefore valued, for themselves, non-instrumentally, with (particular) 
properties of the person providing the reasons for love. The idea is clearly 
that the beloved should be valued (loved) for themselves, not only because 
of what they bring about or enable, and the beloved is seen as the source of 
the reasons for this valuation (love).  
If the valuation of love is non-instrumental and final, then the beloved will 
be valued in this way in both close-friend love and romantic love. In both 
types of love they will be valued for themselves, and not for some further 
thing that they bring about or enable. In both types of love, the beloved is 
the source of one’s reasons for valuing (and therefore loving) them. 
Exploring the notions of non-instrumental and final valuation will therefore 
not enable us to show that there is a difference between romantic love and 
close-friend love.  
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This demonstrates that we cannot use Appraised Value Accounts (which 
view the appraisal as involving non-instrumental and final valuation of the 
beloved) in this way, to show that romantic love is distinct.  
2.4.2 Other Forms of Valuation (Instrumental and Non-Final) 
Whilst love is typically taken to involve non-instrumental and final 
valuation, it is not generally thought that instrumental and non-final 
valuation is incompatible with love. It can occur in addition to (or 
alongside) love’s non-instrumental and final valuation. Looking more 
closely at these other forms of valuation highlights ways in which close 
friendships and romantic relationships might be distinct.  
Taking instrumental valuation first, clearly we can value the beloved as 
themselves whilst at the same time valuing them because of other valuable 
things that they bring about. For example, the beloved could also be valued 
for their sunny disposition that brightens up our day, or for their culinary 
skills that we get to appreciate regularly. In addition the beloved could also 
meet particular desires or needs that we have, and be valued instrumentally 
in this way. For example, the desire to have a partner who is tall, dark and 
handsome, or the need for someone who understands our way of thinking.  
Thinking about how the beloved is valued instrumentally highlights that 
there will be a key difference in how the beloved is valued in romantic 
relationships and close friendships. The beloved will be identified as a 
romantic partner or a close friend, because they are participants in 
relationships that are understood to be romantic relationships or close 
friendships. They will be valued as a romantic partner in romantic 
relationships and as a close friend within close friendships. In other words, 
they will be instrumentally valued for their ability to either be a romantic 
partner or a close friend. There is a difference in how they are 
instrumentally valued here, because they are being measured against 
different criteria (i.e. what it is to be a (good) romantic partner or close 
friend).  
This highlights that before we can understand what is distinct about the 
instrumental valuation that occurs in romantic relationships, we first need to 
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know what it is to be a romantic partner. We learn what is expected of 
romantic partners and close friends through the society we live in, and the 
examples that we are provided with. We then relate this information to the 
person that we love, and consider their properties in light of these roles, 
determining whether or not we value them in this way. In order to better 
understand what this difference amounts to - what it means to be valued as a 
close friend or a romantic partner - we need to further investigate what the 
nature of these relationships is taken to be and what is expected of people in 
such roles. The question about the relationship is more basic than the 
question about the valuation. 
Moving on to non-final valuation, we can also clearly value the beloved 
non-finally alongside valuing them finally. We can have reasons for valuing 
the beloved that are external to the beloved at the same time as seeing the 
beloved themselves as providing reasons for valuing them. For example, in 
addition to seeing the beloved as a source of the reasons for valuing her, I 
might also take the relationship that I have with the beloved to be a further 
source of reasons for valuing her (because I also value the relationship). 
Here again, we can see that there might be a difference in the valuation that 
occurs in close friendships and romantic relationships. The different 
relationships (romantic relationships and close friendships) provide different 
sources of reasons for valuing a person. A romantic partner can be valued 
non-finally, where the source of the reason for this valuation is a romantic 
relationship. A close friend can be valued non-finally, where the source of 
the reason for this valuation is a close friendship.  
As with instrumental valuation, in order to determine whether a particular 
instance of this type of non-final valuation is romantic we will first require 
an account of the romantic relationship, and how this relationship differs 
from close friendship.  
This discussion has shown that we might be able to use the valuation that is 
not typically taken to be a part of love - instrumental and non-final valuation 
- to show that there is a difference in the way that romantic partners and 
close friends are valued. This is therefore one potential way in which 
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romantic relationships and close friendships are distinct. This difference 
does not lie in the love that occurs, but in the valuation that occurs alongside 
that love. This difference in valuation depends on a difference in the 
relationship in which it occurs. This highlights that we need to further 
explore the distinct nature of these two relationships.  
2.4.3 Kolodny’s Relationship Theory  
As noted above Kolodny’s Relationship Theory of love is unusual in that it 
treats non-final valuation as a part of love.38  
Love is both a final valuation of a relationship, from the perspective 
of a participant in that relationship, and a nonfinal, noninstrumental 
valuation of one’s “relative”… In other words, love consists (a) in 
seeing a relationship in which one is involved as a reason for valuing 
both one’s relationship and the person with whom one has that 
relationship, and (b) in valuing that relationship and person 
accordingly. (2003, p. 150) 
When we love someone, Kolodny thinks that we value them non-
instrumentally and non-finally. They are valued for themselves, and not for 
any further object or state of affairs that they bring about. However, the 
source of the reason for this valuation is not the beloved, it is something 
distinct: the relationship that the beloved has with the lover. It might 
therefore be suggested that we could use Kolodny’s account to show that 
romantic love is a distinct type of love.39  
                                                          
38 Kolodny is responding to Velleman’s account of love – another Appraised 
Value Account. Velleman views love as responding to the value someone 
has in virtue of being a human being. This value, that everyone possesses, is 
what warrants both Kantian respect for persons, as well as love. Velleman 
regards “respect and love as the required minimum and optimal maximum 
responses to one and the same value” (1999, p. 366). Opponents to this 
view, including Kolodny, are concerned with making sense of the following 
three claims: (a) everyone is valuable; (b) there are reasons for love; (c) not 
everyone is loved by everyone else. Kolodny’s proposal for making these 
claims consistent with each other is to suggest that the source of the reasons 
for love lies in the relationship, rather than the person.  
39 Whether Kolodny can maintain that the beloved is still valued non-
instrumentally (that they are valued for themselves, and not for the 
relationship they bring about) is open to debate. What I say here is meant to 
highlight the worry, rather than conclusively argue against Kolodny’s claim: 
Non-final valuation looks suspiciously like instrumental valuation because it 
posits a separate, distinct ground as the reason for valuation. This seems 
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On his view it is the relationship with the other person that provides the 
reason for loving that person. When comparing romantic love and close-
friend love we can see that there are therefore two distinct reasons for loving 
the other person that occur in the two relationships. One type of love 
involves non-final valuation of the other person where the reason for this 
valuation is a close friendship. The other type of love involves non-final 
valuation of the other person where the reason for this valuation is a 
romantic relationship. 
Kolodny’s account can therefore demonstrate that romantic love is distinct. 
In fact he thinks that it is a particular advantage of his theory that it can 
adequately account for and explain the different modes of love that he 
assumes do occur in different relationships. However, the only way he can 
do this is by appealing to the relationships that the love occurs in. The 
location of this difference is still in the relationships themselves. The 
difference is a result of the love arising out of different types of relationship. 
To understand what this difference consists in, we still need to further 
explore these relationships themselves. We cannot simply say that a 
romantic relationship is distinct because it involves a distinct type of love. 
We need to say more.  
2.5 Summary: Appraised Value Accounts  
The discussion of Appraised Value Accounts which take love to respond to 
the value of the beloved has shown that we cannot (in general) use such 
accounts to demonstrate that romantic love is distinct by considering what, 
                                                          
unnecessary if we value something non-instrumentally, for itself, and for no 
other thing that it can bring about. The valued object already provides a 
reason for this valuation. Additionally, when we value x because of some 
distinct y (as is the case in non-final valuation) then it looks plausible that 
we value x because of the relationship it has to y. This could also be 
construed as a ‘state of affairs involving y’ (which looks like instrumental 
valuation). Consider Kolodny’s human remains example. Human remains 
provide a link to the person who died, and are only important to us because 
of this fact. It seems plausible to claim that ‘providing a link to a deceased 
person’ is a ‘state of affairs involving that deceased person’ - and so the 
human remains look as though they are valued instrumentally - in order to 
bring this state of affairs about.  
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and how, the beloved is valued. For atypical accounts that do enable us to 
show that romantic love is distinct, it was shown that we are only able to do 
this by appealing to the nature of the relationship that the love occurs 
within. This suggests that we cannot use accounts of love alone to show that 
the romantic relationship is distinct. We need to supplement them with an 
account of the different relationships.   
This conclusion is supported by the discussion of the valuation that occurs 
alongside love. This instrumental and non-final valuation is distinct in 
romantic relationships and close friendships, but again, this difference 
depends on the distinct relationship that the valuation occurs in. We 
therefore need separate accounts of these distinct relationships as well.  
2.6 Bestowed Value Accounts  
Bestowed Value Accounts take love to consist in the bestowal of value on to 
the beloved. This bestowal of value is ‘autonomous’, creating value that is 
completely independent of the value that the beloved may or may not 
already possess. This means that an apparently valueless object can be 
loved, and gain value through love.40 An example from Frankfurt highlights 
this idea of bestowal: he claims that our love for our children is not in 
response to the value that they already possess (they might not even have 
come to possess any valuable traits yet) rather, our children “are so valuable 
and important to [us] just because [we] do in fact love them” (1999, p. 
173).41    
Singer’s account of love can be understood as a Bestowed Value Account. 
Whilst he claims that love in some sense involves both appraisal and 
bestowal, it is clearly bestowed value which he takes love to primarily 
consist in: “in being primarily bestowal and only secondarily appraisal, love 
is never elicited by the object … [love is] a new creation of value and 
                                                          
40 This suggests that love may not be ‘for reasons’ or ‘justifiable’ (contrary 
to what the Properties View claims, as seen in sections 2.2 and 2.3) which is 
a concern for some.  
41 Frankfurt’s account isn’t a Bestowed Value Account as he views love as a 
form of caring about someone, but it does involve the idea of bestowed 
value, and this example highlights the idea well.  
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exceeds all attributes of the object that might be thought to elicit it” (1984, 
p. 13). Singer describes love as creating value in the beloved. The value that 
is bestowed on the beloved is “created by the affirmative relationship itself, 
by the very act of responding favourably, giving an object emotional and 
pervasive importance regardless of its capacity to satisfy interests…it is the 
valuing alone that makes the value” (p. 5).  
Can we use Bestowed Value Accounts to show that romantic love is 
distinct? If love consists in the bestowal of value, then wherever love 
occurs, there will be a bestowal of value, whether that is in close-friend 
love, romantic love, or any other kind of love. It would therefore seem that 
we need to focus in on the value that is bestowed and ask if there is any 
difference between the value bestowed in close-friend love and romantic 
love. However, if this question is understood to be about the nature of the 
value bestowed, then it doesn’t really make sense. Bestowing value, at least 
on Singer’s account, is simply to accord someone positive value. As Singer 
notes, bestowal is a type of valuation, but not a type of “evaluation” (p. 9). 
We cannot ask what the beloved is valued for, or how they are valued. They 
simply are valued.  
2.6.1 How much is the Beloved Valued?  
We can however ask whether there is a difference in the amount of value 
bestowed in close-friend love and romantic love – whether we positively 
value close friends more or less than romantic partners. How might we 
determine whether we bestow more or less value on someone? We could 
perhaps look to the things that indicate that value is being bestowed: i.e. 
particular types of behaviour that suggest we value and love them in this 
way.  
The bestowal of value shows itself in many different ways, not all of 
which need ever occur at the same time or in equal strength: by 
caring about the needs and interests of the beloved, by wishing to 
benefit or protect her, by delighting in her achievements, by 
encouraging her independence while also accepting and sustaining 
her dependency, by respecting her individuality, by giving her 
pleasure, by taking pleasures with her, by feeling glad when she is 
present and sad when she is not, by sharing ideas and emotions…by 
sympathising with her weaknesses and depending upon her strength, 
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by developing common pursuits, by allowing her to become second 
nature…by having a need to increase their society with other human 
beings upon whom they can jointly bestow value, by wanting 
children who may perpetuate their love. (Singer 1984, p. 7) 
Perhaps it would be possible to identify a difference in how much close 
friends and romantic partners care about, delight in, encourage, sympathise 
etc. with each other. Perhaps romantic love tends to elicit more instances of 
this type of behaviour, demonstrating that romantic love bestows more value 
on the beloved. Alternatively, it might be the case that certain indications of 
bestowal only occur in romantic love. Perhaps only romantic love involves 
the desire to have children who can perpetuate love. In order to find out 
whether one or both of these options is plausible, and to understand what 
this difference consists in however, we again need to look to further features 
of the relationship, and not simply the love (bestowed value) that occurs. 
We would need to look at what behaviours typically occur in these different 
relationships, in order to see whether they indicate close-friend love or 
romantic love. As such we would only be able to use Bestowed Value 
Accounts to demonstrate that romantic love is distinct if we also appealed to 
other features of the relationship that the love occurs in. 
2.7 Emotion Accounts of Love  
Most accounts of love will include emotion in at least some part of their 
analysis.42 We typically characterise the experience of falling in love as 
involving intense emotions, delight at being with the beloved, despair at 
being separated from the beloved, and all the physiological occurrences 
such as shaky knees and shortness of breath that go along with this. Emotion 
Accounts however take emotions to play a primary, definitive, role in 
explaining what love is.  
 There are two kinds of Emotion Accounts: Emotion Proper Accounts and 
Emotion Complex Accounts. Emotion Proper Accounts take love to just be 
another emotion, akin to other emotions (like fear and joy etc.). Emotion 
                                                          
42 Frankfurt (1999) provides the exception to this rule. He views love as a 
“mode of caring” which is “neither equivalent to nor entailed by any type of 
feeling or cognition” (p. 165). 
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Complex Accounts on the other hand view love as “a complex emotional 
attitude towards another person” (Helm 2013, Section 5.2) and focus more 
on the complex emotional interconnectedness that occurs between people 
who love each other. I will take each account in turn and consider whether 
we can use them to show that romantic love is distinct. I argue, again, that 
they will only be able to do so if we supplement them with an account of the 
relationship that the love occurs within and the norms that influence them.  
2.8 Emotion Proper Accounts  
In order to understand what Emotion Proper Accounts mean by saying that 
love is an emotion, we need to understand first what an emotion is. On the 
(generalised) standard view emotions are “responses to objects that combine 
evaluation, motivation, and a kind of phenomenology” (Helm 2013, Section 
5.1).  They have identifiable targets - what the emotion is aimed at - as well 
as formal objects - the particular evaluation of the target. Take jealousy, for 
example. Jealousy is usually directed at some person or group of persons (its 
target). The target of jealousy is usually evaluated as possessing something 
that the subject (the jealous person) lacks and wants. Emotion Proper 
Accounts view love as a “particular kind of evaluative-cum-motivational 
response to an object” (Section 5.1).  The target is usually a person – the 
beloved. What constitutes love’s formal object (how the beloved is 
evaluated) is up for debate. One suggestion, is that the beloved is evaluated 
as “being worthwhile” (Section 5.1).43  
Hamlyn (1989) provides an Emotion Proper Account. He asks whether we 
can identify love’s formal object in the same way as we can identify the 
formal objects of other emotions. The formal object - the way that the object 
of an emotion is evaluated - restricts the set of possible objects for that 
particular emotion. For some accounts of emotion “to have a given 
emotional attitude to an object … one has either to have a certain sort of 
belief about that object or to see it in the corresponding way, whether or not 
that belief or way of seeing it is in fact justified” (p. 223). Hamlyn uses the 
example of pride. It isn’t possible to “take pride in anything” because the set 
                                                          
43 See Brown (1987). 
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of things we can take pride in is restricted in some way (p. 222). For pride, 
we have to believe, or see the object, as in some way connected to us.  
Hamlyn asks whether we can say something similar for love (and hate, 
which he sees as a parallel emotion). He asks “if one does love x, what 
beliefs must one have about x, and how must one see or regard x if it is 
really to be love” (1989, p. 225)? If love is an emotion, then it seems that we 
need to be able to answer this question. The problem is that “it is very 
difficult to think of any particular belief that the lover must have about the 
beloved, or any way in which the lover must see the beloved” (p. 227). This 
is because a whole variety of attitudes (both positive and negative) about the 
beloved are compatible with loving the beloved. The only thing that seems 
to be necessary is for the lover to “see the beloved object as an object for 
love” (p. 227).  This however is “merely a formal condition of the 
possibility of love” – it doesn’t tell us what the love is for, and cannot 
provide a way of restricting the set of objects that can be loved (p. 227).   
As such, whilst Hamlyn takes love to be an emotion, he thinks that it is 
different from the other emotions. For other emotions, only objects that are 
evaluated in a way that is “appropriate to the emotion” (1989, p. 228) can be 
objects of that emotion. This isn’t the case for love: “With love the 
difficulty is to find anything of this kind which is uniquely appropriate to 
love. My thesis is that there is nothing of this kind that must be so” (p. 228). 
It should however be noted that Hamlyn is talking about love of both objects 
and people in general. When we consider the love (and hate) of persons 
within personal relationships, things usually work differently. For personal 
love, claims Hamlyn, we can identify objects that are taken to be 
appropriate objects of love.  
…we should have no clear understanding of what hatred [and love] 
was in a normal human being if we did not know something of what 
sort of thing is normally an object of hatred [and love] for such a 
being. In consequence, if we think some range of objects as 
appropriate kinds of object for hatred [and love] it is because this fits 
in with our conception of the place that hatred [and love] has in 
human life. (1989, pp. 228-229) 
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On Hamlyn’s account personal love does typically (although not 
necessarily) have a formal object – a typical way that the beloved is 
evaluated. Looking to the types of objects we take to be appropriate for love 
will tell us what this formal object is.  
Can we use this type of account to show that romantic love is distinct? If 
Emotion Proper Accounts show that there is one emotion that occurs in both 
close friendships and romantic relationships then it is clear that this emotion 
will not provide a distinguishing factor between the two relationships. It is 
possible that the same emotion may motivate different responses in the 
different relationships, but this would be a difference located in the 
relationship, and not in the love. We would therefore need to look to the 
different behaviours etc. that were motivated by the emotion in order to 
spell out what makes the romantic relationship distinct. 
If, on the other hand, Emotion Proper Accounts show that there are two 
related but distinct emotions - close-friend love and romantic love - then the 
emotions could be used to distinguish the two relationships, even if the 
relationships appear to be similar in other ways.  
The question we need to ask then is whether an Emotion Proper Account 
can demonstrate that there are distinct emotions of romantic love and close-
friend love. In discussing Hamlyn’s account of love I aim to show that 
whilst we could use his account to show that romantic love and close-friend 
love are distinct emotions, the only way that we can do this is by appealing 
to the different relationships (and associated norms) that the love occurs 
within.  
2.8.1 Is Romantic Love a Distinct Emotion? 
How could we use Hamlyn’s Emotion Proper Account to show that the 
emotion of romantic love is distinct? As was highlighted above, emotions 
are thought to involve particular evaluations of their objects (their formal 
object). Only certain evaluations are thought to be appropriate to particular 
emotions. One way to show that romantic love and close-friend love are 
distinct emotions would therefore be to show that they have different formal 
objects.  
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As illustrated, on Hamlyn’s account any object can be evaluated in any way, 
and still be loved. Yet, Hamlyn makes it clear that he thinks there are many 
different forms of love and suggests that “the nature of the object may affect 
the possibility of given forms of love in relation to it” (p. 225).  This seems 
very plausible when we consider the difference between things and persons 
and the difference between the types of love that we have for them. What he 
says about personal love in particular also suggests that there is a way to 
distinguish romantic love and close-friend love as it provides a possible way 
of limiting the set of objects that are appropriate to each form of love.   
We can take the idea that the appropriate objects of personal love are the 
things that are normally an object of love for humans a little further than 
Hamlyn does, for our purposes. It seems possible that we can distinguish the 
set of objects appropriate to close-friend love and romantic love by 
appealing to the objects that are normally taken to be appropriate for each 
type of love. The set of appropriate objects for close-friend love includes 
those objects that we normally take to be appropriate for close-friend love 
and which fit with our conception of the place that close-friend love has in a 
human life. The set of appropriate objects for romantic love includes those 
that we normally take to be appropriate for romantic love and which fit with 
our conception of the place that romantic love has in a human life. 
When we look to our (Western) society, we can see that close-friend love 
and romantic love play an important role in our lives. They are the emotions 
that are part of important (and apparently conceptually distinct) personal 
relationships that shape and enrich our lives. There are norms associated 
with such relationships, and which govern who we think make appropriate 
candidates for those relationships, and relatedly, the love that such 
relationships entail.  
It seems plausible to suggest therefore that an appropriate object for 
romantic love is someone whom the lover sees as desirable as a romantic 
partner, in virtue of certain character traits. An appropriate object for close-
friend love would then be someone whom the lover sees as desirable as a 
close friend, in virtue of certain character traits.  
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This means that Hamlyn’s account can be used to distinguish close-friend 
love and romantic love, because we can distinguish between what it is to be 
taken as an object of close-friend love and romantic love. For example, 
Hermione’s love of Harry is close-friend love because Hermione takes 
Harry to be an object of close-friend love.  
However, on pain of circularity, we cannot define what an appropriate 
object of close-friend love is in terms of close-friend love. As such, we need 
a separate account of the nature of the close friend relationship (and mutatis 
mutandis for romantic love). It is this separate account that would explain 
why Hermione takes Harry to be an object of close-friend love. We can only 
use Hamlyn’s account to show that there is a distinction between romantic 
love and close-friend love if we have these separate accounts in addition.  
The preceding discussion has aimed to demonstrate that we could use 
Emotion Proper Accounts to show that romantic love is distinct, in virtue of 
being a distinct emotion with a distinct formal object. The only way that we 
can do this however (on Hamlyn’s account at least) is to appeal to a separate 
account detailing the nature of this relationship.  
2.9 Emotion Complex Accounts  
Emotion Complex Accounts, rather than viewing love as another 
independent emotion that should be included on the list of human emotions, 
instead take love to be constituted by a complex emotional interdependence 
between people. This can involve a variety of different emotions proper as 
well as other emotional attitudes (which might not be thought of as 
emotions proper in themselves). On this type of account love is a form of 
emotional vulnerability to another person.  
Emotional vulnerability is often taken to be a feature of love. We saw in 
Chapter One that Nozick’s (1990) Union Account appealed to the idea of 
pooled well-being, which will include being aware of and responsive to the 
emotions of the beloved. Velleman’s Appraised Value Account which 
describes love as an “arresting awareness of value in a person” (1999, p. 
362), views love as arresting “our tendencies toward emotional self-
protection from another person …. [making] us vulnerable to the other” 
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emotionally (p. 361). Kolodny’s (2003) Appraised Value Account also takes 
love to involve being emotionally vulnerable to the beloved, and their well-
being.  
Annette Baier (1991) on the other hand provides us with an Emotion 
Complex Account of Love which takes love to be constituted by this 
emotional vulnerability. She notes that whilst love has often been identified 
as a single emotion, she views it as more like (Humean) sympathy which 
communicates and spreads emotions from one person to another.44 It 
activates certain emotions and responses to emotions in people. She 
describes love as  
… a coordination or mutual involvement of two (or more) person’s 
emotions, and it is more than [Humean] sympathy, more than just 
the duplication of the emotion of each in a sympathetic echo in the 
other. (p. 442) 
The mutual emotional interconnectedness and interdependence is complex.  
It is not just that one takes on an extra set of joys and sorrows to 
one’s own – one does that if one has sympathy for a person over a 
period of time whether or not one loves her. When one loves, one’s 
occasions for joy, sorrow, and other emotions will become ‘geared’ 
in a more complex way… to those of the loved person, and this may 
indeed affect the balance of joy over sorrow in one’s life. The loved 
person’s indifference will hurt, her boredom will disappoint, her 
premature withdrawal will grieve one. (p. 443) 
This highlights that love involves both the recognition of emotion in the 
beloved, and an emotional response to what is recognised. This emotional 
response will include sharing the beloved’s emotion, as one does in 
sympathy, but in addition to this … 
… it is also appropriate follow-up responses to what one knows by 
sympathy that the other is feeling – mischievous delight at the 
other’s temporary bafflement, a frisson of fear at their feigned 
aggression, glory in the other’s surrender. (p. 443)  
Viewing love in this way - as a “special form of emotional interdependence” 
(p. 444) - allows Baier to recognise that it involves both an emotional and a 
                                                          
44 Baier (1991) notes that sympathy in Hume’s sense is more like our notion 
of empathy (p. 442). 
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relational aspect, where the ‘emotion’ of love acknowledges, endorses and 
sustains the relationship had with the beloved.45  
How might Baier’s account enable us to show that romantic love is distinct? 
There are two central features of the account: the emotional interdependency 
between people who love each other in general; and the emotional responses 
that form part of this interdependency in particular. In what follows I will 
take each of these features in turn. Firstly, I will consider whether we can 
show that there is a difference in the extent to which the lover is affected by 
the other’s emotions in romantic love. Secondly, I will consider whether 
there are different emotions (or ranges of emotions) that can be considered 
as appropriate responses in close-friend love and romantic love. 
2.9.1 Emotional Interdependence  
If love involves emotional interdependence, and both close friendships and 
romantic relationships involve love, then the existence of emotional 
interdependence between two (or more) people is not going to help us 
distinguish romantic love from close-friend love. The only way that we 
could use this feature to highlight a distinction between the two forms of 
love is if it could be shown that there is a difference in the nature of the 
emotional interdependence that occurs in romantic love and close-friend 
love.  
Emotional interdependence involves mutual emotional dependence between 
two (or more) parties: X’s emotions respond to Y’s emotions, and vice 
versa. It seems unlikely that there will be a difference in the emotions that 
will cause a response. If there is an emotional interdependence it seems 
likely that all of the emotions of the beloved will affect the lover in some 
way. Or, at least, all of the emotions that the lover can recognise in the 
beloved. This suggests a possible distinction. Perhaps it is the case that there 
                                                          
45 Baier is keen to highlight the risks (as well as the benefits) that such 
emotional interdependence can lead to (for example, heartbreak and 
domination) and this is something that I will discuss further in Chapter 
Eight.  
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can be degrees of emotional interdependence, which relates to the degree to 
which the lover can recognise the beloved’s emotions (or is shown them). 
Being able to recognise emotions in another person can be difficult, and 
requires knowledge about the other person. Whilst some emotions may 
seem to be obviously displayed (a smile indicates happiness, tears indicate 
sadness), others will be harder to interpret (or deliberately concealed). This 
is because some emotions are complex, and closely related, and how we 
express them will be personal to each individual. 
Just how much emotional knowledge and interdependence is present in 
either close-friend love or romantic love is going to be extremely hard to 
pinpoint, and no doubt dependent on the individuals involved. The 
relationship that they have with each other - whether it is a close friendship 
or a romantic relationship - looks as though it will be key, however. As 
Baier notes, the relation between the two people is a key part of the 
emotional interdependence, and so surely the nature of this relation will 
affect the nature of the emotional interdependence. For example, the nature 
of the relationship will affect how intimate it is, and how much knowledge 
is shared.  
This again suggests that we should be looking to the nature of these 
relationships, and not simply the love in isolation, if we want to find a 
distinction. We need to know whether close friendships and romantic 
relationships differ in their level of intimacy, and whether there are certain 
emotions that we think should be shared (or concealed) in these 
relationships. This will likely be affected by social norms and practices 
relating to these relationships within our society which tell us what to expect 
of (and what is expected of us) as romantic partners and friends. This 
suggests that we should also be looking to these norms (as well as the 
relationships they shape) in order to understand what is distinct about 
romantic relationships.  
There is another (related) way that emotional interdependence might be able 
to demarcate close-friend love and romantic love. This concerns the 
importance of this emotional interdependence for the lover’s overall 
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emotional state. Whilst all love may be thought to involve emotional 
interdependence, the extent to which the beloved’s emotions affect the 
lover’s overall emotional state might be thought to be able to differ.  
Baier provides some examples of the beloved’s emotions and the lover’s 
appropriate responses above. For instance, indifference will hurt, and 
boredom will disappoint. We can think of other, more positive examples too 
– interest will delight, and engagement will inspire perhaps. How much it 
hurts, disappoints, delights or inspires will depend on who the beloved is. 
We can imagine that a romantic partner’s indifference will hurt a great deal 
– that the lover’s overall emotional state will be greatly affected by the 
beloved’s emotions. On the other end of the spectrum, we can imagine that 
some people’s indifference, whilst hurtful, can be easily shrugged off and 
ignored – the lover’s overall emotional state is, whilst affected, not greatly 
so.  
Whilst it seems plausible that there is such a spectrum, it might be 
questioned whether the emotional interdependence that occurs at the latter 
end really amounts to love. It also doesn’t appear to provide a clear way to 
distinguish close-friend love and romantic love, as intuitively it seems that 
they would both be close to the former end of the spectrum.46  
2.9.2 Appropriate Emotional Responses 
Can the second central feature of Baier’s account - the appropriate follow up 
responses to the beloved’s emotions - help us to show that romantic love is 
distinct? Can we identify a distinct set of appropriate follow up responses 
for romantic love, and a different set for close-friend love? 
Initially it doesn’t look as though this feature will be particularly helpful for 
our project. It isn’t clear from Baier’s account what makes a response to the 
beloved’s emotion appropriate. Why, for instance, is it appropriate for the 
lover to feel some glory in response to the beloved’s surrender? There are 
                                                          
46 My claim is not that the interdependency of close-friend love and 
romantic love do not lie at different points on the scale. Rather, my claim is 
that if we are looking for a way to distinguish romantic love and close-
friend love then this is not going to be a particularly clear way of doing it.  
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two main reasons why providing an account of appropriate emotional 
responses in love would be very difficult.  
The first reason is that it will involve considering a vast number of infinitely 
variable situations. This is because all possible emotions are compatible 
with love, even the negative ones. As Singer states: “every emotion or 
desire contributes to love once it serves as a positive response to an 
independent being” (1984, p. 8). There are therefore a lot of different 
emotions to consider. Additionally, there will be as many (if not more) 
possible responses to these emotions which will be influenced by the 
specific situations, and the relationship that they occur in. 
The second reason is that determining whether or not a particular emotional 
response is appropriate looks as though it will be largely relative. It will 
depend on a huge variety of conditions, such as the history of the 
relationship, the nature of the relationship, the particular circumstances that 
the emotion arises in, and the individuals involved. 
If there is a difference to be found between close-friend love and romantic 
love that relates to the appropriate emotional responses that occur in love, 
then we will not be able to locate it without a comprehensive investigation 
into the nature of romantic relationships and close friendships. Whether a 
particular emotional response is appropriate will depend on the nature of the 
relationship and the social norms governing that relationship. It will depend 
(at least in part) on how we expect close friends and romantic partners to 
respond to us.  
Even after such an investigation, it may still be too difficult to provide a 
generalised account of what counts as an appropriate emotional response for 
close-friend love and romantic love due to the infinite number of possible 
situations and individual character traits that are involved. Nevertheless, 
considering this feature of love highlights yet again that in order to 
determine what makes the romantic relationship distinct, we need to look at 
the relationship itself and the norms that influence it, not simply the love 
that occurs.  
 
97 
 
2.9.3 Summary: Emotion Complex Accounts 
I have shown in this section that Emotion Complex Accounts can only help 
us to show that romantic love is distinct if they are supplemented by an 
account of the distinct romantic relationship and the norms that influence it. 
Baier’s Emotion Complex Account has two central features: emotional 
interdependence and the appropriate emotional responses that this 
interdependence involves. The discussion of both these features highlights 
how the nature of the relationship (and the associated norms) directly and 
significantly affect the love that is present.  
2.10 Conclusion  
This chapter continued to consider whether it is the nature of the love that 
occurs within the romantic relationship (as the paradigmatic marital 
relationship) that makes it distinct. It explored whether Valuation and 
Emotion Accounts of love could be used to show that romantic love is 
unique.  
I argued that we cannot use typical Appraised Value Accounts to show that 
romantic love is distinct. When considering what is valued in the beloved I 
argued that it is very difficult to show that romantic love responds to a 
distinct set of valuable properties because both close friends and romantic 
partners value similar traits, and what is seen as a reason for love (of any 
kind) will be very personal and subjective. When considering how the 
beloved is valued, I identified that love is typically taken to involve non-
instrumental and final valuation. Neither of these types of valuation 
provided a way to show that the beloved was valued differently in romantic 
love.  
Instrumental and non-final valuation are usually taken to be separate from 
the valuation of love. These forms of valuation did enable us to show that 
romantic partners are valued differently from close friends (but not that 
romantic love is distinct): they are valued as romantic partners, and in virtue 
of the romantic relationship they participate in. Kolodny’s Relationship 
Theory, an atypical Appraised Value Account, could be used to show that 
romantic love is distinct because it incorporated non-final valuation into 
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love. The only way it could do this however was to appeal to the nature of 
the relationship that the love is found in, and to assume that it is a distinct 
relationship.  
I also argued that we could potentially use Bestowed Value Accounts to 
show that romantic love is distinct because they might be able to show that 
romantic love involves a bestowal of more value than close-friend love. The 
only way that we would be able to know that this is the case however is by 
looking to the behaviour that occurs within the relationship and which 
indicates that love is being bestowed.  
Moving onto Emotion Accounts. I argued that Emotion Proper Accounts 
could be used to show that romantic love is a distinct emotion, with a 
distinct formal object, but it could only do this by appealing to the social 
norms surrounding romantic relationships as it is these that will determine 
what are generally taken to be the appropriate objects of romantic love.  
Finally I argued that Emotion Complex Accounts can also be used to show 
that romantic love is distinct. There plausibly is a unique form of emotional 
interdependence in romantic love that involves uniquely appropriate 
emotional responses. Again however we can only show that this is the case 
when the account is supplemented by an account of the romantic 
relationship and the norms that influence it. It is the relationship, and 
associated norms that will affect what emotions are recognised in the 
beloved, and how affected the lover will be by this emotional 
interdependence. It is the relationship and norms that will also affect what 
the appropriate emotional responses are for romantic partners.  
Both this chapter and the preceding one have highlighted that in order to 
answer the question of what makes the romantic relationship distinct, we 
need to take a closer look at the relationship itself. It is not simply the love 
that occurs that makes the relationship unique. This chapter has also 
highlighted that we need to pay closer attention to the social norms 
surrounding the romantic relationship. I undertake both of these tasks in the 
next two chapters. First I will show why I think we should favour a role-
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based account of the romantic relationship in Chapter Three. Then in 
Chapter Four I aim to provide an account of the role of a romantic partner. 
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Chapter Three 
Romantic Relationships: Arguing for a Role-Based Account 
 
The central question of Part One was this: What is the paradigmatic marital 
relationship? We are attempting to uncover the nature of the relationship 
that the institution of marriage is meant to ‘fit’. In our Western society it is 
the romantic relationship that is taken to be the paradigmatic marital 
relationship. So far we have been unable to deduce what is unique or 
distinctive about this relationship. Chapters One and Two have shown that 
we cannot simply look to the love that is present within the relationship; we 
cannot identify the romantic relationship simply as one in which romantic 
love is present. We need to say more.  
In order to understand what a romantic relationship is, and what makes it 
distinct from other very similar relationships (such as close friendships), we 
need a fuller picture. Love is still of course an important element of this 
picture: it is a part of the relationship, and will influence other aspects of the 
relationship in important ways. The previous two chapters have however 
highlighted that we need (in addition to an account of romantic love) an 
account of the relationship itself - the pattern of behaviour and interaction 
over time - before we can understand what makes romantic love unique (if it 
is unique at all). The preceding discussion has also hinted that we need to 
look at the norms and expectations that surround these relationships as well 
as the behaviour that is influenced by them, in order to build up this fuller 
picture.  
As such, the guiding question for this chapter (and the next) is: What is 
distinct about the pattern of behaviour and interaction that occurs in 
romantic relationships (as opposed to other loving relationships)? In this 
chapter I will argue that in order to address this question we need a role-
based account, as opposed to a behaviour-based account of the romantic 
relationship. A role-based account of a relationship will provide an 
explanation of the relationship-role that participants play in that relationship 
for one another. I look at accounts of social roles and suggest ways in which 
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a relationship-role might be analogous. In particular I suggest that an 
account of a relationship-role will have three tiers: an overarching social 
institution or category; relationship roles that relate to this institution or 
category; and patterns of behaviour that are required to fulfil those roles.  
In Chapter Four I begin to build up a role-based account of the romantic 
relationship and argue that it is in virtue of this relationship-role that the 
relationship is distinct.  
3.1 Problems with Behaviour-Based Accounts   
Chapters One and Two have demonstrated that we require an account of the 
romantic relationship, independent of an account of romantic love, if we 
want to understand the nature of this relationship, and what makes it 
distinct. What should such an account look like?  
One option is to provide a purely descriptive account: a behaviour-based 
account. This would involve looking at romantic relationships and 
identifying what typically happens - what kinds of behaviours and 
interactions commonly occur - in that kind of relationship. A behaviour-
based account would claim that a romantic relationship is a relationship in 
which the participants typically behave or interact in a certain way. It would 
then also provide a list of the typical day-to-day behaviours and interactions 
that commonly occur in romantic relationships. This list might include 
things like living together, going on holiday together, being physically and 
emotionally intimate with each other, etc. 
The problem with this type of account relates to the need for this list of 
typical behaviour and interaction. Such a list will be hard to provide because 
romantic relationships are both too unique, and not unique enough.  
They are too unique because each individual romantic relationship will 
likely be very different, due to a number of different factors, including the 
unique characters of the participants and the context in which the 
relationship is formed and maintained. Attempting to identify certain 
behaviours and interactions, or patterns of behaviour and interaction that 
apply to all romantic relationships will therefore be very difficult. For 
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example: some romantic partners may live together, but others may not even 
be in the same country; some romantic partners might do all of their leisure 
activities together, but others may not; and the list would go on.  
Despite this wide variation, it might be thought that we can identify some 
activities that are typically present in most romantic relationships. They 
typically involve sharing some leisure activities, typically involve living 
together at some point etc. Looking at this list we can now see that romantic 
relationships are not unique enough for us to be able to provide a distinct 
and definitive list of romantic behaviour. Other loving relationships, such as 
close friendships, can also involve the sharing of leisure activities and living 
together.  
These problems with constructing a list of typical romantic behaviour and 
interactions suggest that attempting to construct a behaviour-based account 
of the romantic relationship will be futile. It might however be objected that 
we can identify some activities that only occur in romantic relationships. 
Sex seems like the obvious suggestion here – at least in as much as it is 
commonly thought to play this kind of definitive role within the literature. 
As Thomas (1989) notes it is now commonly thought that the (only) 
conceptual difference between close friendships and romantic relationships 
is the following: “romantic partners are involved as sexual partners; friends 
are not” (p. 183). Is sex really the thing that determines whether a 
relationship is romantic or not?  
3.1.1 Romantic Relationships are not Close Friendships plus Sex 
I want to challenge this common idea and argue that the difference between 
close friendships and romantic relationships cannot rest merely on the 
presence or absence of sex. Showing that this is the case then enables me to 
maintain the claim that we should not attempt to construct a behaviour-
based account of the romantic relationship for the reasons stated above.  
Firstly, the mere presence of sex clearly does not produce a romantic 
relationship. Sex does not only occur in romantic relationships, nor only 
between people who like, let alone romantically love each other. There are 
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clear examples of this: sexual abuse, sex that is paid for, and one-night-
stands are just three. 
So, if the presence of sex is to make a difference, it needs to be viewed as 
adding something to an existing relationship. The idea that romantic 
relationships are simply close friendships plus sex takes this view. It seems 
to rely on a particular model of relationships and intimacy. On this model  
…each human self is a discrete substance combining essential and 
unique qualities. All attraction between selves is a desire for union, 
for sharing these qualities, possessing them, taking part in them in 
some way. One can hierarchically order the various types of 
attraction between selves by the essential importance (reality) of the 
qualities shared. 47 (Conlon 1995, p. 295) 
For example, the relationships of colleague and friend can be viewed as 
being at different points on the scale. When colleagues become friends they 
move higher up the relationship scale because their relationship now 
involves more intimacy. They go from only meeting at work and talking 
about work-related things, to spending more time with each other outside of 
work and talking about a wider range of things. Carrying on up the scale, “if 
these friends subsequently became lovers, this change would be interpreted 
in the same manner: as an increase in their degree of intimacy” (Conlon 
1995, p. 295). 
This model is cumulative, which means that nothing of importance is 
thought to be lost as we go up the scale. We simply add more intimacy to 
the relationship (and share in more behaviour that reflects/enables 
intimacy). Sex is a very intimate act. If we add sex to a close friendship, so 
the thought goes, we have added a (or even the final) level of intimacy. This 
transforms the close friendship into a romantic relationship.  
One way to challenge the claim that romantic relationships are simply close 
friendships plus sex (and to demonstrate that we cannot use the presence of 
sexual behaviour to identify a romantic relationship) is to challenge the 
model on which this idea is based. Conlon does just this.48 He claims that 
                                                          
47 Conlon highlights that this is a Platonic model. 
48 Conlon (1995) argues that love and friendship are two distinct forms of 
intimacy that don’t fit on this Platonic model in order to object to the 
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this model misrepresents what happens when relationships change form: it 
misses the fact that something is lost.   
Consider again the example of a colleague turning into a friend on the 
cumulative model. Where they once (as colleagues) talked only about 
professional matters, they now (as friends) discuss personal and emotional 
matters as well. Conlon claims that the cumulative picture ignores the fact 
that “the intimacy that pure professionals have between each other” (p. 296) 
has been lost. Whereas colleagues can discuss professional matters as 
“’unconcerned’ professionals” (p. 296), friends can no longer do this, 
because the nature of the intimacy between them has changed:  
Friends would be continuously conscious of, and concerned about, 
personal factors extending far beyond the topic at hand. They could 
not put these on hold while they discussed professional matters. 
Thus the joys and powers of purely professional conversation would 
be lost to them. (Conlon 1995, p. 296) 
Conlon thinks the fact that we lose something when relationships change 
form suggests that those relationships (and the intimacy involved) are 
different in kind. 
[T]he reality of loss suggests that relationships actually differ not in 
degree, but in kind. They are not steps on the way toward anything 
fuller; they are just what they are, modes of relation, each possessing 
distinct and - sometimes - incompatible strengths and weaknesses. 
(1995, p. 297) 
He proposes an alternative model of intimacy. On this model “each type of 
intimacy is a perspective on, creates an interpretation of, the sharing of 
selves” (1995, p. 297). He uses an analogy of literary genres to better 
explain this idea:  
                                                          
common claim that “that one’s spouse is also one’s closest friend” (p. 295). 
He doesn’t use this argument to show that sex is not a definitive feature of 
the romantic relationship, and in fact claims (but does not argue) that 
romantic love has an “inextricable sexual component” (p. 297). What I say 
here is meant to show that we cannot use a behaviour based model that takes 
the romantic relationship to be close friendship plus sex to identify what 
makes the romantic relationship unique. There is a further question as to 
whether romantic relationships are inextricably sexual which I don’t address 
here. I think the example of asexual couples does however provide a 
counterexample to this thought.  
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Each type of relationship (colleague, friend, lover, and so on) is like 
a literary genre (poem, novel, play). Obviously, differences between 
genres do not represent steps toward a perfect and complete artistic 
expression… Rather, they are just different ways of doing it. (1995, 
p. 297) 
On Conlon’s model, friends and lovers have different forms of intimacy 
with each other – forms which are incompatible. This means that the 
intimacy of friendship cannot be understood to cumulatively lead onto the 
intimacy of romantic love. They are different in kind. As Conlon puts it 
(borrowing C. S. Lewis’ imagery) “we picture friends side by side and 
lovers face to face” (Conlon 1995, p. 298). This difference makes them 
incompatible. People cannot stand side to side and face to face at the same 
time.  
Viewing romantic relationships as close friendships plus sex suggests that 
romantic relationships are just a slightly more intimate version of close 
friendships. Conlon’s argument shows that this isn’t the case: it 
demonstrates that the difference between close friendships and romantic 
relationships is more than sex. The level of intimacy that the presence of sex 
is meant to represent, is not in fact there to be represented. Romantic 
relationships are a completely different form of intimacy. 
In addition to this, the fact that it seems possible to have a romantic 
relationship without sex, also challenges the close-friendship plus sex view. 
Consider Romeo and Juliet – their relationship is paradigmatically romantic 
despite the fact that they never have sex. There are also numerous examples 
of romantic couples who don’t have sex until they are married, and of 
married couples who continue to have a romantic relationship even though 
they have stopped having sex. Someone that wants to hold on to the view 
that romantic relationships are close friendships plus sex would need to 
provide a strong argument as to why romantic relationships minus sex (such 
as those in the examples) are in fact close friendships.  
Sex therefore cannot play the definitive role that is suggested by the ‘close 
friendship plus sex’ view of romantic relationships, and so a behaviour-
based account that aligns with this view (where sex is only on the romantic 
relationship list, whereas all other behaviours can be on both close 
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friendship and romantic relationship lists) is not going to aid us in 
identifying what is distinct about a romantic relationship.49  
How then are we going to explain the difference between romantic 
relationships and close friendships in a way that enables us to i) encompass 
the vast variety of behaviour that occurs within individual romantic 
relationships; ii) identify the romantic relationship as a distinct relationship 
type; and iii) not characterise the romantic relationship as close friendship 
plus sex. I propose that a role-based account enables us to do this. 
3.2 Role-Based Accounts  
Rather than focusing on, and describing, the behaviour that typically occurs 
within a relationship, a role-based account defines a relationship in terms of 
the norms governing the relationship. This is analogous to an account of 
playing the role of a character in a play. There are certain norms that govern 
how to play a role. If an actor violates these norms, then he fails to play the 
role in question. For example, when an actor plays Romeo he ought to recite 
the lines in the order found in the script of Romeo and Juliet; he ought to 
treat the others actors on stage, and respond to them, as their characters (and 
not the individuals playing those roles); he ought to be dressed in his 
costume and not his usual clothes, and so on. If he violates one of these 
rules then he fails to play the role of Romeo.  
Moving back to relationships, this role-based approach allows us to 
distinguish between the purely biological relationship of X being Y’s 
offspring and the normatively salient relationship of Y being X’s parent. 
These are importantly different, as the example of adoptive parents 
                                                          
49 It might be suggested that whilst sex can occur in both close friendships 
and romantic relationships, only romantic relationships involve committed 
or exclusive sexual activity. If we understand this as a claim that romantic 
relationships are just close friendships plus committed or exclusive sex, then 
we can still use Conlon’s argument to argue against the model this is based 
on. For a further argument that claims exclusive sex cannot provide the 
conceptual difference between romantic relationships and close friendships 
see Thomas (1989). 
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highlights. The latter relationship is defined in terms of the norms that 
govern it, the former is not.  
A role-based account will provide an account of relationship-roles in terms 
of what occupants in those roles ought to do as inhabitants of those roles. It 
may base these norms on what behaviour is typically taken, within the 
society in question, to fulfil this role or it may be a critical analysis of the 
relationship role and specify some account of what norms ought to define 
the relationship. For example, a parent should (among other things) look 
after their children, or more specifically, they should provide material and 
psychological care for their children. Friends ought not to accommodate 
each other’s casual racism and sexism, although it might in fact be the case 
that they do.  
In the case of the romantic relationship, it will detail the role of a romantic 
partner in terms of norms spelling out how to be a romantic partner (which 
may be the behaviour that is typically taken to fulfil the role of the romantic 
partner or may also include certain critical additions or exclusions). The 
claim that I want to explore - and begin to defend - is that romantic 
relationships are distinguished as romantic by the norms constituting the 
role of a romantic partner. It is these norms, rather than the behaviour 
governed by them, that we should use to give an account of the romantic 
relationship (the paradigmatic marital relationship).50  
I think it is fairly uncontroversial to suggest that relationship-roles, 
including the role of a romantic partner, exist. I think that we understand 
there to be a difference between these relationship-roles. I also think it is 
reasonable to say that we understand what it means to play a relationship-
role, and that generally we understand what is required by particular 
relationship-roles (such as the role of a parent, teacher, spouse, friend or 
romantic partner) within the society we live in. Although there may of 
course be situations where it isn’t always clear how, or how best, to fulfil 
the role that we are occupying (perhaps because of competing roles that we 
                                                          
50 I think something similar could likely be said for other personal 
relationships, such as friendships.  
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also occupy). Despite these intuitions, relationship-roles do not seem to 
have been explored fully as a way of describing the romantic relationship.51  
3.3 The Structure of a Role-Based Account: Two Accounts of Social 
Roles   
In order to better understand what a role-based account of the romantic 
relationship will look like, I suggest that relationship-roles are similar to 
social roles, and could have similarly structured accounts. In this section I 
will introduce two accounts of social roles drawn from the work of 
Laurence Thomas and Stefan Sciaraffa before considering how relationship-
roles might have a similar three-tiered structure.  
Thomas’ (1987) account highlights how social roles influence our behaviour 
whereas Sciaraffa’s (2009) account explains what these roles are. Both 
accounts involve three tiers: the social institution at the top; the social roles 
that fit within that institution in the middle; and the patterns of behaviour 
taken to fulfil those roles at the bottom.52 
3.3.1 Thomas’ Account  
Thomas claims that most of our social interaction with each other is 
influenced by the social roles that we occupy.53  Role governed behaviour 
and interaction occurs 
whenever there are well-delineated modes of behaviour which are 
generally expected of a person, given the position which he occupies 
in an institutional structure (for example, professor or student) or the 
significant social category in which he falls (for example, member of 
a gang or affluent class); and the primary explanation for the 
person’s behaviour in a given situation is that he occupies an 
                                                          
51 There is some discussion of the role of friends. For example see Annis 
(1987) and Jollimore (2000). 
52 We can imagine this either as a pyramid with the social institution at the 
top, or as a branching hierarchy with the a single social institution on the 
left, leading to a number of different social roles, which each in turn lead to 
a number of different patterns of behaviour.  
53 I draw on Thomas’ (1987) paper “Friendship” in which he aims to explore 
this relationship in more detail. This exploration involves an account of 
social interaction in order to contrast the interaction of friendship with other 
forms of interaction. I focus on his account of social interaction here but 
comment on his contrast in section 3.4.4.  
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institutional position or falls into a social category of which the 
preceding is true. (1987, pp. 227-228) 
We can see from this quote that Thomas has a three-tiered structure in mind. 
There is a social institution or category at the top. Underneath this, there are 
individual social roles that sit within this institution or category. At the 
bottom, there are then the patterns of appropriate behaviour for each 
individual social role.  
The idea is that the role that is being occupied specifies “what the 
appropriate forms of behaviour are for the individuals over whom they 
range” (Thomas 1987, p. 228). Social expectations about what these roles 
entail influence individual’s behaviour. However, for Thomas, the roles do 
not dictate exactly what behaviour should occur - “most social roles … can 
be and are played out in a variety of ways” (p. 228). This is because they are 
being played by unique individuals in different circumstances and contexts, 
and in conjunction with a different set of other social roles. This flexibility 
is due to individual variation in how we understand the roles (the middle 
tier), and what is taken to fulfil these roles (the bottom tier) in particular 
circumstances.  
The parent role again provides a paradigm example. There are well-
delineated modes of behaviour that are required of parents given the fact 
that they are in the parenting role, and this role governs their behaviour 
towards their children. Exactly how this role is played out will vary in 
individual cases. The role involves caring for your child, but some parents 
might think this requires protecting the child from all dangers, whereas 
others might think that they need to be exposed to some dangers in order to 
learn how to look after themselves. 
3.3.2 Sciaraffa’s Account  
Sciaraffa thinks that we are all aware of a number of social roles, including 
“mother, father, professor, club football coach, [and] citizen” (2009, p. 107) 
and like Thomas, notes that much of our behaviour and interaction is 
governed by the roles that we occupy. He is interested in explaining how 
and why these roles appear to bind us – why we feel that it is our duty to 
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behave in the ways that these roles dictate. Here however I want to focus on 
his account of what these roles, and the behaviour they dictate, are (rather 
than on his reasons for their bindingness). He also has a three-tiered account 
with social institutions at the top, social roles in the middle, and the required 
patterns of behaviour at the bottom.54   
Sciaraffa views social roles and their associated patterns of behaviour in a 
manner that is akin to the way that legal positivists (like Hart) view laws – 
i.e. as “social facts” (2009, p. 108). He explains that on Hart’s account the 
social facts that constitute legal norms are “social rules” (p. 108). A social 
rule is “constituted by a pattern of convergent behaviour among a group” (p. 
108), but in addition (in order for this pattern of convergent behaviour to be 
a social rule within a group rather than simply a habit) deviations from the 
pattern must be typically criticised by the group and the group must take the 
pattern of behaviour to be a standard that they should all meet.55 
Sciaraffa uses the following example: “members of a group must habitually 
remove their hats in church for it to be the case that there is a social rule 
within the group of removing one’s hat in church” (2009, p. 108). In order 
for this to be a social rule (and not just a habit) not removing your hat in 
church must be habitually met with criticism and each member of the group 
must think that removing your hat in church is something that everyone in 
the group should do.  
Relating these ideas back to Sciaraffa’s account of social roles, we need to 
start at the bottom of the three tiers with the required patterns of behaviour. 
Sciaraffa views these as “clusters of [Hartian] social rules that are taken to 
apply to persons who occupy certain roles within society” (2009, p. 109). 
When you occupy a social role, you should comply with the required pattern 
of behaviour (the social rules), and will be criticised for not doing so. Each 
individual social role has a particular required pattern of behaviour. The 
                                                          
54 Sciaraffa uses the term “role duties” (2009, p. 108), but as he views these 
duties as normatively inert in themselves (until/unless they are identified 
with) I think it will be less confusing to refer to them as required patterns of 
behaviour. 
55 See Hart (1994), pp. 55-58. 
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existence and content of this required pattern will be “determined by social 
practices” (p. 109), which includes the social institution that it is found in. 
Sciaraffa takes social institutions to have an overarching aim or purpose. 
Within a single social institution there will be various social roles which 
together help to fulfil this overarching purpose. For example, the “professor 
fulfils a particular role within the university that together with other social 
roles in the university fulfils the university’s ends” (Sciaraffa 2009, p. 109). 
In addition to universities, Sciaraffa counts the “family, the state, and 
various places of employment and association within civil society” as 
examples of social institutions (p. 109).  
Fleshing out the example of the professor’s role should help to illuminate 
this idea. The role of the professor sits within, and aims to partially fulfil the 
aims of, the institution of the university. In our society this role involves an 
expected pattern of behaviour which typically includes lecturing, leading 
seminars, grading assessments, researching and writing. It is these actions 
that are “widely taken to be standards that persons occupying the role ought 
to meet, and deviations [from this behaviour] by persons occupying the 
professor role are taken to be a reason for criticism” (Sciaraffa 2009, p. 
109). 
The role of a doctor is another useful example. This role sits (alongside 
other roles, such as that of nurses, health care assistants, administrators, etc.) 
within the institution of a health care system which has the overarching 
purpose of providing healthcare to the society in which it is situated. The 
role of a doctor helps to meet this overarching purpose, and has a pattern of 
expected behaviour that relates to this – seeing patients, diagnosing 
illnesses, prescribing medication etc. Or looking at it the other way – pattern 
of expected behaviour X exists, and has the content that it does (e.g. 
see/diagnose/prescribe) because we have social role Y (the doctor) that is 
part of the social institution Z (healthcare system).  
3.3.3 The Three Tiers 
These two accounts show that there is a three-tiered structure that social 
roles sit within. First, there are social institutions (or categories). These 
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institutions (or categories) are made up of a system of social norms, 
including a number of different social roles. Each particular social role then 
has an associated pattern of required behaviour which is taken to fulfil this 
role.56 
3.4 Relationship-Roles: Borrowing the Three-Tiered Structure 
My suggestion is that relationship-roles (including the role of a romantic 
partner) fit into a similar three-tiered structure. The general idea is that there 
are patterns of required behaviour, governed by a set of social norms, and 
that this set of social norms constitutes a relationship-role. If certain norms 
apply to an individual, then ipso facto, they occupy a particular relationship-
role. For example, if someone is required to give lectures, do research, and 
mark assessments then ipso facto they are occupying the role of a professor. 
The norms constituting relationship-roles are in part determined by the 
institution of which they are part. For example, the norms constituting the 
role of a professor are partially determined by the professor role being a part 
of the institution of the university.  
Consider again the two different ways that we can think about familial 
relationships. We can describe the relationships of parent, grandparent, 
brother, sister, aunt etc. using purely biological categories. For example, we 
can describe siblings in the following way: A and B are both the offspring 
of X and Y. Once we shift to the normative viewpoint however, we then 
need to use terms given to us by the social institution of the family. So, for 
example, if someone is required to look after a child in a certain way 
(providing material and psychological care for example) then ipso facto they 
are the child’s parent. The different familial roles (of parent, grandparent, 
sister, etc.) are governed by different norms, which require particular 
                                                          
56 I am interested in the structure of these accounts here. As such I do not 
endorse Sciaraffa’s claim that social institutions have overarching aims or 
purposes (a teleological view). This is only one way of viewing social 
institutions (understood as systems of social norms) – an alternative would 
be a collective-acceptance view (for example, Tuomela 2007) that 
understands social institutions to be “created and maintained by collective 
acceptance” (Miller 2014, Section 3). 
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patterns of behaviour, and which are (partially) determined by the familial 
institution.  
3.4.1 Institutions 
Social institutions are systems of social conventions, rules, rituals, and 
norms (Miller 2014, Section 1). Some social institutions are organisations, 
such as hospitals or governments; others, such as the English language, are 
not (Section 1). Social roles can fit into both sorts of institution (for 
example, the role of a doctor, and the role of an English language speaker).  
When building up accounts of social roles the social institution in which 
they sit is often a good place to start. As we saw in the accounts above we 
can say something about what these social roles look like by considering the 
institution that they are found within (and the other social norms etc. that 
make up that institution). This is because they fit within, and align with, the 
institution as a whole. For example, when we want to build up an account of 
the role of a professor we can begin by looking at the institution of the 
university in which this role sits. The role of a professor fits with the other 
social norms etc. that make up that institution and which make it an 
institution of research and learning. 
Relationship-roles are clearly not part of an organisation, like a hospital or a 
government. There do however appear to be (non-organisational) systems of 
social conventions, rules, rituals and norms which relate to (and incorporate) 
relationship-roles such as the role of a romantic partner and the role of a 
friend. When we think of friendship there are certain things that we will 
typically do with our friends, there are ‘rituals’ such as buying rounds in the 
pub, and conventions such as inviting friends to birthday parties. With 
romance we can think of things that are only considered appropriate within 
a romantic relationship, there are scripts that people enact (dating for 
instance), and conventions such as chocolates and flowers being regarded as 
romantic gifts. Both of these examples could be described as a system of 
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social conventions, rules, rituals, norms and roles: as the social institutions 
of ‘friendship’ and ‘romance’.57  
These institutions are less well defined than, for example, the institution of a 
university, and it isn’t as clear what unifies the social norms into one system 
(institution). This means that the social institution will be a less fruitful 
place to start when building up an account of (non-familial) relationship-
roles. As a result when we come to build up an account of a (non-familial) 
relationship-role, we need a different approach. We need to start with the 
relationship-role itself (rather than the institution). 
3.4.2 Roles  
Consider the ‘practice’ of promising (Rawls 1955). In a particular practice 
there are “rules setting up offices, specifying certain forms of action 
appropriate to various offices, establishing penalties for breach of rules, and 
so on” (p. 25). These are the constitutive norms of the practice. The practice 
of promising contains the roles of promisor and promisee (in some 
institutional cases, such as the practice of law, the term ‘offices’ may be 
more appropriate). The constitutive norms of the practice of promising 
establish this role, and they do that in part by stipulating the obligations, 
rights, and so on, governing the occupant of that role. For example, it seems 
that one rule constituting occupation of the role of promisor is: ‘if an agent 
knowingly and sincerely utters a promising phrase, that person must 
perform the promised action, unless released by the promisee’.  
Rules that define practices are logically prior to any particular instance of 
that practice – they are the necessary “stage-setting” for performing those 
actions: “given any rule which specifies a form of action …a particular 
action which would be taken as falling under this rule given that there is the 
practice would not be described as that sort of action unless there was the 
practice” (Rawls 1955, p. 25). You cannot make a promise without there 
                                                          
57 See Chapter Four, section 4.4.2, for a discussion of ‘romance’ being the 
social institution for the role of a romantic partner.  
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first being the practice of promising. You cannot be in the role of promisor 
or promisee without that role first being established.  
Another helpful analogy is to think of the rules of a game: game rules define 
what the game is (whether it’s chess or snap for example) and how to play 
that game (by moving certain pieces in a certain way across a board, or by 
placing cards in front of you). To play the game, the rules have to first be in 
place, and you then have to comply with those rules (otherwise you are not 
playing that particular game).58 Just as you cannot ‘checkmate’ without the 
rules of chess, you cannot be a friend without the role of a friend.  
Similarly relationship-roles (like social roles) are made up of constitutive 
norms – norms that define what the relationship is, and how to be an 
occupant of the relationship-role. These roles have to be established prior to 
anyone occupying and fulfilling them. Constitutive norms specify what a 
person in that role should and should not do (as well as the acts that are 
permitted), they set up the rights and obligations (or responsibilities) a 
person occupying that role has, and they specify who they have those rights, 
obligations, and so on towards. Someone becomes an occupant of that role 
by conforming to the constitutive norms, in engagement with someone else 
who is also conforming to the norms of the relationship. Just as there needs 
to be a promisee in order for someone to occupy the role of promisor, you 
cannot occupy the role of a friend without there being someone you are 
playing that role for (and who also conforms to the norms of the 
relationship).  
Consider, again, the role of a parent. The constitutive norms of this role 
specify how one becomes a parent, and the rules of that role – the rights and 
duties that parents have. To be a parent (in the normative rather than the 
biological sense) is for these constitutive norms apply to you. You are a 
parent when you have entered that role in a specified way (for example, as a 
birth parent, or through adoption) and when you are required to comply with 
                                                          
58 See Suits (2014) for a definition of playing a game which includes 
constitutive rules: “one cannot (really) play the game unless one obeys the 
rules of the game” (p. 26).  
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the constitutive norms of that role. For example, when you have the 
obligation to raise and look after your child. Similarly, you cannot be in a 
romantic relationship (or friendship), nor be a romantic partner (or a friend), 
without first taking on that role for someone (in the specified way) so that 
the rights, duties etc. of that role apply to you.  
3.4.3 Patterns of Behaviour  
The constitutive norms of the institution determine what is in each set of 
rules (rights, duties etc.) that defines a particular role. When someone 
occupies a role they must act in a way so as to comply with this set of rules:  
this is the required pattern of behaviour for that role. A professor, for 
example, must conduct research and educate her students.  
As Thomas (1987) notes however, the constitutive norms of a role won’t 
necessarily dictate exactly what behaviour is required.59 They don’t specify 
exactly how research should be conducted, or how students should be 
educated, for example. Roles are “interpretative” (Hardimon 1994, p. 355, 
emphasis added), which means that people can disagree about what 
behaviour is required, and find a way of fulfilling a role so that it suits them. 
This means that a variety of different patterns of behaviour can fulfil the 
same role.  
However, it does not mean that we can “custom tailor the obligations [we] 
undertake” (Hardimon 1994, p. 356) when we enter a role. A role may 
contain options but “those options are fixed by the role”, and signing on for 
the role involves signing on “for the whole package, properly understood” 
(p. 356). Hardimon is talking about social roles (for example, the role of a 
professor or doctor), but the same applies for relationship-roles.  
In addition to the constitutive norms of a role there are also regulative 
norms.60 These determine what it is to fulfil a role in better or worse ways. 
                                                          
59 See Section 3.3.1. 
60 The distinction between “constitutive” and “regulative” rules in the 
literature is fairly common. David Lewis, for instance, makes use of it in 
Lewis (1979) p. 343. Kenneth Ehrenberg suggests - following Joseph Raz 
(1975) - that we should understand this distinction not as distinguishing 
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They concern how someone discharges the obligations of their role. 
Regulative norms (for the same role) can be different in different contexts, 
and they can change over time. Whilst it used to be the case that a professor 
fulfilled his role well by grading hand-written papers and giving lectures in 
person, professors can now discharge their role well by monitoring online 
discussion forums and giving webinars.  
Relationship-roles are similar. In addition to the required pattern of 
behaviour (determined by the constitutive norms of the role) there are 
regulative norms which determine how to fulfil this role well, although 
these might be more numerous and vague. Consider, again, the role of a 
parent. A parent is required to care for their child (this is a constitutive 
norm). In certain contexts, such as a particularly sunny day at the beach, 
there are various ways in which this duty can be can be done well: applying 
sun-cream to their child, or taking them into the shade for instance.  
Different roles (formed of different constitutive norms) can have (some of) 
the same regulative norms. Both a professor and a graduate teaching 
assistant will fulfil their roles well by grading papers and leading seminars. 
Thinking about sport can help to illustrate this point. Consider the two 
different sports of rugby union and rugby league. These two different sports 
are formed of different constitutive rules; but there are a number of 
regulative norms (the directions for how to play well) that are the same, for 
example, running quickly, kicking accurately, aiming to place the ball over 
the line etc. 
The same can be said for relationship-roles – there will be different 
behaviours, governed by regulative norms (for example, living together) that 
contribute to fulfilling different relationship-roles well.  
 
 
                                                          
“two different types of rules” but as two different ways of describing “a 
rule’s use” (Ehrenberg 2018, p. 5).  
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3.4.4 Some Notable Differences between Relationship-Roles and Social 
Roles  
So far I have been highlighting the similarities between social roles and 
relationship-roles in order to build up an account of a relationship-role as a 
set of constitutive norms (which define the role and govern how to be in that 
role), which fit within a social institution of some sort, and which have 
regulative norms that direct individuals in how to fulfil the role well. I claim 
only that social roles and relationship-roles are similar enough for the 
analogy to be a help rather than a hindrance. It illuminates the social nature 
of our personal relationships,61 and shows how our behaviour and 
interaction is governed. There are however some differences which are 
worth highlighting. 
Thomas (1987) claims that the interaction that occurs within “companion 
friendships and romantic loves” (p. 219) is different to most other forms of 
social interaction in that it is not governed by social roles, nor in fact any 
social rules at all. If the latter part of this claim is true, then it would 
challenge both my claim that there are relationship-roles, and that they are 
akin to social roles in the way I suggest.  
Thomas does not explicitly argue for this claim. His aim is after all to 
explore the nature of friendship, and his remarks about social interaction are 
there to illuminate his claims on this score. He doesn’t provide any reasons 
for thinking that his claim is true, but he does provide goods reasons for 
thinking that the interactions between those in romantic relationships and 
close friendships is different from the interactions that occur within social 
roles – that they are somehow freer, and less determinate. These reasons 
will help me to show in what way relationship-roles are different to social 
roles.  
                                                          
61 They are social - or socially constructed - in the sense that they are 
“socially distinguished, socially constituted, and socially caused” 
(Haslanger 2012, p. 197). We make a distinction between different types of 
personal relationships for social purposes, the conditions for something 
being a particular type of personal relationship (or not) are social features, 
and the differences between relationship types is socially caused.  
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The following passage highlights the differences that Thomas sees:  
[P]recisely what distinguishes the interaction characteristic of 
companion friendships (and loves) from other forms of social 
interactions is that none of the social roles which friends occupy 
serve as the primary basis for their interaction. It is not primarily 
because they are fellow employees or have entered into a client-
lawyer relationship, or some such thing, that friends interact with 
one another. Rather, the raison d'etre for their interaction is the 
delight they take in being with one another. It follows, then, that the 
expectations of others as refracted through the prism of social roles 
minimally, if at all, influence the way in which friends interact with 
one another. (Thomas 1987, p. 230) 
The claims he makes here seem reasonable. With most social interaction, 
the roles that we occupy provide the reason for the interaction. We interact 
with people as a part of fulfilling our role: Dr Jones interacts with Sally (her 
patient) because that is what her role dictates. There would be no other 
reason for her to interact with Sally.  
The reasons for interaction in romantic relationships and close friendships 
looks different. There are two ways in which occupying a role could be the 
reason for interaction within personal relationships, and neither seems 
correct. First, we do not interact with our friends because of any particular 
social roles (for example, doctor, teacher, parent) that they happen to 
occupy.62 Second, we do not interact with our friends because we occupy 
the relationship-role of a friend for that person. We don’t first take on the 
friend-role, and then for that reason, interact with our friend. Rather, as 
Thomas claims, we interact with our friends because we enjoy being with 
them, and want to interact with them. Relationship-roles don’t appear to 
provide the initial reason for interaction to occur.  
If a particular social role does not provide the reason for interaction in close 
friendships and romantic relationships then it seems like the requirements of 
that social role will play no part in that interaction. For example Jenny may 
be a doctor, but she can talk to her friend George about any topic (and not 
just George’s health). There might be cases where certain role obligations 
                                                          
62 We might come to know them initially through interaction that is because 
of a particular social role (if, for example, you first interacted with them 
because they were your tutor, and then you decided to become friends). 
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might influence the interaction between friends, but these cases look like the 
exception rather than the rule. For example, if I am a teacher, and my close 
friend is making inappropriate advances towards my student, it seems that 
my role as a teacher will determine how I interact with my friend with 
regards to this particular issue. The rest of our interaction as friends will not 
necessarily be affected (unless it colours my overall view of my friend so 
that I no longer want to be his friend, whereupon our interaction would no 
longer be that of close friends). 
Social roles (for example, parent, doctor, teacher) do not (usually) govern 
our behaviour and interaction with our friends and lovers. In an analogous 
way it might be suggested that if the relationship-role does not provide the 
initial reason for interaction within close friendships and romantic 
relationships, then the requirements of that role will not govern the 
interaction that occurs within the relationships either. 
Here is where we can see that relationship-roles are similar but not identical 
to social roles. We can occupy social roles independently from any 
interaction with a specific individual. Jenny is a doctor whether or not she 
interacts with her patient Sally. We also need social roles to provide a 
reason for the particular interaction. Jenny interacts with Sally only because 
her role requires her to do so. When we first interact with people who will 
become friends and lovers, the norms of friendship or love cannot justify 
our interactions with them. They do not occupy those roles yet. We need a 
separate reason for the interaction– namely, liking them or wanting to be 
with them. If this reason remains in place, and continued interaction occurs, 
a relationship emerges, and the relationship-roles will be occupied. Once 
that relationship-role is occupied, the role governs the interaction that occurs 
in the way suggested above.  
The requirements of relationship-roles might not be as prescriptive as the 
requirements of social roles. Even different social roles can be more or less 
restrictive in what behaviour they allow or require, and the rules governing 
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those roles can be more or less vague.63 Thomas suggests that we can place 
all social interaction along a “continuum” (1987, p. 218). He puts the 
interaction between people in roles such as heads of state at one end, and the 
interaction between romantic partners and close friends at the other. The 
majority of social interaction is somewhere in the middle. He characterises 
the differences along the continuum as the extent to which interaction is 
governed by social roles. I think it is better to characterise it as the extent to 
which different social and relationship-roles restrict behaviours. This will 
depend on both the constitutive and regulative norms of the roles in 
question.  
Some roles, such as the heads of state, have strict rules governing how they 
should interact with other heads of state for instance. Most social roles have 
rules, but they might only apply in specific situations, or they can be 
interpreted in multiple ways. How a doctor interacts with a patient will be 
different depending on whether they meet in the doctor’s office, or in the 
supermarket. How they go about diagnosing a patient will, at least to some 
extent, be up to them (for example, what tests to order etc.).  
The constitutive norms that make up relationship-roles, and the regulative 
norms that tell people how to occupy these roles well, tend to allow for 
more of a variety of behaviours to fulfil that role, and more interpretation of 
the role to suit the individuals involved.  
3.5 The Benefits of a Role-Based Account  
A role-based account of the romantic relationship will have a number of 
benefits. Firstly it enables us to account for the vast variety of behaviour 
that occurs within different romantic relationships. Different types of 
                                                          
63 This will, in part at least, depend on whether the social institution of 
which the social role is a part, is either formal or informal. A formal 
institution is codified – which means that its rules are formally declared in 
some way (for example, written into law). An example of a formal 
institution is money. An informal institution is uncodified (although it 
would be possible to codify it). An example of an informal institution is a 
cocktail party. The norms (rules) of informal institutions are more flexible, 
because it hasn’t been specified exactly how to understand or apply them. 
See Hindriks (2003), pp. 203-205 and Ehrenberg (2018), pp. 6-9. 
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behaviour can be seen as fulfilling the same role. Secondly it enables us to 
identify what makes behaviour distinctly romantic. For example, whilst both 
close friends and romantic partners can live together, the reason why they do 
so will be different because the reason will relate to the different roles being 
played. Thirdly, it enables us to show that romantic relationships are more 
than just ‘enhanced’ close friendships (or close friendships plus sex), 
because we can show these two relationships involve distinct relationship-
roles made up of distinct constitutive norms.64  
In addition, a role-based account seems to align with the insights drawn 
from Chapters One and Two. It will help to explain how love - which is a 
feature of both romantic relationships and close friendships - can be 
different in these two relationships. In each relationship love is governed by 
a different set of norms. In a romantic relationship ‘benefitting the beloved’ 
will be governed by the norms of the romantic partner role, in a close 
friendship it will be governed by the norms of the close friend role. The way 
that we evaluate our romantic partner and close friends (instrumentally and 
non-finally at least) will depend on how well they are seen to fulfil the role 
of a close friend or a romantic partner. When the other person is valued as a 
romantic partner this means that he is valued for playing the role of a 
romantic partner – for doing those things that romantic partners should do. 
Thinking about the role of the romantic partner (or close friend) can also 
help us to think about the place that this relationship has in our lives – we 
might think that certain traits make people better at playing this role for us, 
which in turn might make them appropriate objects of the emotion of 
romantic love. Further, thinking about the romantic partner role, and what 
behaviour fulfils it, will help us to understand what level of intimacy is 
expected within romantic relationships and suggest what emotional 
responses are appropriate (i.e. which ones are required by, or aid the 
fulfilment of the role).  
 
                                                          
64 I demonstrate that the role-based account of romantic relationships has 
these benefits in Chapter Four, section 4.5.  
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3.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have argued against a behaviour-based account, and in 
favour of a role-based account of the romantic relationship to assist us in 
determining what makes this relationship unique. A role-based account is 
one which defines a relationship in terms of the norms governing the 
relationship; and provides an account of those norms.  
I have suggested that a role-based account will have a three-tiered structure 
(akin to the accounts of social roles), and discussed what those three tiers 
might look like for relationships such as close friendships and romantic 
relationships. I have highlighted that relationship-roles are made up of 
constitutive norms which, along with regulative norms, govern the 
behaviour of those occupying the relationship-role in question.  
In Chapter Four I will begin to build up an account of the romantic partner 
role, identifying constitutive norms, considering what the patterns of 
required behaviour and interaction might be, and suggesting what social 
institution this role might sit within. 
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Chapter Four  
The Role of a Romantic Partner  
 
So far in Part One I have shown that in order to understand what makes the 
romantic relationship (the paradigmatic marital relationship in our society) 
distinct, we need an account of the relationship as well as an account of 
romantic love. Chapter Three has demonstrated that we need a role-based 
account rather than a behaviour-based account, and explained what the 
structure of such an account might look like. This chapter will attempt to 
construct a role-based account of the romantic relationship.  
The guiding question for this chapter is still: what is distinct about the 
pattern of behaviour and interaction that occurs in romantic relationships (as 
opposed to other loving relationships)? In order to answer this question I 
will build up an account of the role of a romantic partner. I will claim that 
the romantic relationship is a relationship in which the participants play the 
role of the romantic partner for each other. This role is meaningfully distinct 
from other relationship roles, such as the role of a parent, a friend, or a 
colleague.  
I begin by looking back at Chapters One and Two to remind us of what we 
want an account of a romantic relationship to do, the things that it needs to 
explain, and the things which we want it to specify. My aim is to provide an 
account that can help to fill in these gaps. I propose four constitutive norms 
that make up (at least part of) the role of the romantic partner, and then flesh 
out this role-based account of romantic relationships a little bit more by 
discussing the pattern of required behaviour associated with the role and the 
social institution that it might be thought to sit within.  
The focus on filling in the gaps identified in the love accounts means that I 
only identify the norms that clearly relate to these gaps, and so there could 
well be additional norms that I do not account for. I aim to be responsive to 
(changing) social practices within societies, and so this account is meant to 
be taken as a (continuing) work-in-progress. It does not provide a trans-
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historical account of the romantic relationship. It is also fairly stipulative in 
nature, but I think that it is a fair interpretation of the romantic relationship 
as it is found within our contemporary society at this moment in time. It will 
at least suffice as a working account of what a romantic relationship is, and I 
round off the chapter by highlighting its benefits. We can then move on in 
Part Two to consider whether our institution of marriage fits this 
relationship. 
4.1 A Starting Point  
The role of a romantic partner is constituted by a set of norms governing 
how those who fill this role should behave and interact with each other. As 
such we might expect the role of a romantic partner to include norms 
surrounding how romantic partners feel about one another, what they know 
about each other, and what they do with and for each other.  
If there is one thing that we can confidently say about the role of a romantic 
partner, it is that it will have something to do with love. In Chapters One 
and Two I discussed various different accounts of love. I have not argued in 
favour of any one account in particular, partly because this was not my aim, 
but also because I think that these separate accounts all identify important 
features of love (whether or not they are constitutive of love). These four 
main features - union, robust concern, valuation and emotion - are all 
interconnected. For example, if we value something, then we want to be 
associated with it, we will want to promote its well-being, and we will be 
emotionally vulnerable to its loss.  
The discussion of these accounts of love brought to light various objectives 
that we would want an account of a romantic relationship to be able to meet. 
This seems like as good a starting point as any for considering what a role-
based account of a romantic relationship will need to explain.  
4.1.1 Union  
If love involves the desire for, or the formation of a union (a ‘we’), and 
romantic love involves a unique kind of union, then we want an account of 
the romantic relationship to be able to tell us what that unique union looks 
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like. A loving union is hard to describe, but the features that were suggested 
were things like pooled well-being, pooled autonomy, shared identity and 
shared interests.  
This immediately suggests that the role romantic partners’ play for each 
other is as people who share things with each other, whose well-being is 
intertwined, who have common interests, and who make decisions together. 
As such, the role of a romantic partner is governed by norms requiring these 
things and stipulating, to some degree, how to do these things 
‘romantically’.  
We want our account to tell us something about what romantic partners 
should share, how their well-being should be intertwined, what interests 
they should have in common, and what decisions they should make 
together.  
4.1.2 Robust Concern  
Having robust concern for someone involves caring about them for their 
own sake, and is often characterised as having the desire to benefit the 
beloved. This feature of love demonstrates that well-being is not only 
intertwined in love, but that people in love want to promote the well-being 
of the other person. Individuals playing the role of a romantic partner are 
those who have this desire and act on it.  
I suggested in Chapter Two that if there was anything distinct about the 
romantic desire to benefit, then it would be seen in the behaviour exhibited 
in the relationship. This behaviour will be governed by the role of a 
romantic partner – it is the norms that make up this role which will tell us 
what it is appropriate for a romantic partner to do in regard to this desire. 
We want our account to be able to tell us in what ways a romantic partner 
should benefit the beloved.  
4.1.3 Valuation  
All kinds of valuation are thought to be compatible with love, but (typically) 
only final and non-instrumental valuation are thought to be a part of love. 
As the romantic relationship clearly involves love, the role of a romantic 
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partner will need to (at least) be consistent with valuing the beloved in this 
way.  
It was noted in Chapter Three that looking to the instrumental and non-final 
valuation that occurs within a romantic relationship might enable us to 
distinguish this relationship from other loving relationships. Part of the 
instrumental valuation of the beloved will include being valued as, for 
example, a close friend or a romantic partner. The different relationship 
types could provide different sources of reasons for valuing the beloved. 
Whilst this doesn’t inform us about any specific features that the role of a 
romantic partner needs to include, it does remind us, and reinforce the 
thought, that we need the role for our account to indicate where and how it 
is different from other relationship-roles, and in particular from the role of a 
close friend. 
4.1.4 Emotion 
If we take love to be (or at least to involve) an emotion ‘proper’ then we 
will want our account of a romantic relationship to identify what an 
appropriate object of this emotion will be. For Hamlyn, the appropriate 
object of romantic love would be something that fits “with our conception 
of the place that [love] has in a human life” (Hamlyn 1989, p. 231). We 
need our account to tell us what that place is.  
Whether or not we take love to be an emotion ‘proper’, it clearly involves 
emotional vulnerability to the beloved (and vice versa). People playing the 
romantic partner role for each other have an emotional vulnerability towards 
one another. This has already been acknowledged by the idea of pooled 
well-being, but the discussion of Emotion Complex Accounts in Chapter 
Three suggested that the nature of the romantic relationship would affect the 
level and nature of the emotional interdependency within a relationship, and 
the appropriate emotional responses romantic partners would have to each 
other’s emotions. We therefore want our account to say something about 
these things.  
For example, if we find that the role of a romantic partner demands more 
intimacy than the role of a close friend, then this would suggest that the 
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emotional interdependency between romantic partners is required to be 
greater. Or if the norms that constitute the romantic partner role require a 
romantic partner to be sympathetic and supportive, then certain responses to 
the beloved’s despair are going to be ruled out. They cannot be indifferent 
to it, or be secretly pleased by it for instance, but rather they need to 
acknowledge it and feel concerned about it. 
4.2 Building up a Picture of the Role of a Romantic Partner 
Drawing the insights of the previous section together we can see that our 
account of the romantic partner role is going to need to say something about 
the norms governing love; the things that are shared between romantic 
partners and the extent to which they are shared; and well-being – both how 
it should be affected and promoted. We also want this account to be able to 
show that the role of a romantic partner can be distinguished from the roles 
played within other loving relationships.  
4.2.1 Love  
It is clear that there is an expectation that romantic partners will love each 
other, and continue to love each other throughout the duration of their 
relationship. The same can be said for close friendship. It is not as clear how 
we should understand this norm to govern our behaviour. Loving is 
generally not thought to be something that we can demand of people, as it is 
not generally thought to be (fully) under our control, nor is it something that 
we want to be controllable in this way (part of the beauty and wonder of 
love is its unpredictability). As such this particular norm seems more like a 
pre-condition than a rule to be followed.65  
However, as Troy Jollimore notes with regards to friendship “[f]or a 
friendship to exist these feelings [of love and affection] must be brought 
into the open: they must be expressed through action” (2000, p. 72). In a 
similar way, in addition to the expectation that romantic partners love each 
other, there is also the requirement that this love will be expressed. Love can 
                                                          
65 Exactly what this norm requires will depend on your favoured account of 
love.  
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be expressed through both actions and words. I think that the romantic 
partner role requires all behaviour and interaction between romantic partners 
to be performed in a way that expresses love, or is at least consistent with 
the fact that the other person is loved. This in turn might be thought to help 
promote the continuance of love - we may not be able to command love, but 
we can work to maintain the conditions in which it flourishes. 
I suggest, therefore, that the first constitutive norm of a romantic partner 
roles states:  
(1) Romantic partners should love one another, and act in ways that 
express that love.  
Unsurprisingly (given the discussion of Chapters One and Two) this norm is 
likely to also be a part of the role of a close friend. We expect close friends 
to love one another and they should also express their love for each other in 
some way. This particular norm is therefore not a unique feature of the 
romantic partner role. As such, we will need to look to the other constitutive 
norms of the romantic partner role in order to see where the distinguishing 
features lie.66  
4.2.2 Sharing Things  
All relationships involve sharing things: we share conversations with 
acquaintances; a dance class with the other members; a place of work with 
colleagues; our thoughts and fear with therapists. These examples show that 
we can share both activities and information – we do things with people, 
and we share information about ourselves with them. There are norms in 
place that tell us what kinds of things to share with whom. We shouldn’t 
(typically) ask our therapist to join us in a dance class, and we shouldn’t 
share our intimate problems with acquaintances on the bus.67 
                                                          
66 Love could be expressed by fulfilling the other (unique) constitutive 
norms of the role. Or it could also be the case that there are regulative norms 
that direct romantic partners and close friends to express their love in 
different ways. I will discuss this in section 4.4.1. 
67 We shouldn’t typically do this. However context can influence and 
change some norms – it might be considered appropriate to share intimate 
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We tend to, and are required to, share more (activities and personal 
information) with people that we like, and in relationships built on this 
mutual regard (such as friendships and romantic relationships). Only a 
minimal amount of sharing may be required by the role of a friend, but it 
seems that more is required by the role of a close friend and the role of a 
romantic partner. These relationships demand more sharing. We might 
happily call two people who occasionally meet up for coffee friends, but I 
think we would be less confident in calling them close friends, and we 
certainly wouldn’t identify them as romantic partners. This is because they 
aren’t conforming to the norms of these relationships. They aren’t sharing in 
enough activities and don’t have the opportunity to share enough personal 
information.  
Whilst I want to say that both the role of a close friend and the role of a 
romantic partner have norms that require more than a minimal amount of 
shared experiences, comparing how much is required will not get us any 
further in determining what is distinct about the norms that constitute the 
romantic partner role. It might be thought that we could put the three 
relationship roles on a scale: with the role of a friend at one end that has a 
norm requiring only minimal shared experiences; the close friend role in the 
middle; and the role of a romantic partner at the other end where the norm 
demands the sharing of all activities and a complete sharing of personal 
information. I do not think this picture is correct for romantic relationships. 
I do not think that there is a norm, nor even an ideal, that requires romantic 
partners to do literally everything together, and to share all of their personal 
information. It would be an impossible norm to conform to.  
We can however identify something distinct about the norms of a romantic 
partner in this respect. It is not that the norms demand romantic partners to 
share more experiences with each other, but rather that they require them to 
share specific activities and personal information - those that are taken as 
                                                          
information with strangers if you find yourself in an emergency or life-
threatening situation, for example. 
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central to the lives of the individual’s involved - and require them to share 
these things in a specific way. 
What knowledge and activities are central to an individual’s life? The key 
point here is that the list will differ for different individuals. Whatever 
activities are taken to be central to an individual’s life - whether living 
together, having sex, planning a future, playing sport, all or none of the 
above - it is those that should be shared with a romantic partner. Similarly 
whatever experiences, beliefs, interests and values etc. that are taken to be 
key parts of their lives and identities, it is those that should be shared.68  
Consider Ron and Hermione who were romantic partners by the end of the 
Harry Potter books, and go on to get married. They both, as adults, have 
careers at the Ministry of Magic. Knowing that Hermione always worked 
hard at school we can assume that Hermione’s career is something that she 
regards as central to her life. As such, it is something that she should share 
with Ron in their romantic relationship. There might be activities that she 
participates in that she regards as less central to her life (perhaps she plays 
quidditch to keep fit once a week), and these would not need to be shared 
with Ron (although they could be). The point is that the norms of the 
romantic partner role require Hermione to share her career with Ron (and 
relatedly require Ron to know about it), but they do not require her to share 
which particular sporting activity she does to keep fit. 
The example of sharing a career highlights that not all activities can be 
shared in the same way. Whilst activities like living together and raising 
children might be shared in virtue of doing those things together, other 
activities (like one’s career) will be shared through the sharing of 
information about those activities. This distinction might be thought to be 
between sharing in and sharing of.  
                                                          
68 This will also be governed by other norms within our society – norms 
about what things should be valued and focused on within our lives. This 
might explain why romantic relationships can look very similar in our 
society and very different across different societies and cultures. 
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Our example of Ron and Hermione can help to illustrate this distinction. 
When Hermione shares her career with Ron (which she is required to do as 
his romantic partner) she is not required to invite Ron to take on the same 
role as her within the Ministry, nor is she required to share in the day-to-day 
activities of this role with Ron. She can pursue and partake in her 
independent career as an individual. Rather, Hermione is required to share 
information with Ron about her career, sharing her successes, failures, 
worries, and joys relating to her career. She is required to share of (rather 
than share in) her career with Ron. In contrast, when Ron and Hermione go 
on to have children, if they both view the upbringing of their children as 
central to their lives, the role of a romantic partner requires that they both 
share in this activity.  
All relationship roles have norms governing both the sharing in and sharing 
of activities (as well as the sharing of knowledge). However, it is only the 
romantic partner role that has the norm that requires the sharing in and 
sharing of those experiences that the participants take as central to their 
lives.  
There is a further, and distinct, way in which the role of a romantic partner 
governs how experiences should be shared. Returning to the career example, 
there are different ways in which close friends and romantic partners are 
required to share of their career. Assuming that Hermione has shared of her 
career with Harry (her close friend) the norms of the close friend role 
demand that Harry listen, acknowledge, remember and respect what she 
shares with him. In addition Harry is required to ‘make space’ for her to 
pursue her career (or at least ensure that he, or their close friendship, does 
not prohibit her in any way). For instance, in order to fulfil this obligation, 
he might check with her when arranging a social event that it does not clash 
with any work engagements, or he might not contact her for a few weeks if 
he knows she is busy with work. 
When Hermione shares of her career with Ron he is required to do similar 
things to Harry (listen, acknowledge, respect etc.) but the norms of a 
romantic partner role demand more as well. Rather than simply ‘making 
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space’ for Hermione’s career, Ron will be required to ‘accommodate’ her 
career within their joint life. This means ensuring that Hermione can pursue 
her career should become important for both of them. This might affect 
decisions on where they live, when to have children etc. Importantly, it 
should affect decisions about activities, beliefs, and values etc. that are 
central to Ron’s life (because they are part of the joint life as well). Whereas 
Harry (as a close friend) is not required to sacrifice things that are central to 
his life to make space for Hermione’s career, Ron (as a romantic partner) is 
required to (or at least to consider doing this).  
One difference, then, between romantic relationships and close friendships, 
is that the norms of the romantic partner role and the close friend role 
govern the sharing of experiences in different ways. Romantic partners 
should put the experiences (activities, interests etc.) that are central to their 
lives into a mutual ‘pot’ – their joint life. These things should be 
accommodated by both partners (within this joint life that they lead 
together) as best they can. Close friends should ‘make space’ (and often 
quite a lot of space) for each other’s activities and interests, but they need 
not accommodate these things in the same way as romantic partners. 
I suggest that the second constitutive norm of a romantic partner role states:  
(2) Romantic partners should share the experiences that are central 
to their lives and accommodate these things within a joint life.  
In order to fulfil this part of the role romantic partners will need to be open 
and honest with each other, and in particular specifically about those things 
that are central to the lives and identities of each. If they aren’t open and 
honest about these things, then they are not fulfilling their roles, and their 
joint life cannot be maintained. 
4.2.3 Well-being  
From the discussion about love we have seen that there are two distinct 
(although linked) features of love that concern well-being: wanting to 
promote the beloved’s well-being (benefitting the beloved) and having your 
well-being intertwined with someone else’s (emotional vulnerability). These 
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seem to be features of both close-friend love and romantic love, but the 
nature of the relationship (it was suggested) might highlight a difference. 
We want our account of the romantic partner role to add content to these 
features.  
Whilst the roles that both romantic partners and close friends play for each 
other will be as people who promote each other’s welfare and who have 
their well-being intertwined, there are norms that govern how this is done 
which distinguish the roles. The norms that constitute the role of a close 
friend (and of a friend) demand that close friends promote (in some general 
way) each other’s general well-being (concerning things such as health, 
emotions and material/economic security). The norms that constitute the 
role of a romantic partner demand more - romantic partners should do more 
than simply promote the other’s general wellbeing in some way - and are 
more specific.  
Romantic partners, as we have just seen, are required to share and 
accommodate the central experiences of their lives within a joint life. The 
norms governing the promotion of well-being need to align with this 
sharing-norm. The well-being of romantic partners will be closely linked to 
this joint life. If something threatens a shared activity or interest for 
instance, then the central aspects of well-being of all participants will be 
threatened (because they each should take this thing to be of central 
importance in their lives). Romantic partners are in a position to act, and 
have reason to act, in ways that particularly promote the other’s well-being, 
in ways that are directly related to the central experiences of their lives.  
The role of a romantic partner demands romantic partners to use (and not 
abuse) this position. They should promote each other’s central aspects of 
well-being. This will entail providing help and support in joint projects 
(whatever those might be), taking due care when making joint decisions 
about their joint life, and providing comfort for each other when things 
don’t go so well.  
We have so far considered what romantic partners are meant to be 
concerned with, but haven’t said much about how romantic partners should 
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‘promote’ each other’s central aspects of well-being. It seems that romantic 
partners are required to do more than occasionally or half-heartedly act in 
ways that would promote the other’s central aspects of well-being, but how 
much more?  
Here, the first constitutive norm of a romantic partner looks particularly 
relevant. Romantic partners should love each other and act in ways that 
express that love. We saw on Baier’s Emotion Complex account that all 
love involves a complex form of emotional interdependency. This ‘pooled 
well-being’ (as Union Accounts describe it) involves more than empathy. It 
is not simply the duplication of the other person’s emotion and the taking on 
of an “extra set of joys and sorrows” (Baier 1991, pp. 442-443). When 
people love each other (as they do in close friendships and romantic 
relationships) their emotions are geared towards each other in a much more 
complex way.  
Each romantic partner’s emotions, and therefore their emotional well-being, 
are complexly intertwined. It seems reasonable to expect romantic partners 
to be aware of the fact that their emotional wellbeing directly affects the 
emotional wellbeing of the other, that they are therefore (jointly) responsible 
for the state of (each) other’s emotional well-being in an important way. 
This responsibility ought to extend to ensuring that the other central (non-
emotional) aspects of well-being (relating to the joint life) are maintained, 
because these will have a direct effect on the emotional well-being of the 
participants in the romantic relationship.  
In light of this I suggest that romantic partners are not simply required to 
promote the central aspects of each other’s well-being, but that they should 
take joint responsibility for it. Two contrasting examples will help to 
illustrate what this norm of joint responsibility entails.  
Harry is a close friend of Hermione’s. As close friends, they are expected to 
comply with the close-friend norm that requires them to be concerned for 
each other’s welfare. They are not however held jointly responsible for each 
other’s central aspects of well-being. Hermione may be held at fault for 
acting in a way that diminishes Harry’s well-being in some way, but she 
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cannot be held responsible for ensuring that his central aspects of well-being 
are promoted. This is because Harry may not have shared with Hermione 
what those central aspects are (he is under no obligation to), and his 
emotional well-being is not so intertwined with Hermione’s so that his 
central aspects of well-being are automatically or completely affected by 
hers. Harry and Hermione do not have a joint life because they are not 
romantic partners. This means that when Hermione and Harry make 
decisions about their lives (what to do, where to live, who to be friends with 
etc.) not all those decisions will affect the other’s well-being. The norms of 
close friendship state that they only need to consider the impact on the other 
person’s well-being of those decisions that do.  
In contrast, consider again Ron and Hermione’s romantic relationship. As 
romantic partners they will have a joint life in which the experiences that are 
central to each individual’s life are shared and accommodated. Their well-
being is also intertwined because of their emotional interdependence. This 
means that when they are making decisions about their lives (at least the 
central aspects that are shared) they will be required to consider the 
implications of all those decisions on the well-being of both individuals, and 
to act in a way that promotes the central aspects of the well-being of both. 
A further example helps to bring out the difference I have in mind here.  
… if you have an important job interview, but when you start to 
leave for it, your car won't start, you might legitimately expect your 
friend, who can easily drive you, to help. If your friend refuses, you 
would justifiably feel hurt and betrayed, and not understand how 
your friend could treat you this way. It isn't merely that decent or 
nice friends act this way, so that helping is supererogatory. Not 
helping seems inconsistent with the friendship, and if it happens 
often, the friendship has been abandoned. Notice that we wouldn't in 
general expect a stranger to drive us, and we would view it as being 
"awfully nice" of the person if he or she did help. (Annis 1987, p. 
352) 
The friend, unlike the stranger, should be concerned for our welfare and 
should help and support us if she can easily do so (in this case). If we altered 
the case so that it is a romantic partner who has the ability to drive you to 
the important job interview, I think the story proceeds a little differently. A 
romantic partner should drive you to the interview even if it is not easy for 
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them to do so. They should take joint responsibility for your well-being, 
which will be negatively affected if you do not go to the important job 
interview. They therefore have a responsibility to assist you in getting to the 
job interview unless there are very weighty reasons for them not to – i.e. 
reasons that relate to other shared central aspects of either’s life (for 
example, an equally important interview, or the needs of a child or a parent).  
I propose that the third constitutive norm of the role of a romantic partner 
states:  
(3) Romantic partners should take joint responsibility for the central 
aspects of each other’s well-being.  
4.2.4 Trust  
Whilst it is not something that has been mentioned in the discussion of love, 
I think that trust is a key element of loving relationships, and is assumed by 
the various features of love, and the norms of the romantic partner role that 
we have identified so far. Romantic partners should trust each other, and 
trust each other deeply. If they did not do this then they would not be 
willing to share the central experiences of their lives, to put these into a joint 
life, nor to take joint responsibility for one another’s well-being. Too much 
is at stake to do this without expecting a certain level of trust as well.  
In particular the role of a romantic partner requires romantic partners to tell 
the truth (about the central aspects of their lives for instance), to use the 
information they are entrusted with in the ways that the norms of the role 
dictate, and to fulfil the role that they are occupying in its entirety. If 
romantic partners did not do this, then the romantic partners risk making 
themselves hugely vulnerable. The requirement of trust can go some way 
towards mitigating that vulnerability.69  
                                                          
69 Whilst there is a norm that demands close friends to be trustworthy, the 
way that they fulfil this requirement will be different, because it will relate 
to different constitutive norms (i.e. not those that relate to sharing the 
central aspects of each other’s live etc.). 
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I will add a fourth constitutive norm to the role of a romantic partner which 
states:  
(4) Romantic partners should trust one another deeply.  
4.3 The Constitutive Norms that make up the Role of a Romantic 
Partner  
Using the discussion of romantic love as a starting point I have identified 
four norms that I propose constitute the role of a romantic partner.  
(1) Romantic partners should love one another, and act in ways that 
express that love.  
(2) Romantic partners should share the experiences that are central 
to their lives and accommodate these things within a joint life.  
(3) Romantic partners should take joint responsibility for the central 
aspects of each other’s well-being.  
(4) Romantic partners should trust one another deeply.  
These norms tell us what we need to do in order to be a romantic partner – 
we need to comply with these norms.  
It is undeniable that romantic relationships involve love, and so it seems 
reasonable to assume that the features that accounts of love illuminate will 
be features of the role of a romantic partner too. It is possible, however, that 
these four norms could be explained in further detail, or broken down into 
more precise norms, and that these norms could change with time. 
There could also be additional norms that I have not yet identified. As noted 
in Chapter Three, constitutive norms specify a range of things: for example, 
rights, obligations, how a role is entered, penalties for non-compliance etc. 
The four constitutive norms listed above all look like role-obligations that a 
romantic partner has towards the other person(s) within a romantic 
relationship. It seems likely therefore that there will also be additional 
constitutive norms specifying these further things.  
My account of the role of a romantic partner is therefore meant to be 
provisional. It is however sufficient for our purposes – it gives us a working 
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account of the romantic relationship (in our current time and place) and will 
enable us to consider whether the political institution of marriage ‘fits’ this 
relationship.  
4.3.1 Relationship Schmelationship? 
Before moving on to flesh out this role-based account a little more, I first 
want to address a potential normative worry that might arise, along similar 
lines to that of the “Agency, Schmagency” objection levelled towards 
constitutive accounts of normativity (Enoch, 2006). 
If we want to class romantic relationships as a relationship in which the 
participants play the role of a romantic partner for each other, and to claim 
that this role has normative force - that romantic partners ought to fulfil it - 
then problems might arise. It seems as though we would have to say that 
romantic partners who failed to fulfil this role are not in fact romantic 
partners, but then if they are not, then they are under no duty to comply with 
the role of a romantic partner. In order for the role of a romantic partner to 
have normative force it looks as though we need something (other than the 
role) which determines whether or not we are in a romantic relationship in 
the first place.  
This potential concern is less worrying if we consider how personal 
relationships come about. As already noted (in section 3.4.4), the initial 
reason for interaction between friends and romantic partners will be some 
sort of desire or attraction to the other person. These relationships then build 
up through a process of interaction over time, and the participants come to 
take on the associated relationship-role for each other.70  
At different points in this process friends and romantic partners might have 
taken on more or fewer of the duties that make up the relationship-role for 
each other. So long as they are fulfilling some subset of the duties that make 
up that relationship-role, then they are in (some form) of that relationship. 
This implies that there are ‘sub-standard’ forms of friendships and romantic 
relationships - relationships that don’t quite live up to the ideal - but then 
                                                          
70 See Chapter 8, section 8.3.3 for a discussion of how role-obligations can 
become binding.  
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this implication seems correct. We can find ourselves thinking that Harry 
shouldn’t have done that to Hermione if they were ‘real’ friends – if he was 
fulfilling all of the duties of the role of a friend for Hermione. The fact that 
he hasn’t fulfilled that duty means that they are not ‘real’ friends. In order to 
be ‘real’ friends, they both need to fulfil all of the duties of friendship.  
A further concern might then arise. If Harry and Hermione have developed a 
‘real’ friendship, and have taken on all of the duties that make up the role of 
the friend, then what happens if Harry then fails to fulfil one of his friend-
duties? Is his action obligation-defying, or is it obligation-releasing? Has he 
really failed to fulfil his duty, or has he stopped playing the role of a ‘real’ 
friend and so been released from that duty?  
I think, from an outside perspective, we would judge Harry to have failed to 
fulfil the duty of a ‘real’ friend, and so failed to be a ‘real’ friend. He has 
become a sub-standard friend. If he wanted to be a ‘real’ friend to Hermione 
then he should have fulfilled that duty. His actions have altered the nature of 
their relationship.  
From Harry’s perspective however, he might simply claim that he is now 
occupying the role of a sub-standard friend, and fulfilling the duties of that 
role. What, he might then ask, is the problem with failing to fulfil the duty 
of a ‘real’ friend – a duty that does he does not take to apply to him? Here it 
is important to keep in mind that personal relationships involve more than 
one person. Hermione is in the relationship too. She thinks that their 
relationship is a ‘real’ friendship, and expects Harry to fulfil the role of a 
‘real’ friend. It could be the case that Hermione was mistaken, and that they 
in fact only had a sub-standard form of friendship. If this is the case, then 
her expectations were not legitimate, and Harry is not at fault. However, it 
could also be the case that Harry had led Hermione to believe that they were 
in a real friendship. If this is the case, then Harry is at fault for failing to 
meet Hermione’s legitimate expectations. He should have fulfilled his role 
as a real friend. 
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4.4 Fleshing out the Role-Based Account 
Role-based accounts define a relationship in terms of the norms governing 
the relationship; and provide an account of those norms. Having built up an 
account of the role of a romantic partner, this enables me to make the claim 
that a romantic relationship is one in which the participants play this 
romantic partner role for each other.  
The role is only one part of a role-based account. On the three-tiered 
structure that I am proposing role-based accounts of relationships utilise, the 
relationship-role can be found in the middle tier. On the bottom tier there is 
the required pattern of behaviour of someone occupying a particular 
relationship-role. This pattern of behaviour is taken to fulfil the role, and 
can be understood as being governed by both the constitutive norms of the 
role, and the regulative norms which tell us how to fulfil the constitutive 
norms well. On the top tier there is the social institution that the role sits 
within.  
4.4.1 The Pattern of Required Behaviour  
We can identify, within our society, required patterns of behaviour and 
interaction that, when performed, fulfil the role of a romantic partner. In the 
preceding sections I have spelled out some of the behaviour that is governed 
by the constitutive norms of the romantic partner role (sharing the central 
experiences of our lives etc.).  
There are also a variety of regulative norms that dictate (within our society) 
how to fulfil the role of a romantic partner well. There are regulative norms 
that say we should express our romantic love on particular days (for 
example, on Valentine’s Day), and in particular ways (that we should do it 
through particular gifts such as flowers and chocolates, or by having ‘date 
nights’ for example). There are also regulative norms that say we should 
share particular things with our romantic partners - things like living 
together, physical and emotional intimacy, raising children, and leisure 
activities etc. (these are the things identified in our discussion of behaviour-
based accounts in Chapter Three).  
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However, as was highlighted in the previous chapter, there is a vast array of 
behaviour that is taken to be compatible with the role of a romantic partner, 
and a vast array of behaviour that is taken to be appropriate to both romantic 
relationships and close friendships. It appears that relationship-roles are less 
determinate than social roles in exactly what patterns of behaviour they 
demand.71   
Let’s take the vast variety of romantic behaviour first. Firstly, the 
interpretative nature of the constitutive norms allows for a variety of 
behaviour to be thought to fulfil them. Secondly, we can identify a ‘typical’ 
pattern of behaviour that is required by the regulative norms because it 
includes the things that people are expected to take as central to their lives 
(governed and influenced by further social norms). Within our society living 
together and raising children are seen as valuable things for instance. In 
light of this, the regulative norms state that people should share in these 
particular activities within a romantic relationship, because this will be a 
good way of fulfilling the romantic partner role for many. Despite this, a 
huge variety of concrete behaviours can emerge. The smaller details - such 
as what type of house, who does the cleaning, how to bring up children, etc. 
- will still vary greatly from one romantic relationship to another, without 
affecting how well the role is played.  
The regulative norms of relationships (and seemingly what we should take 
to be central and valuable) can also be flouted. Flouting a regulative norm 
does not stop someone from playing the role of a romantic partner. 
Individuals can (and do) reject what the social norms tell us we should take 
as valuable and central to our lives. Whilst many people take living 
together, raising children and being sexually intimate etc. to be central 
experiences of their lives, not everyone does. For those that don’t take these 
things to be central to their lives, they will (and should) not feature in the 
joint life that they share with their romantic partner. Other things will. The 
list of things that can be shared is restricted only by what the other 
                                                          
71 This was acknowledged in the discussion of Thomas’s (1987) claim in 
section 3.4.4. 
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constitutive norms of the romantic partner dictate (they have to be consistent 
with loving and caring about someone for instance).  
Moving on, the large range of behaviour that is taken to be appropriate 
within both close friendships and romantic relationships is regarded as such 
because it is taken to fulfil both of these roles. This is, again, in virtue of the 
interpretative nature of the constitutive norms, and in virtue of the regulative 
norms. As we saw in Chapter Three, different roles (with different 
constitutive norms) can have the same regulative norms. This was seen in 
the rugby league/ruby union example. Within our society there are 
regulative norms that say that both the role of a close friend and the role of a 
romantic partner can be fulfilled well by participating in the same activities 
and interacting in the same way.  
4.4.2 The Social Institution  
As acknowledged in section 3.4.1, identifying what social institution a non-
familial relationship-role sits within will be difficult. It also seems, in 
contrast to social roles, as though the institution is less important in 
determining the content of a romantic partner role. Nevertheless, I think 
there is a possible social institution (system of social norms etc.) that we can 
identify for the role of a romantic partner: namely ‘romance’.  
Romance certainly forms a part of our social world, and we can identify 
norms, rituals and conventions that are thought of as romantic (as seen in 
Chapter Three, section 3.4.1). These are the type of social phenomena that 
typically make up social institutions. There are also a number of different 
relationship roles that could be thought to sit within this social institution: 
teenage ‘boyfriends and girlfriends’; 1950s-style model of heterosexual 
relationships with complementary but different gender roles; unrequited (but 
acknowledged) love perhaps; holiday romances; and, the role of a romantic 
partner. Each of these relationship-roles have patterns of required behaviour 
that are associated with them.72 I will not argue for this suggestion here 
                                                          
72 I think there is also plausibly a social category of ‘friendship’ that 
includes relationship-roles such as acquaintances, close friendships, long-
distance friendships as well as norms of civility and friendship gestures etc.  
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however as it will not add anything further to the characterisation of the 
romantic relationship.  
4.5 The Benefits of a Role-Based Account of the Romantic Relationship  
I will bring this chapter to a close by highlighting the various benefits of a 
role-based account of the romantic relationship. There are benefits that 
relate both to the problems that arose with behaviour-based accounts, and to 
the gaps identified in the accounts of love.  
4.5.1 Addressing the Problems of Behaviour-Based Accounts  
In section 3.1 it was shown that there are certain problems that behaviour-
based accounts of relationships will face. There I claimed that role-based 
accounts might be able to overcome these problems. I suggested that they 
might enable us to i) encompass the vast variety of behaviour that occurs 
within individual romantic relationships; ii) identify the romantic 
relationship as a distinct relationship type; and iii) not characterise romantic 
love as close friendship plus sex. Here I want to defend this claim.  
The discussion surrounding the pattern of behaviour required by the 
romantic partner role demonstrated that there is a vast variety of behaviour 
that can be taken to fulfil this role, because there are a vast number of 
different things that people will take to be central to their lives. The role-
based account of romantic relationships therefore enables us to account for 
the vast variety of behaviour that occurs within individual romantic 
relationships.  
Acknowledging and allowing for this vast variety of behaviour within 
romantic relationships does not limit the role-based accounts’ ability to 
identify the romantic relationship as a distinct relationship type. It is still the 
case that the same types of behaviour may occur in different relationships 
(including close friendships), but this is because roles are interpretative, and 
because different roles can have the same regulative norms, which people 
can ignore (to a greater or lesser degree). This doesn’t stop us from 
distinguishing these relationships: the relationship roles they involve are 
made up of different constitutive norms. It is only in the romantic 
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relationship that the participants play the role of a romantic partner for each 
other. Whilst close friends and romantic partners can both live together, 
only the latter will live together because it is a part of their joint life, and 
helps them to fulfil their role as a romantic partner. 
Characterising the romantic relationship as one in which the participants 
play the role of the romantic partner for each other also enables us to show 
that romantic relationships are not simply close friendships plus sex. There 
is more to the difference between these relationships than that. The role-
based account enables us to show this because it identifies the unique 
constitutive norms of the romantic partner role.73  
4.5.2 Meeting the Love Accounts’ Objectives  
The role-based account just sketched enables us to claim that romantic 
relationships are unique, and has begun to explain in what ways they are 
unique. We can therefore understand in a little more detail what we mean 
when we say that we value someone (instrumentally) as a romantic partner, 
and we know a little more about what type of relationship can provide the 
source of the reason for (non-final) valuation of someone in a romantic 
relationship.   
This account enables us to identify what is unique about the union of romantic 
love as well. Romantic partners share all of those things – activities, interests, 
values, etc. – that are central to their lives within a joint life. The decisions 
that might be made jointly (as a part of a pooled autonomy) will be about 
those things within this joint life. This is part of what ‘accommodating’ those 
things means. The distinction between ‘sharing in’ and ‘sharing of’ is 
important. When romantic partners share of a career for example, decisions 
that will affect the ability to pursue that career will be pooled – but day to day 
decisions about how an individual acts in their career-role will be up to the 
individual. Activities that are shared in however will include more joint 
decisions about day-to-day activities.  
                                                          
73 The role-based account also allows for the possibility of a romantic 
relationship without sex: if none of the participants regard sex as a central 
activity, it will not need to be a part of their joint life. 
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This account also allows us to fill in the pictures of what it means to desire to 
benefit a romantic partner, and to show that this desire is different in romantic 
and close-friend love. The norms governing what a romantic partner can do 
in this regard are influenced by the other norms of the romantic relationship 
– in particular the norm regarding the sharing of experiences that are central 
to the romantic partners’ lives within a joint life, which is unique to the 
romantic partner role. A romantic partner will desire to benefit the romantic 
partner in ways that relate to this joint life. 
Considering love as an emotion proper, we can now say more about what an 
appropriate object of this emotion would be – someone who we want to play 
the role of a romantic partner for, and who we want to play the role of a 
romantic partner for us.  
Identifying the distinctive norms that constitute the role of a romantic partner 
also provides us with the means to distinguish between the emotional 
interdependence of romantic love and close-friend love. We can now show 
that the romantic relationship does involve a different level (or type) of 
intimacy, and that it will involve different appropriate follow up responses to 
the recognised emotions in virtue of the second and third constitutive norms 
of the romantic partner role.  
Romantic partners ought to share (in and of) experiences that are central to 
the participants’ lives, and they should do this in a distinctive way (within a 
joint life). Romantic partners should take responsibility for the central 
aspects of each other’s well-being, which they are able to do because of this 
joint life. We can see that these are norms concerning how intimate 
romantic partners are (sharing the central aspects of our lives is very 
intimate) and what responses are appropriate (responses which will promote 
the other’s well-being and contribute to continuance of this joint life). These 
norms affect the emotional interdependency of romantic relationships, and 
mark that interdependency out as distinct.  
Whilst it might still be possible to say more, the fact that my role-based 
account allows us to at least begin to meet these objectives is a point in its 
favour.  
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4.6 Conclusion  
The guiding question for this chapter has been: what is distinct about the 
pattern of behaviour and interaction (i.e. the relationship) that occurs in 
romantic relationships (as opposed to other loving relationships). Chapter 
Three showed that we needed a role-based account of the romantic 
relationship in order to answer this question. This chapter has begun to 
construct such an account. In particular it has focused on building up a 
picture of the unique role of a romantic partner. I have argued that it is in 
virtue of this role that the romantic relationship is distinct.  
This enables me to draw Part One of this thesis to a close. It is the romantic 
relationship that is the paradigmatic marital relationship. The romantic 
relationship is a relationship in which the partners play the role of a 
romantic partner for each other. This role clearly incorporates the idea that 
romantic partners love each other, but demonstrates that there is more to the 
relationship than love. The role of a romantic partner is constituted by other 
norms as well which govern the behaviour (as well as the emotions) of those 
within the romantic relationship. 
I have highlighted the social nature of this relationship, and the role itself, 
and have shown that whilst each individual relationship is of course unique 
and personal, our idea of what the relationship is, the role that it 
encompasses, and the pattern of the behaviour required to fulfil this role all 
sit within, and are strongly influenced by our social world. They are made 
up of social norms. 
The question now is whether our current - political - institution of marriage 
‘fits’ this paradigmatic marital relationship. I address this question in Part 
Two. 
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Part Two  
What Relation Should the State Bear to the Paradigmatic Marital 
Relationship? 
 
In the Introduction I identified a distinctive shift in common thinking about 
marriage. We have shifted from expecting the marital relationship to fit the 
marital institution, to expecting the marital institution to fit the marital 
relationship. I claimed that by noticing this shift two things became 
apparent: first that a more detailed investigation into the nature of the 
paradigmatic marital relationship was called for; and second that this focus 
on the paradigmatic marital relationship can and should be brought into the 
current debate surrounding the political institution of marriage. 
Part One took on the first task: I identified the paradigmatic marital 
relationship as the romantic relationship and I argued that this relationship is 
distinct in virtue of the romantic partner role that participants of this 
relationship play for each other. I built up a picture of this role and its 
constitutive norms, which demonstrated the significantly social nature of 
this relationship.  
With an account of the romantic relationship in hand, the question is now 
whether the institution of marriage that we currently have fits this 
relationship.74 Within Western liberal democracies we have a political 
institution of marriage: marriage is more than just a social institution, it 
comprises a legal status that is conferred, recognised and regulated by the 
state, and has a particular bundle of legal rights and duties that attach to it. 
In order for the institution to fit the relationship, the relationship needs to 
provide reasons for each of these features.  
There are a number of arguments that focus on and object to the political 
nature of the current institution of marriage. The arguments that I want to 
                                                          
74 As explained in Chapter 1, Section 1, the direction of fit that we are 
looking for is for the institution to be shaped by the relationship, rather than 
the other way around. 
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focus on claim, more precisely, that on entirely political liberal grounds 
there are decisive objections against a liberal state establishing and 
recognising an institution of marriage. I want to focus on these arguments 
because a significant number of contemporary political philosophers are 
political liberals and because Western liberal democracies are often thought 
to ideally adhere to political liberal principles. I take these arguments as my 
starting point for Part Two.  
If these arguments are correct and the political nature of the institution of 
marriage is illiberal then this suggests that the state ought not to establish 
and recognise marriage. This still leaves open the question of what the (non-
political) institution of marriage should look like. It also leaves open the 
question of whether the state should relate to the romantic relationship at all, 
and how, if so. There could still be liberal reasons for the state to regulate 
(and even recognise) such a relationship in some way.  
If these arguments are incorrect, and the objections to the political 
institution of marriage are unfounded, we still need to know what reason the 
state has for regulating and recognising the romantic relationship, and 
whether a political institution of marriage is the best regulatory tool to do 
this.  
The guiding question for Part Two is therefore: what relation should the 
political liberal state bear to the paradigmatic marital relationship (the 
romantic relationship)? Does the state have reason to regulate the romantic 
relationship, and if so, does it have reason to regulate it through the political 
institution of marriage, or via some other means?  
I aim to demonstrate four things over the coming chapters. First, that none 
of the arguments I consider conclusively show the political institution of 
marriage to be incompatible with political liberal principles. State 
recognition of marriage is not as problematic as the anti-marriage theorists 
claim. Second, through reframing the debate in terms of direct and indirect 
regulation, that underlying the arguments against the political institution of 
marriage is a claim that the state should not directly regulate the romantic 
relationship (by which I mean it should not create a distinct legal category 
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corresponding to it). Third, and in contrast, I claim that it is not 
inappropriate for the state to directly regulate the romantic relationship. 
There is something about this relationship in particular that warrants direct 
regulation (namely, the fact that it leads to systematic material, physical and 
psychological vulnerability). Fourth, that the political institution of marriage 
is one regulatory tool that could be used to directly regulate the romantic 
relationship, but that it is not the only option.  
I do all of this by drawing on the work of Part One, and as such show the 
relevance and importance of understanding the nature of the romantic 
relationship for the current debate surrounding the political institution of 
marriage. 
I begin, in Chapters Five and Six, by presenting and evaluating the 
arguments against a political institution of marriage. I identify three levels 
of concern: first, a concern about the current structure of the political 
institution; second, a concern about the meaningful nature of the political 
institution of marriage; and third, a concern about the use of any political 
institution that recognises a particular form of adult personal relationship. I 
argue that the concerns at each level can be met. State recognition of 
marriage looks compatible with political liberalism. 
In Chapter Seven I note that the notion of state recognition is unclear and 
reframe the debate in terms of direct and indirect regulation. Direct 
regulation occurs when a distinct legal category is created corresponding to 
the thing being regulated. I identify a complaint that can be taken to underlie 
each of the arguments against a political institution of marriage – namely, 
that this institution directly regulates the romantic relationship when there is 
no compelling reason to do so. I respond to this underlying complaint in 
Chapter Eight by showing that the state does have a compelling reason to 
directly regulate the romantic relationship because of the systematic 
material, physical and psychological vulnerability to which this type of 
relationship can lead.  
This vulnerability is due to both the nature of the romantic relationship, and 
the social and political structures within our Western society. This makes it 
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particularly difficult to propose exactly how we should directly regulate the 
romantic relationship in order to mitigate the systematic vulnerability that it 
causes. I draw on the work of Iris Marion Young (1990; 2006) in my 
concluding remarks to show why this is the case.  
The proposals that the anti-marriage theorists put forward would not be 
suitable because they do not create a distinct legal category that corresponds 
to the romantic relationship. Whilst a political institution of marriage is one 
option for directly regulating the romantic relationship – because it creates a 
distinct legal category corresponding to the romantic relationship – it might 
not be the best as, it might not fully address all of the systematic 
vulnerability that the romantic relationship can lead to. A more holistic 
approach that considers the whole picture of social and political structures in 
society may be called for.  
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Chapter Five  
The Political Institution of Marriage: Three Levels of Concern 
 
As already noted, Western liberal democracies tend to have a political 
institution of marriage that comprises a legal status and a bundle of legal 
incidents: rights, duties, privileges, liabilities, immunities, and powers. This 
amounts to state recognition of marriage. 
The state directly regulates (creates a distinct legal category for) those 
relationships that are eligible for this legal status – typically the 
paradigmatic marital relationship (the romantic relationship) – via this 
institution. I begin addressing the guiding question of Part Two - what 
relation the political liberal state should bear to the paradigmatic marital 
relationship - by considering whether this current relation is appropriate. 
In order for the political institution of marriage to be justified on liberal 
terms, two steps need to be completed. First, there needs to be a liberal 
reason for the state to directly regulate the romantic relationship. Second, 
there then needs to be a liberal justification for using the political institution 
of marriage to directly regulate it and for the state recognition this entails.  
There are a number of arguments which claim that a political institution of 
marriage is incompatible with political liberal principles. These arguments 
challenge the second justificatory step. If these arguments are correct, then 
the liberal state should not relate to the romantic relationship via this 
institution. These arguments do not challenge the view that the romantic 
relationship warrants some form of regulation. Rather, they object to the 
political institution of marriage being used as the regulatory tool because 
they are concerned about there being state recognition of marriage.75  
Before introducing these arguments I briefly outline some key political 
liberal principles. I then introduce the arguments, showing that they 
                                                          
75 However, in Chapter Seven, I identify that an underlying concern running 
through these arguments is with the fact that the state directly (rather than 
indirectly) regulates this relationship.  
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comprise three levels of concern regarding the political institution of 
marriage: first, concerns about its current structure; second, concerns about 
any political institution of marriage; and third, concerns about any political 
institution that involves the state recognition of adult personal relationships. 
I then move on to present, evaluate, and reject the Public Reason Argument 
from Elizabeth Brake (2012), which is an argument that raises the first level 
of concern.  
I consider arguments from Tamara Metz (2010) and Clare Chambers (2017; 
2013) which raise the second and third levels of concern in Chapter Six. The 
aim of these two chapters is twofold: firstly, I argue that none of the 
arguments (at any level of concern) conclusively show the political 
institution of marriage to be problematic for political liberalism; secondly, I 
highlight that despite being able to address the concerns raised by these 
arguments, we are still left wondering what relation the state should bear to 
the romantic relationship.  
5.1 Political Liberalism: A (Very) Brief Overview 
As a liberal theory political liberalism (in all of its forms) is primarily 
concerned with personal freedom. It aims to find and defend political 
principles that maximise the liberty of citizens who hold diverse (yet 
reasonable) and often incompatible views, whilst still recognising the 
importance of equality, and the necessity of a stable society. One of the 
ways it typically aims to maximise personal freedom is by making a 
distinction between the political and non-political spheres of society - 
sometimes referred to as the public and private spheres.  
In the non-political sphere, individual freedom reigns unfettered by 
the demands of political unity, and diversity flourishes. In the 
political sphere, universal norms and uniform laws govern actions of 
independent citizens. (Metz 2010, p. 6) 
This means that there are certain areas of society where political 
involvement and regulation are appropriate (subject to strict political 
principles), and then other areas where it is not.  
On a Rawlsian picture the main distinction is between the basic structure of 
society, which is clearly political, and then the other associations, 
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institutions and individual relationships that occur underneath this political 
framework. Rawls characterises the basic structure as “society’s main 
political, social, and economic institutions” unified into a “system of social 
cooperation” (1985, pp. 224-225). Rawls’ conception of justice - Justice as 
Fairness - which outlines his two principles of justice, is constructed 
specifically for this political sphere. 
The purpose of the basic structure is to secure “background justice” (Rawls 
2003, p. 10), which it does by allocating basic rights and duties, and 
ensuring a just distribution of the social and economic advantages of social 
cooperation. This is done according to Rawls’ two principles of justice:  
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with 
the same scheme of liberties for all; and  
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: 
first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second they 
are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members 
of society (the difference principle). (2003, p. 42) 
In order to determine whether a basic structure is just and to be able to make 
interpersonal comparisons between diverse citizens’ resources, Rawls 
introduces primary goods. Primary goods are resources that any ‘political 
person’ would reasonably want. The conception of a ‘political person’ that 
Rawls utilises characterises people as possessing two moral powers (the 
“capacity for a sense of justice” and the “capacity for a conception of the 
good”) along with “some determinate conception of the good” (Nussbaum 
2011a, p. 4). Primary goods are the things that people need in order to 
develop and exercise these moral capacities, and to pursue their distinct 
conceptions of the good. 
The list of primary social goods includes “basic rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, and … all-purpose means such as income and wealth … [as 
well as the] social bases of self-respect” (Rawls 1993, p. 180). It is these 
goods that the basic structure needs to distribute, according to the principles 
of justice.  
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The easiest way of explaining what makes political liberalism political is to 
contrast it with other forms of liberalism: in particular comprehensive, and 
perfectionist forms. Comprehensive liberals “base political principles on 
some comprehensive doctrine about human life that covers not only the 
political domain but also the domain of human conduct generally” 
(Nussbaum 2011b, p.5). Most versions of comprehensive liberalism are also 
perfectionist. Perfectionist liberalisms base their political principles on a 
comprehensive doctrine which involves a “doctrine about the good life and 
the nature of value” (p.5).76 For example, a perfectionist liberal might claim 
that autonomy is important because it contributes to human flourishing, and 
justify political principles on this basis.  
Political liberalism is neither comprehensive, nor perfectionist. It does not 
rely on any comprehensive doctrines (doctrines that cover all areas of 
human conduct, rather than just the political) to defend its political 
principles, and in particular, it does not advocate any theory about the good 
life, or what is valuable. A political liberal “asserts only that liberal values 
are required by justice, that they are in some sense the fairest way of 
adjudicating conflict and ordering society” (Chambers 2017, p. 52).77 
Political liberalism therefore insists  
on a distinction between the principles and ideals that …define a 
liberal order for society, and the deeper values and commitments 
associated with particular philosophical outlooks. The political 
liberal insists that the articulation and defences of a given set of 
liberal commitments for a society should not depend on any 
particular theory of what gives value or meaning to a human life. 
(Waldron 2004, p. 91) 
One reason that it insists on this is because of the recognition of the 
‘burdens of judgement’. Within contemporary liberal societies people hold a 
variety of different conceptions of the good concerning what is valuable and 
what constitutes the good life, which are incompatible with each other. This 
                                                          
76 Non-perfectionist comprehensive doctrines would have no reference to 
the good life or the nature of value. Nussbaum gives the example of a 
comprehensive doctrine based on astrology which holds that our fate in all 
domains of human life is fixed by the stars (2011b, p. 5). 
77 See also Chambers (2017), pp. 52-55 for an explanation of the differences 
between political, comprehensive, and perfectionist liberalism.  
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means that they will not be able to come to an agreement on what political 
principles are best (when arguing from their particular and distinct 
positions). Rawls notes the persistence of these incompatible views and 
argues that this state of affairs is both inevitable and reasonable. This is not 
because all of the different views are correct, but because citizens face 
burdens of judgment when they use their powers of reasoning and judgment. 
These burdens of judgment - which include things like insufficient and 
inconclusive evidence, and different ways of assessing and weighing 
evidence - mean that citizens will inevitably come to different conclusions 
about important matters.78 
As Nussbaum explains, this gives us reason to not ground political 
principles in comprehensive doctrines, and not to advocate particular views 
of the good life, especially if we think that we owe fellow citizens equal 
respect.  
If we accept the burdens of judgment, then we have reason to try to 
ground our political principles in a set of “freestanding” moral ideas 
that can be accepted by citizens with a wide range of different views 
concerning the ultimate sources of value. Principles will be 
acceptable in this way only if their framers practice a “method of 
avoidance,” refusing to ground them in controversial metaphysical, 
religious, or epistemological doctrines, and not even in 
comprehensive ethical doctrines. Instead, they will seek a 
freestanding ethical justification for the principles that will 
ultimately form one part of the comprehensive doctrines of all of 
them… (2011b, p. 16) 
This has particular implications for how political principles, and particular 
laws and political institutions, can be justified. In particular, it requires state 
neutrality and the use of public reasons when arguing for political 
principles, institutions and laws. It is these two concepts that are particularly 
relevant in the political liberal debate surrounding the political institution of 
marriage.  
When political liberals discuss the principle of neutrality they usually make 
a distinction between consequential and justificatory neutrality.79 Both types 
                                                          
78 See Rawls (2003), p. 35. 
79 See Kymlicka (1989), p. 884. 
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of neutrality require the political liberal state to remain neutral between the 
many varied conceptions of the good that its citizens hold. This means that 
the state should not hold or express a particular conception of the good 
itself. Consequential neutrality - where the consequences of state action 
must be neutral between different reasonable conceptions of the good 
(insofar as they affect the level of adherence to particular conceptions of the 
good) - is usually taken to be too demanding. Political liberals therefore tend 
to endorse the less demanding justificatory neutrality which focuses on how 
the state justifies its actions. It is primarily a principle that informs us of 
what a political liberal state should not do when justifying its principles, 
laws and institutions.  
The Principle of Neutrality: The state should not hold or express a 
particular conception of the good nor appeal to any particular 
conception of the good when justifying its laws, policies and 
institutions. 
In addition to the requirement of justificatory neutrality, there is the 
principle of public reason. This principle states that the “rules that regulate 
our common life [must] be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all 
those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority” (Quong 2013, 
Introduction). This is to ensure that all citizens, with their many differing 
and often conflicting views, are treated as free and equal. The reasons 
appealed to when justifying these institutions and laws must therefore be 
public reasons – “reasons which everyone can reasonably recognise as valid 
public considerations” (Quong 2011, p. 256). This principle informs us of 
what a political liberal state should do when justifying its principles, laws 
and institutions. 
The Principle of Public Reason: The state must appeal to public 
reasons when justifying its laws, policies and institutions so that they 
are understandable and acceptable to all citizens.  
The arguments I consider in this chapter and the next claim that a political 
institution of marriage violates the principle of public reason and the 
principle of neutrality.  
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5.2 The Three Levels of Concern Regarding the Political Institution of 
Marriage  
Whilst there are a variety of historical and contemporary debates 
surrounding marriage (for example, feminist concerns about marriage’s 
oppressive nature, and the legalisation of same-sex marriage)80 the one 
which I want to explore focuses on the question of whether there should be 
a political (as opposed to a merely social) institution of marriage at all.81 If 
there are problems with the political institution of marriage then this 
suggests that the state should not relate to the romantic relationship via this 
institution.  
A political institution of marriage exists when marriage comprises a legal 
status that is conferred, recognised and regulated by the state, and which has 
a particular bundle of rights and duties that attach to it. For example, in the 
UK, the marital status is a legal status that is conferred by state 
representatives (registrars) in state-sanctioned ceremonies. The state 
recognises this status as a distinct legal status, and regulates it in various 
ways; it decides who is eligible for the status, how the status can be 
dissolved, etc. There is also a particular bundle of legal rights and duties that 
is conferred on to couples that attain the marital status. This bundle includes 
things such as next of kin rights, inheritance rights, and tax benefits (among 
many other things).82  
The state could bear a different relation to the romantic relationship. There 
are a couple of options. The political institution of marriage could be 
retained but reformed so that it is compatible with political liberal 
principles. Or, it could be abolished, leaving only a non-political institution 
of marriage in its place. This would mean that there would still be marriage, 
but it would be a non-legal status that could only be conferred by a non-
                                                          
80 See Brake (2016) for a good overview.  
81 This debate owes a lot to the previous debates, in particular the same-sex 
marriage debates, as it often builds on and extends the logic of arguments 
put forward in favour of same-sex marriage (for example, those concerning 
equal treatment).  
82 See Brake (2012), pp. 158-159, for a comprehensive list of what is 
included in the US bundle.  
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political body, such as a church. As such, the state would not recognize the 
marital status as especially legally significant, and no legal rights or duties 
would depend on the status alone. 
Even if the political institution of marriage is abolished, the state might still 
regulate the romantic relationship via other means. This could be directly, 
through an alternative regulatory framework which still creates a distinct 
legal category for the romantic relationship. Or it could be indirectly, 
through regulatory frameworks that are set up for (and which create distinct 
legal categories for) other personal relationships, such as caring 
relationships, or the parental relationship.  
There could also be reason for the state to regulate (non-legal) marital 
relationships when the political institution of marriage is abolished. It might 
be necessary, for example, to have laws forbidding certain marriages (such 
as between parent and child) because of the harm such marriages could do 
to the individuals involved.83  
The arguments that claim that the political institution of marriage is 
objectionable on political liberal grounds, and which I want to look at in 
more depth, are drawn from the work of Elizabeth Brake (2012), Tamara 
Metz (2010) and Clare Chambers (2017). Whilst Brake is strictly the only 
political liberal in this group, Metz raises issues concerning neutrality that a 
political liberal should be concerned about, and Chambers specifically 
addresses the arguments I consider to political liberals.  
Each of the three authors have different overall projects. Brake considers 
and rejects moral defences of marriage before arguing that her proposed 
minimal marriage is all that can be justified on a political liberal framework. 
Metz is concerned that the state’s involvement in marriage is assumed but 
never justified, and aims to show that liberal arguments in favour of a 
political institution of marriage only justify state recognition of intimate 
caregiving, and not of marriage per se. She therefore proposes an alternative 
Intimate Caregiving Union (ICGU) Status. Chambers aims to show that a 
                                                          
83 See Chambers (2017) Chapter Six. 
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political institution of marriage (and any alternative status plus bundle of 
rights and duties) violates both equality and liberty, and argues in favour of 
a marriage-free state.84  
Whilst none of them argue that marriage (in some form) should be erased 
completely as an option for people to choose, they do all think that 
something needs to change with the political institution of marriage. Where 
they differ, is in what they think that change should be. Brake is a marriage 
reformer. She aims to show that whilst state recognition of marriage is 
justifiable per se, the current political institution of marriage is not, and 
stands in need of reform. Metz and Chambers both argue for the abolition of 
the political institution of marriage but differ in their alternative proposals. 
Metz argues instead for the state recognition of intimate caregiving 
relationships, whereas Chambers argues that we should regulate relationship 
practices through default state directives.  
There are three levels of concern that can be identified within the arguments 
that these authors put forward: the first (and weakest) accepts the existence 
of a political institution of marriage but argues that the current structure of 
the institution needs to be reformed in order for it to be compatible with 
political liberalism; the second argues against any political institution of 
marriage however it is structured; the third (and strongest) rejects any form 
of political institution (of marriage, civil union, or alternative status) that 
involves state recognition of adult personal relationships.   
1st Level: the current political institution of marriage is structured in 
a way that is problematic for political liberalism.  
2nd Level: any political institution of marriage (however it is 
structured) is problematic for political liberalism.  
3rd Level: any political institution (a legal status plus a bundle of 
rights and duties) that recognises adult personal relationships is 
problematic for political liberalism.  
                                                          
84 I provide more detail on each author’s alternative proposal in Chapter 
Seven.  
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I consider Brake’s (2012) Public Reason Argument for the first level of 
concern in the next section. This argument is concerned that the current 
structure of the political institution of marriage cannot be justified by appeal 
to public reasons, and so the institution violates the political liberal principle 
of public reason. I argue that a public reason for the current structure could 
possibly be found.  
In Chapter Six I address the second and third levels of concern. I present 
and evaluate Metz’s (2010) Neutrality Argument and Chambers’ (2017) 
Argument from Meaning, both of which raise the second level of concern. 
These arguments highlight the meaningful nature of marriage. They claim 
that the state’s involvement with something that has such meaning will 
violate the principle of neutrality. I aim to demonstrate that a political 
institution of marriage doesn’t necessarily have to mean something, but 
acknowledge that, practically, it might be preferable to have a political 
institution of something else (for example, civil union). 
Finally I consider Chambers’ (2017) Justificatory Neutrality Argument, and 
in particular her Argument from Bundling and her Argument Concerning 
Hierarchy (which form a part of the Justificatory Neutrality Argument along 
with the Argument from Meaning) which aim to show that any political 
institution that recognises a particular adult personal relationship is prima 
facie non-neutral. This means that the state can only use such an institution 
if it can find sufficiently weighty public reasons (that override the prima 
facie non-neutrality) to do so. I intend to show that the concerns regarding 
bundling and hierarchy are unfounded, especially as we will have shown, 
when discussing the second level of concern, that marriage doesn’t have to 
have a comprehensive meaning.  
5.3 The 1st Level of Concern: An Argument against the Current 
Political Institution of Marriage  
The Public Reason Argument focuses in on a structural feature of the 
current political institution of marriage - the fact that only romantic couples 
are eligible for the marital status. The argument claims that this restriction is 
unjustifiable on political liberal terms, and should be removed.  
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This argument assumes that there is a legitimate reason for the existence of 
the political institution of marriage and so it does not give us reason to be 
concerned that the state currently relates to the paradigmatic marital 
relationship (the romantic relationship) through such an institution.  Rather, 
the concern it highlights is that the state bears a special relation to the 
romantic relationship. Brake claims that the state should recognise other 
personal relationships as well (in particular, for Brake, other adult caring 
relationships). If the institution was reformed in a way that addressed this 
concern (for example, Brake’s proposed minimal marriage), then it would 
no longer be problematic for political liberalism (according the Public 
Reason Argument at least). As such, we can understand this argument to be 
situated at the first level of concern. 
5.3.1 The Public Reason Argument  
The Public Reason Argument starts from the assumption that the political 
institution of marriage is a “part of the basic structure” of society, and so 
unquestionably subject to the requirements of public reason (Brake 2012, p. 
134). This argument claims that the current political institution of marriage 
violates the principle of public reason because the state has to appeal to non-
neutral value judgments, “drawn from within comprehensive doctrines”, 
concerning the value of romantic couples in order to justify its current 
structure (p. 168).  
It follows a typical argument made in favour of same-sex marriage, and 
Brake aims to show how this argument has more extensive implications than 
the same-sex marriage proponents realised.  These arguments begin with the 
“recognition that the state provides numerous benefits though marriage … 
which are denied to same-sex relationships” (2012, p. 140). They 
characterise “marriage as providing a legislative framework for certain adult 
relationships” (p. 140) – typically either “intimate or committed or caring 
adult relationships” (p. 144). They then claim that the restriction to 
heterosexual couples requires a justification that appeals to public reasons 
because homosexual relationships can also be intimate, committed and 
caring. The proponents of same-sex marriage aim to show that there is no 
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way to distinguish same-sex and different-sex relationships without 
appealing to reasons that depend on contested (rather than public) views, for 
example views about the “value or permissibility of same-sex activity” (p. 
144). This demonstrates that the restriction to heterosexual couples is 
unjustifiable because it violates the principle of public reason. This 
restriction should therefore be removed and marriage should be made 
available to homosexual couples as well. Brake, assuming that marriage is 
characterised in the same way, demonstrates how this argument can be 
taken further.  
As already noted, the Public Reason Argument focuses on a particular 
feature of the current political institution of marriage. This feature is the 
restriction to “sexual or romantic relationships, [that involve] shared 
domicile or finances, aspirations to permanence or exclusivity, or a full 
reciprocal exchange of marital rights” (2012, p. 168). The argument rests on 
a (potential) concern about equal treatment: the state provides numerous 
benefits through marriage that are denied to caring (or intimate or 
committed) relationships that do not fit the romantic couple norm, such as 
close friendships and adult care networks. These benefits include both the 
legal rights and benefits (financial and otherwise) conferred on to married 
couples, as well as state recognition of their relationship (p. 144). The 
principle of public reason, claims Brake, demands a justification “for 
excluding friendships, care networks, and groups from the benefits of 
marriage” that appeals to public reasons (p. 145). Such a justification, she 
claims, cannot be provided.  
The reason why Brake thinks that this restriction cannot be justified 
appropriately is because the justification has to appeal to the view that this 
particular type of relationship - the romantic couple - is especially valuable. 
In other words, the only way to distinguish romantic couples from other 
relationships such as friendships or care networks, is to appeal to the special 
value of romantic couples. This is because all of these relationships have the 
relevant (public) features of, for example, care, intimacy, and commitment. 
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The view that romantic couples are especially valuable is not one that all 
citizens can endorse or accept because it is not a view that they will all share 
as there are “many varying conceptions of good relationships [which] exist 
within different comprehensive doctrines” that citizens hold (2012, p. 168). 
The view that romantic couples are especially valuable is contested, and so 
it cannot be appealed to when justifying the restriction that is present in the 
current political institution of marriage. To appeal to such a view, is to 
violate the principle of public reason. The current political institution of 
marriage, with this restriction, can therefore be seen to be problematic for 
political liberalism.  
The argument can be set out as follows:  
1) If a law or a political institution cannot be justified by appeal to 
public reasons then it is illegitimate.  
2) The current political institution of marriage restricts eligibility to 
romantic couples.  
3) The restriction to romantic couples is only justifiable by appeal to a 
contested (non-public) view about the value of romantic couples.  
4) The current political institution of marriage illegitimate.  
This argument can therefore be understood as claiming that the relation that 
the state (exclusively) bears to dyadic romantic relationships (the 
paradigmatic marital relationship) via the current political institution of 
marriage is problematic because this institution cannot be justified by public 
reasons. The concern is not that the state provides recognition and legal 
rights and benefits to certain relationships. Rather, the concern is that the 
category of relationship eligible for these benefits is too narrow. 
5.3.2 An Evaluation of the Public Reason Argument  
As Ralph Wedgwood (2016) notes, defending a claim that says there is no 
suitably public justification for the current political institution of marriage 
requires demonstrating that all possible justifications are unsuitable. He 
claims that Brake does not do enough to establish this conclusion. It also 
opens her up to an obvious form of objection: providing a public reason for 
the current institution (with its eligibility restriction). Wedgwood does just 
165 
 
this. He offers one possible public reason for the current institution of 
marriage; namely that it promotes the common good in virtue of satisfying 
citizens’ preferences – preferences that could not be satisfied in any other 
way, other than through the political institution of marriage (with its current 
eligibility restriction). 
Wedgwood assumes that a political institution of marriage can be 
appropriately, publically, justified if it “promotes the common good of 
society” (2016, p. 39). He claims that it would promote the common good if 
it meets three criteria: first, that “it is a central part of many people’s most 
fundamental goals and aspirations in life to participate in the institution of 
marriage, and a legal institution of civil marriage is the best way for these 
people to satisfy these aspirations”; secondly, that “the existence of the 
institution of marriage does not in itself cause any serious harms”; and third, 
that “at least prima facie marriage is consistent with justice…” (p. 39, 
emphasis in the original). He goes on to argue that the current political 
institution of marriage meets these three criteria.  
His argument for the first criterion rests on the observation that many 
citizens of Western liberal democracies “aspire to participate in the 
institution of marriage” and treat this aspiration as central to their lives 
(Wedgwood 2016, p. 39). This aspiration specifically involves the desire to 
acquire the legal marital status, rights, and duties which bring with them a 
“generally understood social meaning” (p. 39). This social meaning is “a 
body of common knowledge and general expectations about marriage that is 
shared among practically all members of society” (p. 32).  
The social meaning of marriage is important (and desired) because it allows 
couples to communicate their marital status, by saying they are ‘married’, 
within a diverse pluralistic society. Marriage law, including the package of 
legal rights and duties (and the eligibility restriction) reflects this social 
meaning and “reinforces society’s expectations” that marital relationships 
will tend to have the generally expected features this social meaning 
describes (Wedgwood 2016, p. 35). Wedgwood therefore claims that 
maintaining the current political institution of marriage is the best way for 
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the state to enable its citizens to satisfy their aspirations to be a part of this 
institution.  
Wedgwood then provides reasons for thinking that the further two criteria 
can also be met. He thinks that any harms that might be thought to result 
from the existence of a political institution of marriage are either not due to 
the existence of the political institution or can be easily mitigated through 
other means (for example, by extending third party benefits to 
individuals/relationships that are ineligible for marriage). He claims that 
nobody’s rights are violated by the existence of a political institution of 
marriage (once it has rid itself of its sexist traditions and is extended to 
same-sex couples). In particular he claims that the restriction to dyadic 
couples does not violate the rights of people in polyamorous relationships 
because their exclusion from the institution is not “arbitrary and unjust” 
(2016, p. 42). This is because there is a reasonable concern that the “serious 
harms that have historically accompanied polygamy” (p. 42) - for example, 
harm to women - would be reintroduced if the restriction was relaxed. 
How does Wedgwood’s response meet the Public Reason Argument’s 
concerns? It claims that there is a public reason - promoting the common 
good - for having (and maintaining) the current political institution of 
marriage complete with its eligibility restriction.  
Brake rejects Wedgwood’s response for a number of reasons. She disputes 
the idea that there is a shared social meaning of marriage, given the diverse 
conceptions of the good within society and the various definitions and 
debates surrounding it (2012, p. 186).85 She also points out that it might not 
only be romantic couples that want their relationships recognised by a legal 
institution (p. 142). Denying this recognition could potentially constitute a 
harm, and isn’t mitigated by extending third party benefits to ineligible 
relationships. I think the claim that concern about the reintroduction of past 
                                                          
85 Brake says this in reference to a different point (relating to her reasons for 
retaining the label ‘marriage’) but it is a relevant objection to Wedgwood’s 
argument. See Chapter Six, section 6.3.2, for more on this point, and why I 
think we should be wary of accepting Wedgwood’s claim that we have such 
a comprehensive view of what marriage ‘means’.  
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injustices justifies the restriction to dyadic relationships also looks 
problematic (it at least requires further evidence).  
I will not go through these objections to Wedgwood’s view in more detail 
because I think there is an alternative, and preferable response to the Public 
Reason Argument that avoids these objections. This response also suggests 
that public reasons can be provided for the current institution of marriage 
(with its eligibility restriction), but it focuses more directly on the restriction 
to romantic couples. It also concentrates on one of the relationship features - 
care - that the legal framework of marriage is taken to legitimately 
recognise.  
I think we can directly challenge claim 3) of the Public Reason Argument - 
namely, that the restriction to romantic couples is only justifiable by appeal 
to a contested view about the value of romantic couples - by demonstrating 
that there is a relevant difference in the care that occurs in romantic 
relationships.  
As noted above, marriage is often thought to be a legislative framework for 
caring relationships. Pointing to the care that usually occurs in marriage, and 
demonstrating how marriage can foster, protect and promote this care via 
the tangible benefits that attach to the marital status is in fact a typical, 
liberal way of providing a defence for the political institution of marriage. A 
number of authors (including Brake, Chambers and Metz) think that care is 
something that the political liberal state is legitimately concerned with. 
Brake and Metz also hold that the recognition of certain caring and care-
giving relationships is something that can be justified by appeal to public 
reason. 
What the Public Reason Argument makes clear however is that we need to 
be able to show that the care that is being recognised in romantic 
relationships by the legislative framework of marriage is relevantly different 
from the care that occurs in other relationship types. Otherwise there would 
be a legitimate complaint of unequal treatment.  
If it can be shown that there is a relevant difference in the care that occurs in 
romantic relationships, then this will directly challenge Brake’s claim that 
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there is no relevant way to distinguish romantic couples from (non-dyadic 
and non-amorous) friendships and other group relationships without 
appealing to contested views about the value of romantic couples. I think 
such a relevant difference can be found. 
Christopher Bennett for instance suggests that the romantic couple - or in 
his terms “the relationship of conjugal love” (2003, p. 286) - is the only 
relationship in which the participants assume particular relationship duties: 
namely to take on “responsibility for the whole person, the whole life of 
one’s partner” and to have a “generalised duty to support the other and see 
them through any problems that they are having in any area of their life” 
(2003, p. 296). These unique duties of care, according to Bennett, lead to a 
particular type of reciprocal recognition which is crucially important for 
promoting our social bases of self-respect (a Rawlsian primary good). 
Appealing to this feature of the romantic relationship - if true - could 
provide a relevant, and public, reason for regulating and recognising the 
romantic relationship and only the romantic relationship through marriage.  
For his full argument to be successful, he would need to defend the further 
claim “that getting married itself protects and promotes conjugal love” 
(Bennett 2003, p. 286), which he does not do in any detail. Rather, he just 
suggests that “marriage is instrumentally valuable in promoting and 
preserving conjugal love because it makes breaking up harder to do” (p. 
287). Nevertheless, the key idea that I want to draw out of his argument is 
that there is a difference between dyadic romantic (conjugal love) 
relationships and other caring relationship which could warrant differential 
treatment.  
Bennett’s view provides a reason to think that romantic relationships are 
better at providing crucial aspects of care. When it comes to questions of 
political justification there are other differences that might also justify 
differential treatment – namely the risks of care. Tamara Metz argues that 
state recognition of personal relationships is warranted when the 
relationships involve intimate caregiving. Whilst she acknowledges the 
value of caregiving in general and of intimate caregiving in particular, it is 
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not the value of the caregiving that warrants state recognition. Rather, it is 
because intimate caregiving involves particularly grave “material, physical 
and psychological” risks (Metz 2010, p. 126).86   
All caregiving involves some risk. This is because it “creates vulnerability” 
for the caregiver who has to “expend resources” on the person they are 
caring for, resources which “they might otherwise use to care for 
themselves” (Metz 2010, p. 126). These resources will include material 
resources such as money, physical resources such as physical health, and 
psychological resources such as mental health and self-respect. Whilst we 
might expect these expended resources and/or care to be reciprocated within 
a personal relationship (between equals) reciprocation is not guaranteed to 
occur, nor is it predictable what form it will take. This is because caregiving 
is “unmonitored, unpredictable, and often incommensurable” (p. 126).   
Intimate caregiving is particularly risky because it is “unpaid, unrecognised 
and undervalued, and not seen as producing ‘marketable’ skills” (2010, p. 
126). This leads to the generation of “systematic vulnerabilities” for 
intimate caregivers and “serious disincentives” to become an intimate 
caregiver (p. 127). The state has an interest in intimate caregiving work 
being “done well” and in the “benefits and burdens” of intimate caregiving 
being “distributed justly” (p. 127). For this reason, and because the state is 
the body that has the “task and tools [for] protecting citizens from physical 
harm and securing a framework for the just distribution of the costs and 
benefits of political life” (p. 127), the state is warranted in recognising 
intimate caregiving relationships in order to mitigate against these risks, by 
for example, ensuring neither party is impoverished by divorce, and thereby 
mitigating the economic risk.87  
                                                          
86 Note that caregiving is just one aspect of a caring relationship, which also 
involves an attitude of care and concern (see Brake 2012, p. 174). As I will 
show, I think the nature of the caring relationship (including the attitude of 
care and concern) affects how risky it is to provide caregiving in the 
relationship.  
87 I look at Metz’s argument in more detail in Chapter Seven, sections 7.3.2 
and 7.3.4. 
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Metz claims that intimate caregiving is present in a variety of relationship 
types. She argues for an institution that makes all relationships that involve 
intimate caregiving eligible for recognition via her ICGU Status. I think her 
argument is reasonable, and agree that it could demonstrate that all instances 
of intimate care require some kind of state insurance. However, I also think 
that this focus on the risks of intimate caregiving could provide a reason for 
the differential treatment that occurs in the political institution of marriage. 
If the risks in one type of relationship are further intensified by the nature of 
that relationship, then this could provide a reason for recognising that 
particular caring relationship in a different way.  
If it could be shown that romantic couple relationships involve particularly 
risky intimate caregiving, then this might warrant the restriction to romantic 
couples present in the current political institution of marriage, and justify 
the differential treatment of caregiving relationships that results (relieving 
the potential charge of unjustified unequal treatment).  
The account of the romantic relationship given in Chapter Four gives us 
reason to think that romantic couples do involve particularly risky intimate 
caregiving, due to the nature of this caring relationship. The role of a 
romantic partner requires those in that role to share the experiences that are 
central to their lives and accommodate these things within a joint life, and to 
take joint responsibility for the central aspects of each other’s well-being. 
The fulfilment of these relationship duties is arguably going to require 
greater amounts of physical, material and psychological resources than the 
obligations of other relationships. The failure to fulfil these obligations will 
likely also be more detrimental, particularly considering the emotional 
interdependence of people in such relationships. 88  
Whilst I do not claim that romantic relationships are always dyadic, I think 
there is a reason to treat dyadic relationships differently. When there are just 
two individuals involved the caregiver is dependent on just one other person 
to reciprocate the intimate care, which means that it is more detrimental 
when the reciprocation does not happen, or is reciprocated in a way that still 
                                                          
88 I develop this line of thought further in Chapter Eight. 
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leaves the caregiver vulnerable. This can be seen, for example, when 
caregiving leads to financial dependence. If there were more people to rely 
on, the risks of no reciprocation would be less acute. 
It might be objected that it isn’t only romantic couples that involve such 
risky care – that other dyadic relationships, for instance, also involve this 
acute vulnerability. However I think the unique obligations of romantic 
relationships give us reason to think that these relationships enable 
particularly deep and intimate knowledge to be gained of the other person, 
which while opening up the possibility of individually tailored care, also 
leaves one distinctly vulnerable, making the care that occurs in such 
relationships particularly risky. We allow those we love to learn how best to 
care for us, and are motivated to care for them using our own resources. 
This in turn puts those we love in a unique position to be able to harm us. 
My claim is that romantic relationships (and in particular dyadic romantic 
relationships) have a unique nature which can generate acute instances of 
physical, material and psychological vulnerability when they involve 
caregiving (which they typically do). The existence of this risky caregiving 
could provide a public reason for restricting which relationships are eligible 
for marriage. Claim 3) of the Public Reason Argument can therefore be 
challenged, as the restriction to romantic couples could be justified by 
appeal to this public reason. 
5.3.3 Summary  
The Public Reason Argument raised the concern that the current structure of 
the political institution of marriage (with its restriction to romantic couples) 
could not be justified by appeal to public reasons. I have argued that we can 
find public reasons to justify this restriction – reasons that either focus on 
the particularly beneficial care (that leads to recognition) that occurs only in 
romantic relationships, or on the particular riskiness of intimate caregiving 
within romantic couples. This suggests that there is no concern with the fact 
that the state bears a special and unique relation to the romantic relationship. 
This special relation can be appropriately justified.  
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5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has introduced the three levels of concern that can be found 
within political liberal arguments against marriage. Whilst I have argued 
that this first level of concern - regarding the structure of the current 
institution - can be assuaged, there are further, more serious concerns to be 
faced.  
We still need to consider the concern that any political institution of 
marriage (whatever form it takes) violates political liberal principles; and 
even more seriously, that any political institution that recognises adult 
personal relationships violates political liberal principles. These are the 
second and third levels of concern identified above. These concerns 
question whether the state should be involved in the institution of marriage 
at all, and whether it can relate to adult personal relationships (including the 
romantic relationship) via any form of political institution that entails state 
recognition. I consider these next two levels of concern in Chapter Six.  
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Chapter Six  
The Political Institution of Marriage: The Second and Third Levels of 
Concern 
 
This chapter further investigates whether the current relation that the state 
bears to the paradigmatic marital relationship (the romantic relationship) via 
a political institution of marriage is appropriate. It focuses on arguments for 
the second and third levels of concern (identified in Chapter Five). 
The second level of concern is worried that any political institution of 
marriage is problematic for political liberalism because of the meaningful 
nature of this institution. I first consider Metz’s Neutrality Argument and 
then Chambers’ Argument from Meaning, both of which are situated at this 
level of concern. If the concern is warranted, it suggests that the state should 
not establish and recognise marriage. If it has reason to regulate, or even 
recognise, the romantic relationship (for some independent reason) then it 
should not do so via this particular political institution.  
The third level of concern is worried that any political institution (a legal 
status plus a bundle of rights and duties etc.) that provides state recognition 
of adult personal relationships will be problematic for political liberalism. I 
present and evaluate Chambers’ Justificatory Neutrality Argument which is 
situated at this level of concern. If this argument is correct it would suggests 
that the state should not recognise any adult personal relationships (the 
romantic relationship included) via any kind of political institution (and so 
should use an alternative regulatory tool that does not provide any state 
recognition, if regulation is required).  
I aim to show that the concerns at both levels can be dismissed. The 
arguments considered do not conclusively show that it is inappropriate for 
the liberal state to regulate and recognise the romantic relationship through a 
political institution of marriage.  
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6.1 The 2nd Level of Concern: Arguments against the Political 
Institution of Marriage 
I will consider two separate arguments for the second level of concern, 
drawn from the work of Tamara Metz (2010) and Clare Chambers (2017), 
both of which claim that the political institution of marriage is problematic 
for political liberalism. Even if there are independent liberal reasons for 
regulating and recognising romantic relationships, these arguments claim 
that this should not be achieved through a political institution of marriage.  
We need to find some alternative political institution (for example, of civil 
unions or ICGU status).  
Both of these arguments are concerned with the principle of neutrality 
which claims that the state should not hold or express a particular 
conception of the good nor appeal to any particular conception of the good 
when justifying its laws, policies and institutions. They each focus on the 
first part of this principle (concerning the state holding and expressing a 
particular conception of the good). However, each claims that the violation 
occurs for subtly different reasons.  
The key reason for this concern with neutrality, in both arguments, is that 
marriage appears to have some sort of meaning within our societies, rather 
than simply being an instrumental form of state regulation. We can see that 
marriage is treated by some U.S courts as having a particular meaning in 
Baker v. State of Vermont (1999) which concluded that a civil union status 
should be created for same-sex couples. This civil union status was to 
convey the same civil benefits on to same-sex couples that the marital status 
conveyed on to heterosexual couples. Insisting on different statuses that 
have the same instrumental purpose, and retaining ‘marriage’ only for 
heterosexual couples implies that marriage is taken to have a particular, 
special, meaning – a meaning the State of Vermont did not want to extend to 
same-sex couples.89 Again, however, each author takes different approaches 
                                                          
89 See Metz 2010, p. 34. 
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to spelling out what this meaning is, and why it is problematic for state 
neutrality. This will be explained below.   
6.2 Metz’s Neutrality Argument  
Whilst Metz argues from a broadly liberal point of view, she highlights 
worries about neutrality that a political liberal should be particularly 
concerned with. Her focus throughout Untying the Knot is on the fact that 
marriage is a political institution - or in her terms “established” - which 
means that “governments define and confer marital status and use it as an 
exclusive and privileged means for meeting public-welfare aims [and] …the 
state exercises final say over the content and public use of the marital label” 
(2010, pp. 3-4). 
Focusing on the courts in Western liberal democracies, and on liberal 
theorists (including Locke, Mill and Okin) she illustrates that the political 
institution of marriage is often viewed and treated in one way – as having 
some sort of meaning – but justified in another way, namely, in purely 
instrumental terms. As a result, she claims, the state’s recognition of 
marriage is never fully defended. 
Metz aims to build up a fuller picture of how marriage is viewed within our 
Western liberal societies, and in doing so uncovers the “meaning side of 
marriage” (2010, p. 87). She then argues that the liberal state’s involvement 
in marriage (viewed in this way) cannot be defended. She claims that “the 
establishment of marriage flirts with violating liberalism’s most basic 
values” including equality, liberty, stability, and the public/private divide (p. 
7). I will focus on one of her arguments for why the political institution of 
marriage violates liberty and the principle of neutrality. 
6.2.1 Marriage as a Formal, Comprehensive Social Institution  
First, we need to understand the view of marriage that Metz is working with. 
On this view marriage is not a legal framework for regulating some forms of 
adult relationship (the view Brake takes). Rather, it is a “formal, 
comprehensive social institution” (Metz 2010, p. 85), and it is because of 
this that it is incompatible with political liberalism. She claims that citizens 
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of liberal societies - despite their varied and diverse “conception[s] of 
marriage” - nevertheless share this “concept” of marriage as a formal, 
comprehensive social institution (p. 86, emphasis in the original). There are 
three central features to this view of marriage (which I explain in more 
detail below):  
First, marriage is a social institution, which is to say a pattern of 
expected behaviour that exists outside or before secular law… 
Second, marriage has a comprehensive purpose: it relies on and 
reproduces complex accounts of the connections between individual 
and community; public and private; belief and behaviour; and 
sexuate, social, and political self-understanding. The third concerns 
method: marriage relies on formal, public recognition and regulation 
by … an ethical authority”. (Metz 2010, pp. 86-87) 
Viewing marriage in this way, claims Metz, gives us a fuller picture of what 
marriage means: it tells us  
what the extra value of marriage is (its unique capacity to integrate 
individuals to each other and to their community, from the inside 
out) and how it achieves this value (through the formal recognition 
of an ethical authority). (2010, p. 107)  
Social institutions, as we have already seen in Chapter Three, are “patterns 
of behaviour explained and promoted by a socially significant story” (Metz 
2010, p. 96). They are made up of social norms which impose positive and 
negative social sanctions on individuals, influencing them to comply with 
the pattern of expected behaviour. These sanctions are often experienced as 
“natural” (p. 96) rather than as coercive or freedom-limiting. 
The (pre-legal) social institution of marriage, claims Metz, is comprehensive 
both in its purpose, and in its concerns. Marriage aims to alter both 
“behaviour and belief” (2010, p. 97) – it governs behaviour through 
instilling social norms. Marriage is concerned not only with people as 
citizens (as political persons), but as whole individuals – from their “sexuate 
to political identity” (p. 97).  
Marriage is a particular type of social institution – one that requires “formal 
public recognition” (Metz 2010, p. 98): you cannot be married without the 
formal public recognition that you are. Not all social institutions require 
this. Motherhood, for example, is a social institution that doesn’t require 
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formal public recognition: you can fulfil the role of a mother (caring for 
your child etc.) without it being formally and publicly recognised that you 
are in that role. 
In order for this formal public recognition to come about, the social 
institution of marriage needs “the formal involvement of a public authority” 
(Metz 2010, p. 99). Without such an authority the social institution cannot 
exist. This authority also needs to be ethical – “an authority whose 
directives are experienced as natural and freedom-guiding … by dint of the 
shared view[s] … between the individual and the community of which this 
authority is representative” (p. 103).90 Crucially though, Metz claims, this 
public ethical authority does not have to be the state. 
To explain why this public authority needs to be ethical, Metz draws on the 
work of Hegel.91 On Hegel’s view, marriage both governs behaviour and 
material matters, and also “integrates individuals with each other and with 
their community and its norms, practices and institutions, so that their 
inevitable interdependence is experienced as natural and … not 
constraining” (Metz 2010, p. 101). It is this integration that marriage 
enables which requires an ethical authority. Such integrations are only 
possible when an ethical authority has “formal, public control over and 
involvement in the institution” (p. 101).  
This integration occurs in marriage when 
…the individuals formally and expressly consent to the terms of 
marriage, when they self-consciously acknowledge their entrance 
into the institution and its norms of behaviour … in the announced 
presence of the community that determines those terms and norms. 
(Metz 2010, p. 102) 
This highlights that the authority representing that community needs to be 
ethical (rather than merely legal) because it requires the authority to have 
“shared understandings about the nature of the relationship it labels and, 
crucially, about the appropriateness of that authority’s commands in matters 
of the most intimate nature, including belief” (Metz 2010, p. 103). Both the 
                                                          
90 The Pope is an example of an ethical authority for Catholics. 
91 In particular she draws on Hegel’s (1952) Philosophy of Right here.  
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individuals getting married, and the authority conferring the marital status, 
need to recognise and accept the social norms that constitute the institution 
of marriage. Without such shared understandings, the integration could not 
occur.  
The political institution of marriage is problematic for political liberalism 
because it is associated with this formal, comprehensive social institution of 
marriage. It is this (pre-legal) social institution that gives the political 
institution meaning.  
The extra value of the civil status of marriage has everything to do 
with marriage – the socially significant (if variously defined) 
‘pattern of expected action’ that … pre-exists legal definition and 
regulation. (Metz 2010, 2010, p. 95) 
However we reform the political institution of marriage it will always be 
associated with the social institution of marriage and its meaning, and so it 
will always be problematic according to Metz.  
6.2.2 The Violation of Neutrality  
In particular, it is because the state is cast in the role of public ethical 
authority when the institution of marriage is political, that makes it so 
problematic.  
Metz doesn’t clearly spell out her argument here, but she does claim that the 
marital status is akin to the bar mitzvah status. We think that it is completely 
inappropriate for the state to recognise and confer the bar mitzvah status 
because that status is meant to integrate a person into the Jewish 
community, and in order to do this the (ethical) authority that confers the 
status must represent a “community of shared religious belief” which “gives 
the status meaning” (2010, p. 119). If the state tried to play this role it would 
be a “violation of even the least restrictive variety of state neutrality” (p. 
119). We can see that this violation of the principle of neutrality would 
occur if the state conferred the bar mitzvah status because in order to confer 
this status it would have to hold a particular (Jewish) conception of the good 
that views the status as meaningful and valuable (for non-instrumental 
reasons). 
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Similarly Metz claims that in order to play the role of an ethical authority 
for the political institution of marriage, the state reproduces and relies “on 
belief in a particular, comprehensive account and institutional form of 
intimate life and its tie to the community” (2010, p. 114). The state has to 
represent this set of beliefs. It both holds these beliefs, and encourages its 
citizens to hold them by channelling them into the institution of marriage 
(by recognising the marital status) (p. 96). The claim seems to be that this 
amounts to the state holding a particular conception of the good – one that 
says something about marriage and its integrative nature and views the 
marital status as meaningful and valuable (for non-instrumental reasons). 
This is not something that the political liberal state should be doing. 
6.2.3 An Evaluation of Metz’s Neutrality Argument  
Simon May (2016) provides reasons to be wary of Metz’s bar mitzvah 
analogy. May is primarily interested in finding a neutral justification for the 
political institution of marriage. However he notes that even if such a 
neutral justification could be found, there are further ways in which 
neutrality can be violated: when there is “state propagation of a 
philosophical conception of the good life” (p. 23). This is precisely the 
concern Metz has about the political institution of marriage. 
May is responding to various neutrality arguments against the political 
institution of marriage that claim the state’s involvement with the institution 
endorses the matrimonial ideal. The matrimonial ideal can be “defined to 
encompass any belief that marriage constitutes an ultimately superior type 
of relationship” and that it, in some way, “gives ultimate meaning and value 
to human existence” (2016, pp. 10-11). This is a particular conception of the 
good that aligns with a number of different (religious and secular) views and 
is a view that the political liberal state has no business in holding or 
endorsing as a result. 
May includes Metz’s argument in this list of neutrality arguments that make 
this claim. Whilst I do not think that the matrimonial ideal quite captures the 
view Metz claims the state has to hold as an ethical authority (because it 
doesn’t say anything about marriage’s integrative nature), I think it is 
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similar enough for May’s arguments to pose a challenge. Metz is concerned 
about a view that takes marriage to be valuable and she treats this view as a 
conception of the good which is compatible with a variety of different views 
(she claims, after all, that it is a view all liberal citizens hold).  
These neutrality arguments liken the political institution of marriage to state 
promotion of religious practices, and contrast it with state promotion of 
particular sports. In the case of sport, the state cannot say whether one sport 
is ultimately better than another, but it can recognise empirical evidence (if 
there is any) that shows, for example, that football encourages social unity 
because it is accessible and cheap. This would amount to a public, 
instrumental, and neutral reason for promoting football (over other sports 
that aren’t beneficial in this way) via school and community funding.  
The case of religious practices is different. For example, some religions 
involve pilgrimages to holy sites, whilst others do not. The state cannot have 
a position on “whether the true religion requires a pilgrimage to a holy site” 
(May 2016, p. 24). It can recognise that annual pilgrimages have a reliable 
economic impact, and that this is better than the economic impact that 
ordinary tourism has. However, it cannot encourage citizens to go on a 
pilgrimage (as it encourages them to play soccer rather than other sports) 
because this would be to “encourage them to adopt certain religious views” 
(p. 24).92 The concern is that a political institution of marriage is analogous 
to the pilgrimage example: that it encourages people to adopt the 
matrimonial ideal (or in Metz’s terms, the comprehensive view that takes 
marriage and its integrative nature to be valuable).  
The problem with pilgrimage (and allegedly marriage) is that it is 
“presumptively doctrinal” (May 2016, p. 26). A cultural practice is 
presumptively doctrinal when it is “governed by a certain social norm: to 
participate in the practice in good faith, an individual must endorse a 
particular doctrine or, at least, some range of its tenets” (p. 25). Pilgrimage 
is an example of such a practice because a certain religion must be endorsed 
                                                          
92 The encouragement, we can imagine, might be provided by giving tax 
breaks to those who make the pilgrimage.  
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in order for the pilgrimage site to be treated as holy. This means that even 
instrumental reasons cannot justify state promotion of pilgrimage, because it 
would “promote either belief in the religious doctrine or bad faith 
participation in the activity” (p. 25). The state should not do either. 
May claims however that marriage is not presumptively doctrinal (unlike 
religious practices). This is because “there is no social norm that newlyweds 
must also endorse the matrimonial ideal” (2016, p. 25). Some people will 
marry because they endorse the matrimonial ideal. Others however will 
have very different reasons. It is after all an easy way for people to express 
their commitment to each other. These alternative reasons are not insincere 
or cynical, and they don’t imply a belief in the matrimonial ideal. I think the 
same can be said about the view Metz is concerned about – there is no social 
norm that says people getting married have to endorse the comprehensive 
view about marriage and its integrative nature.  
May recognises that this is an empirical, and contingent, claim. But so long 
as there is no such social norm, marriage is not presumptively doctrinal, and 
it is therefore more like a particular sport than a religious practice. The 
political institution of marriage therefore does not violate the principle of 
neutrality because it is not propagating the matrimonial ideal, or the 
comprehensive view about marriage as integrative. 93  
That there appears to be no such social norm also challenges Metz’s claim 
that there is this shared concept of marriage as a formal, comprehensive 
social institution in the first place. The diversity of liberal societies also 
gives us reason to doubt this claim and the idea that there can be such a 
shared concept of marriage. Metz’s argument rests heavily on this claim, 
and so showing that there is reason to doubt it gives us strong reason to 
reject her argument.  
                                                          
93 There are social norms about marrying solely for instrumental reasons 
(for example, to avoid tax or for immigration rights) without any form of 
loving or committed relationship, but this is a view about what the 
institution of marriage is for.  
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People within liberal societies have vastly differing views about pretty much 
everything – marriage included. Getting married is compatible with 
endorsing a whole host of different religious, cultural, and philosophical 
views. These views have different conceptions of marriage, and people get 
married for a whole host of different reasons – some practical, some 
meaningful, some traditional. Not all of these conceptions of marriage will 
view it as something that integrates individuals into a community of shared 
beliefs, or see this as valuable. The dominant view of marriage I identified 
in Chapter One for instance focuses on enabling individual’s to have a 
flourishing, loving relationship. Integration into a community of shared 
beliefs doesn’t necessarily look integral to this. 
Even if such a shared concept is possible, I think it is very unlikely that this 
shared concept will view marriage as a formal, comprehensive social 
institution. It seems far more likely that if there is some sort of shared 
concept then it will be more practical than meaningful – for example that it 
joins some number of people together in some sort of legal union.  
This again is a contingent claim that would need to be empirically verified. 
Nevertheless it suggests that the political institution of marriage is not as 
problematic for political liberals as Metz claims. There are however further 
worries at the second level of concern - also relating to neutrality and the 
meaning of marriage - which cannot be dismissed in this way. These are 
highlighted by Clare Chambers in her book Against Marriage (2017).  
6.3 Chambers’ Argument from Meaning  
The Argument from Meaning - which raises the second level of concern 
about the political institution of marriage - sits within a larger argument that 
raises the third level of concern which I will consider in section 6.5. To 
understand both this argument, and the larger argument, we first need to get 
clear on what Chambers means by ‘political liberal neutrality’. As has 
already been noted, in Chapter Five, political liberals tend to endorse 
justificatory neutrality – the idea that the state should not appeal to any 
particular conception of the good when justifying its laws, policies and 
institutions. Chambers highlights that there are two ways of understanding 
183 
 
the requirement of justificatory neutrality: a strict and a lax reading of the 
principle.  
For “lax neutrality” there needs to be some suitably public justification for a 
particular policy or institution that “does not rest on advocating some 
conception of the good” (Chambers 2017, p. 71) – i.e. it requires a public 
reason.  All that matters is that this reason is “true” (p. 71). In contrast, for 
“strict neutrality” the public reason needs to both be true, and “sufficiently 
weighty” (p. 72). This means that it has to “objectively outweigh other 
justifications” and it has to “be sufficiently strong to overcome any 
objections associated with the policy’s association with a particular 
doctrine”, if it has any (p. 71). 
This distinction indicates that Chambers thinks that there is a further way 
that a particular policy can be non-neutral – by being associated with a 
particular conception of the good. She terms this as being prima facie non-
neutral. For a particular policy to be prima facie neutral it “must be 
compatible with all reasonable conceptions of the good” (2017, p. 55).94  
To see the difference between strict and lax justificatory neutrality, consider 
the case of school prayer which is associated with a Christian conception of 
the good. Implementing a policy of school prayer would require a public 
reason to justify it – for example, that it “teaches children to sit still and 
concentrate” (2017, p. 71), something that aids learning in general. On a lax 
understanding of neutrality all that is required is that this reason is true. It 
doesn’t matter that there are other activities that teach the skill just as well, 
nor that this justification does not outweigh the prima facie non-neutrality of 
praying. On a strict understanding of neutrality, the only way that school 
prayer would be justified is if it is the only way, or a significantly more 
effective way, of teaching this skill.  
                                                          
94 This is related (but not identical) to the first part of principle of neutrality 
(as defined in Chapter Five) – if a policy is associated with a particular 
conception of the good then the state that enforces that policy might be 
thought to be holding and expressing that particular conception of the good.  
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Whilst Chambers acknowledges that it is unclear which understanding of 
the principle of neutrality (strict or lax) political liberals endorse, she 
suggests that they should endorse the strict understanding. This is because it 
appears to better align with political liberalism’s overall aims: “The goal of 
the politically liberal state is not to perfect society or the choices of its 
citizens but to secure justice” (2017, p. 74). As such citizens should only be 
restricted in following their own conceptions of the good if it is necessary 
for justice. Implementing policies that are associated with particular 
conceptions of the good (such as mandated school prayer) simply because 
some public reason can be found seems to amount to the state “unduly 
interfering with the legitimate choices people may make to follow 
alternative conceptions of the good” (p. 74). If other policies are available 
(that are not associated with particular conceptions of the good) then it is not 
necessary for justice that this particular policy (school prayer) be 
implemented. For example if listening to classical music teaches children 
quiet concentration, then mandated school prayer is not necessary for 
justice. It would only be necessary (and it could only have its prima facie 
non-neutrality outweighed) if there was no alternative.   
The Argument from Meaning forms part of Chambers’ argument for the 
claim that the political institution of marriage is prima facie non-neutral. It 
does not, by itself, conclusively show that the political institution of 
marriage cannot be appropriately justified so as to meet the requirements of 
strict justificatory neutrality. It does however give us reason to question the 
state using such a meaningful institution, and if it shows that the political 
institution of marriage is prima facie non-neutral, it would force us to look 
for sufficiently weighty public reasons to justify its use.95  
 
 
                                                          
95 I will explain Chambers’ larger argument, how the Argument from 
Meaning fits in to it, and how Chambers argues for the conclusion that a 
political institution of marriage does violate the principle of strict neutrality 
in section 6.5. 
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6.3.1 The Argument from Meaning  
Recall that in order to show that a particular policy is not prima facie non-
neutral it needs to be shown that it is “compatible with all reasonable 
conceptions of the good” (Chambers 2017, p. 55). 
Chambers argues that the meaning of marriage causes the political 
institution of marriage to be incompatible with some reasonable conceptions 
of the good - including non-monogamous, feminist and celibate conceptions 
of the good (2017, p. 55) - making it a prima facie non-neutral policy. It is 
incompatible with these particular conceptions of the good because they 
“reject assumptions that underpin the special treatment thereby given to 
marriage” within a political institution (p. 55).  
Traditional marriage is a cultural practice that has a particular, 
profound, weighty and controversial meaning. Its historical and 
current significance to many people involves metaphysical and 
perfectionist claims that can be reasonably rejected by others. These 
controversial meanings affect any state use of the concept of 
marriage. (p. 57) 
This passage highlights that, like Metz, Chambers is concerned with the fact 
that marriage means something to people.  
Chambers, following Wedgwood, claims that within our Western liberal 
societies marriage has a particular social meaning which “involves shared 
assumptions about what marriage typically entails” (Chambers 2017, p. 57). 
Wedgwood suggests that we take marriage to involve “sexual intimacy, 
economic and domestic cooperation, and a mutual commitment to the 
relationship” (Chambers 2017, p. 57). Whilst this social meaning can allow 
for a range of different relationships to fall within it (crucially for 
Wedgwood it doesn’t rule out homosexual relationships), Chambers claims 
that it is prima facie non-neutral as it “invoke[s] a conception of human 
flourishing that is decidedly non-political” (p. 57).96 
Chambers claims that we can see that the meaning of marriage is non-
political when we look at traditional, conservative views which are often put 
                                                          
96 By which she means that the conception is “not neutral between 
reasonable conceptions of the good” (2017, p. 57). 
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forward in arguments against same-sex marriage (2017, p. 57). These views 
not only tend to ascribe to patriarchal and heterosexist norms of marriage, 
but also often rest on appeals to comprehensive views about human nature 
and the good life. Chambers gives the example of Catholic bishops who 
have said that “the roots of the institution of [heterosexual] marriage lie in 
our nature” – a claim which is “inescapably perfectionist and metaphysical” 
(p. 58). 
The meaning of marriage can however change. For example, by allowing 
more relationships (such as same-sex relationships) to attain the status we 
can alter the nature of what marriage symbolises because “less approbation 
is reserved for any one particular” relationship form (Chambers 2017, p. 
61). This is exactly what some feminists hope will happen by allowing 
same-sex marriage – they want to change its meaning so that it is less 
patriarchal (p. 61). This suggests that it would (at least in principle) be 
possible to alter the meaning of marriage so that it doesn’t rest on values 
about human nature and the good life. 
This does not make the problem go away, according to Chambers. No 
matter how much we reform the meaning of marriage it will always, 
necessarily, conflict with some reasonable conceptions of the good. If 
marriage retains its “traditional and patriarchal” meaning then it “conflicts 
with feminist and other egalitarian conceptions” (2017, p. 61). If marriage is 
reformed so that it is less discriminatory and more egalitarian then it 
“conflicts with the conception of the good of those who revere its traditional 
meaning, a meaning that they see as sacred and inviolable” (p. 61). 
Whichever meaning marriage has, it is still prima facie non-neutral because 
it conflicts with some reasonable conception of the good.   
If this is correct, then it means that a political institution of marriage will 
always be prima facie non-neutral. This suggests that there is (at least a 
prima facie) reason for the state not to recognise marriage.  
6.3.2 An Evaluation of the Argument from Meaning  
One way that political liberals could respond to this worry, and which 
Chambers considers, is to claim that the conceptions of the good that the 
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values of reformed marriage conflict with are unreasonable. This would 
mean that they do not have to worry about marriage being incompatible 
with them. 
Reasonable conceptions of the good are those that do not “necessarily 
conflict with political liberal tenets such as the conception of citizens as free 
and equal and a commitment to public reason and state neutrality” 
(Chambers 2017, p. 55). If a conception of the good conflicts with these 
things it is incompatible with justice, and can be legitimately ignored (and 
rejected) by a political liberal.  
Are conceptions of the good that endorse the traditional religious or 
conservative views of marriage unreasonable? They would be if they aimed 
to “impose their traditional views of marriage on others via the coercive 
power of the state” (Chambers 2017, pp. 61-62) as this would conflict with 
political liberal principles. Chambers claims however that there are versions 
of these conceptions of the good which maintain religious and traditional 
conservative views and values, and which also “could argue that marriage 
should not be recognised by the state” (p. 62). These versions are reasonable 
conceptions of the good (because they don’t aim to coercively impose their 
views). A political institution that recognised marriage (with a reformed 
meaning) would conflict with this reasonable conception of the good: “state 
recognition of some alternatively configured marriage [is] unreasonable … 
because state recognition of non-traditional marriage would be invoking the 
traditional, honorific term ‘marriage’ in a way that conflicted with that 
reasonable traditional understanding” (p. 62). 
I agree with Chambers that we cannot dismiss conceptions of the good with 
traditional conservative and religious views about marriage as unreasonable 
(unless they coercively impose their views). Attempting to show that these 
conceptions of the good are unreasonable would require showing that the 
traditional and conservative views of marriage make state recognition of 
marriage (as they understand it) necessary. This seems unlikely. As such, 
the unreasonableness response is not open to political liberals.  
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I think there is a further challenge to the Argument from Meaning however. 
The problem of prima facie non-neutrality arises because the different 
meanings that we are comparing all involve comprehensive and 
perfectionist claims. When one conception of the good claims ‘marriage 
means x’, this conflicts with another conception of the good that claims 
‘marriage means y’. The assumption underlying the Argument from 
Meaning is that the political institution of marriage always has to reflect one 
of these meanings, and that these meanings are always comprehensive and 
perfectionist. Something has a comprehensive meaning when it is based on 
a comprehensive doctrine - a doctrine that concerns all human conduct (and 
not just the political). Something has a perfectionist meaning when the 
comprehensive doctrine it is based on makes claims about human 
flourishing and what is valuable in life. We can see that Chambers endorses 
this assumption when she quotes Torcello at the conclusion of her argument.   
We cannot genuinely imagine any definition of marriage that does 
not in some sense call upon a comprehensive notion of the meaning 
of marriage. (Chambers 2017, p. 61) 
This is an assumption that can be challenged. If we reject the assumption, 
then Chambers’ argument does not go through. If it is possible for a political 
institution of marriage not to reflect a comprehensive meaning, then it will 
not always (necessarily) conflict with a reasonable conception of the good.  
Not everyone within the literature accepts this assumption. For example 
Elizabeth Brake, who we saw above argues for the reformation of the 
political institution of marriage, explicitly questions this assumption when 
she argues for retaining the label of ‘marriage’ for her proposed reform – 
minimal marriage.97 She does not opt to distance her proposal from 
marriage, and in fact seeks to maintain the association with it. It is the 
reason that she puts forward for retaining this label that I want to consider 
here.  
In short, Brake’s claim is that using the term ‘marriage’ for a reformed 
version of the institution is a way of “rectifying past amatonormative and 
                                                          
97 I present this proposal in Chapter Seven, section 7.3.1. 
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heteronormative discrimination” (2012, p. 186).98 It is able to do this 
because first, its meaning is malleable; and second, changing its meaning 
will enable the state to “create new social scripts and make alternative 
relationships salient, by recognising them as equal under law” (p. 187). This 
will enable the state to affirm different relationships (through the 
designation of the marital status to non-heterosexual, non-monogamous 
relationships) and get rid of the “ideal of heterosexual monogamy” (p. 187) 
that marriage has historically promoted.   
Brake acknowledges that retaining the term ‘marriage’ can only have these 
beneficial effects if the term really is malleable, and if it is not inherently 
“patriarchal, ethnocentric, or comprehensive” (2012, p. 186). Brake thinks 
that the meaning of marriage can change, noting that “many institutions 
with historically unjust or inegalitarian symbolism have altered their 
symbolism” (such as the term ‘citizen’ which was historically sexist). 
Chambers would agree with this point.  
Chambers (and Metz) clearly think that marriage, however, is “essentially 
comprehensive” (Brake 2012, p. 186), and so would challenge Brake’s 
claim that it can be used to rectify past injustices. Brake disagrees, and 
claims that marriage has “become unmoored from comprehensive 
doctrines” and that this is “reflected in the social confusion about what it 
means” within our Western liberal societies (p. 186). If ‘marriage’ has 
become unmoored from any comprehensive meaning (including 
perfectionist meanings) in this way then a political institution of marriage 
does not necessarily reflect a comprehensive meaning of some sort.  
I think Brake is right. If the meaning of marriage can be altered so that it 
means one comprehensive thing rather than another, then what stops it from 
being altered so that it means something purely instrumental? It seems 
perfectly plausible that there is a definition of marriage which is not based 
on a comprehensive doctrine, and which does not appeal to claims about 
                                                          
98 Amatonormative discrimination, according to Brake, includes both the 
tangible (lack of legal marital benefits) and non-tangible (lack of 
recognition) disadvantages that relationships face when they do not live up 
to the romantic couple norm. See Brake (2012), Chapter 4.   
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human flourishing or value. Brake for instance redefines marriage so that it 
recognises all adult caring relationships (which are seen as necessary to 
function as political persons rather than as particularly valuable or as 
contributing to human flourishing). Such a definition would be ‘thin’, but 
then this would make it compatible with all conceptions of the good. If 
individuals wanted to add extra, comprehensive, meaning to their marriage 
they could then do so by choosing a particular ceremony or way of life that 
went with it.  
Brake acknowledges that it might be tricky to ensure that the symbolism of 
the term ‘marriage’ remains just right. The marital status needs to be strong 
enough to rectify the past injustices,99 but weak enough so “that children or 
adults outside minimal marriage [don’t] face stigma” (2012, p. 187). This is 
why Brake urges that her minimal marriage should only convey “status 
designation” (p. 187) and not “legitimacy in any substantive sense” (p. 
188).100 We have political institutions (for example, which regulate 
contracts or driving) that are purely instrumental and only designate status. 
Marriage could be altered so that it is like these.101  
Some might worry that even if marriage does not necessarily reflect a 
comprehensive meaning, it is likely that it will always do so, and for this 
reason we should be wary of the state being associated with it. This might 
give us pragmatic reasons to concede that the meaning of marriage can be 
(but is not necessarily) problematic for political liberalism.  
One obvious move here would be to simply get rid of the term ‘marriage’ 
and replace it with an alternative status, such as a civil union. Or, as Metz 
proposes, we could reform both the institution and the status so that it better 
aligns with the instrumental justifications we have for recognising personal 
relationships, and have something like her Intimate Caregiving Union 
                                                          
99 Brake claims that it achieves this by “placing all [adult caring] 
relationships on an equal footing under law” (2012, p. 188). 
100 The only type of legitimacy the marital status should convey is 
“procedural legitimacy” (Brake 2012, p. 188) – showing that the rights have 
been obtained by due procedure.  
101 Chambers, as we will see in sections 6.5 and 6.6, would argue against 
this claim. See section 6.7 for my response.  
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Status. If the problem is with the meaning that attaches to a particular 
institution - the institution of marriage - then let’s just get rid of the thing 
that this meaning attaches to. Let’s have a political institution of something 
else.102 
That won’t do, argues Chambers, because it isn’t only the meaning of 
marriage that is the problem: “even reformed or re-named marriage … 
violates neutrality since in recognising it the state endorses a conception of 
the good and denies endorsement to those who are not in the mandated form 
of relationship” (2017, p. 64). I will look at her reasons for raising the third 
level of concern in sections 6.5 onwards.  
6.4 Summary of the 2nd Level Arguments  
Metz’s Neutrality Argument and Chambers’ Argument from Meaning both 
raised the second level of concern. They aimed to show that a political 
institution of marriage is problematic for political liberalism because of the 
meaning associated with this institution. If these arguments are correct, then 
it would suggest that marriage should no longer be recognised and no longer 
be a legal category. This would mean that if there were reasons for the state 
to regulate and recognise the romantic relationship in some way, then it 
should not do so via the political institution of marriage.    
I have argued that the concerns at this second level can be met, but there is 
still the third level of concern to address.  
6.5 The 3rd Level of Concern: An Argument against any Political 
Institution for Adult Personal Relationships  
The third level of concern submits that any political institution (of marriage, 
civil union, or alternatives) is problematic for political liberalism. If there 
                                                          
102 One concern with this type of response is that it is simply relabelling 
what is essentially the same status and institution. The worry is that 
changing the name will not be enough to disassociate the new political 
institution from the institution of marriage and its meaning. This suggests 
that in addition to a name-change, the institution might also need to alter in 
other ways too, perhaps an alteration in scope (to allow more relationships 
to be eligible) for instance. Nevertheless changing the name could at least be 
seen as a symbolic attempt to break away from the meaning of marriage. 
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are reasons for the state to regulate personal relationships between adults 
(the romantic relationship included), then it should not do so via any 
political institution (a legal regulatory framework that utilises a status and 
associated bundle of rights and duties) which provides state recognition of 
certain adult personal relationships.  
The argument I present here is one which Chambers addresses directly to 
political liberals, and which leads her to claim that “state recognised 
marriage is a violation of political liberal neutrality” (p. 49).103 It is the 
larger argument that the Argument from Meaning fits into, and which I will 
term the Justificatory Neutrality Argument. It utilises the particular 
understanding of the principle of neutrality set out in section 6.3.  
The Justificatory Neutrality Argument states that political liberals should 
endorse a strict principle of justificatory neutrality which requires that the 
implementation of prima facie non-neutral policies be justified by 
sufficiently weighty public reasons (reasons that outweigh the prima facie 
non-neutrality). The argument then takes the following general structure: 
first, it states that a policy is prima facie non-neutral when it is not 
compatible with all reasonable conceptions of the good; second, it claims 
that marriage, and any other political institution that provides state 
recognition of adult personal relationships, is prima facie non-neutral 
because it is incompatible with various reasonable conceptions of the good; 
third, it goes on to claim that there are no sufficiently weighty public 
reasons that can justify a political institution of marriage (or alternative 
status); and finally, it concludes that a political institution of marriage (or 
alternative status) violates a strict principle of justificatory neutrality.104 
There are a number of ways in which this argument could be challenged. 
Firstly, as Chambers notes (and as outlined in section 6.3), it is not clear that 
                                                          
103 Whilst Chambers is herself a comprehensive liberal, she addresses 
political liberals directly because most contemporary liberals are political 
liberals and because she wants to show that “political liberals have a 
particular reason to reject state-recognised marriage” (2017, p. 49). She also 
has a second argument against marriage which claims that it violates 
equality, which I do not address.  
104 See Chambers (2017), pp. 55-76. 
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political liberals do (or should) endorse strict justificatory neutrality. If they 
do not need to endorse strict justificatory neutrality (and need only endorse 
lax justificatory neutrality instead) then this argument will not apply.105  
Chambers devotes a whole further chapter (2017, Chapter 3) to arguing for 
the claim that there is no sufficiently weighty justification for a political 
institution of marriage (or alternative). She considers five liberal defences of 
the political institution of marriage that appeal to public reasons - “based on 
communication, gender equality, caring relationships, the interests of 
society, and children’s interests” (p. 77) - and argues that they are not 
sufficiently weighty to outweigh the prima facie non-neutrality of marriage. 
I will not consider these arguments in detail here.106  
I want to focus on Chambers’ arguments for the claim that marriage (or any 
alternative status) is prima facie non-neutral. It is the arguments for this 
claim that are directed at political liberals in particular, and it is this claim 
that I want to challenge. The Justificatory Neutrality Argument rests heavily 
on this particular claim. If it is shown to be false, then there is no need 
(when evaluating this argument) to decide whether or not political liberals 
should endorse strict or lax justificatory neutrality, and there is no need to 
determine whether sufficiently weighty public reasons for a political 
institution of marriage can be found.  
6.6 Arguments for the Prima Facie Non-Neutrality of Marriage (and 
Alternatives) 
Chambers claims that there are “three ways in which the state recognition of 
marriage rests on values which are incompatible with some reasonable 
                                                          
105 Chambers (2017, pp. 72-73) gives Wedgwood (2016) as an example of a 
political liberal argument that argues from a position of lax justificatory 
neutrality and claims that the political institution of marriage can be justified 
by appeal to a public reason; namely preference satisfaction that contributes 
to the common good (as seen in section 5.3.2).  
106 For an argument that attempts to identify a sufficiently weighty public 
reason for the political institution of marriage see May (2016) who suggests 
that the “presumptive permanence” (p. 13) of the marital relationship may 
amplify the beneficial effects of caring relationships, and the institution of 
marriage may further enhance these effects. 
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conceptions of the good, and therefore violates political liberal neutrality” 
(2017, p. 56): via meaning, bundling, and hierarchy. The first of these 
(meaning) concerns the political institution of marriage only (which is why I 
considered the Argument from Meaning under the second level of concern). 
The second (bundling) and third (hierarchy) concern not only the political 
institution of marriage, but any political institution that might be used for 
the regulation of adult personal relationships (civil unions, intimate 
caregiving union, or another alternative status) and which provide state 
recognition of those adult personal relationships. The Argument from 
Bundling and the Argument Concerning Hierarchy attempt to show that any 
political institution that recognises adult personal relationships will also be 
prima facie non-neutral. This puts these arguments (and the full Justificatory 
Neutrality Argument of which they are a part) at the third, and strongest, 
level of concern.107 
6.6.1 The Argument from Bundling  
State-recognised marriage allocates a bundle of rights and duties to 
those who marry. The assertion that this bundle belongs together 
constitutes a conception of the good life. State recognition of that 
bundle is inescapably perfectionist and non-neutral. (Chambers 
2017, p. 57) 
This passage highlights that Chambers is concerned here not with the 
meaning of marriage, but with the mechanism by which marital rights and 
duties are assigned to married couples – via bundling. She characterises 
bundling in the following terms: “giving a married couple a bundle of rights 
and duties covering various aspects or practices of a relationship (a) because 
they are married, (b) regardless of whether the couple does in fact perform 
those practices, and (c) that do not apply to other relationships that do 
include those practices” (p. 65).  
Bundling is problematic, according to Chambers, whether or not the status 
that the bundle attaches to is called ‘marriage’, ‘civil union’, or something 
else. Bundling makes these statuses into a “conception of the good: a claim 
                                                          
107 I discuss the significance of having the three separate arguments 
(concerning meaning, bundling, and hierarchy) in section 6.7.3. 
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about the sorts of functions and interactions that belong together, and which 
properly change a relationship between two people into a capital-R 
Relationship, given an honorary title” (2017, p. 64). This is because 
bundling a particular set of rights and duties together only makes sense, 
claims Chambers, “from within a conception of the good that assumes that 
certain relationship practices should go together, and which prioritises 
unifying those practices over and above supporting them individually” (p. 
65).  
When the state then recognises this status, it endorses the conception of the 
good that says these relationship practices should belong together. This 
makes any political institution (i.e. a legal status plus a bundle of rights and 
duties) that recognises adult personal relationships incompatible with 
conceptions of the good that would not bundle relationship practices in the 
same way. Bundling therefore makes such political institutions prima facie 
non-neutral. 
6.6.2 The Argument Concerning Hierarchy  
The opting-in requirement of state recognition enacts a hierarchy 
between marriage and non-marriage, which violates both equality 
and neutrality. (Chambers 2017, p. 57) 
The third way in which the state recognition of marriage rests on values 
which are incompatible with some reasonable conceptions of the good, is by 
enacting a hierarchy. Chambers claims that the political institution of 
marriage (or alternative status) effectively ranks some relationships (those 
that have the status) higher than others (those that don’t).  
I think there are two stages to this claim. First, in virtue of the opt-in nature 
of a political institution of marriage (or alternative status) “the state 
withholds certain rights and duties from those who have not opted in to the 
relevant status, even if their relationships are otherwise identical” 
(Chambers 2017, p. 66). In other words, the state treats relationships that are 
alike differently, not because they involve different relationship practices 
(they don’t), but because they have opted (or not) to receive a particular 
status. This can lead to a “practical” (p. 66) difference between relationships 
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with and without the status (for example, tax breaks) which might benefit 
the relationships that have opted in.  
So far Chambers has shown that there is differential treatment, but it has not 
yet been shown that this differential treatment amounts to a hierarchy – that 
it ranks relationships that acquire the status higher than relationships 
without the status. The second stage makes this further claim. Marriage is 
“recognised by virtue of a formalised, state run or endorsed ceremony, one 
that is cast as the celebratory conferral of an honorific status” (2017, p. 66). 
It is through this ceremonial aspect that we can see that the state marks out 
those relationships that opt-in to the status as better or higher up the 
hierarchy. This looks as though the state is endorsing and expressing a 
positive value judgment about relationships that acquire the status – which 
would violate the fundamental aspect of the principle of neutrality. This 
hierarchy is “symbolic” (rather than practical) – it “gives those named 
relationships a veneer of state sanctioned respectability and approbation” (p. 
66). 
There are two types of relationships that are disadvantaged and 
discriminated against by this hierarchy: those that are eligible but choose not 
to opt in, and those that are not eligible. Chambers claims that “every form 
of marriage enacts discrimination” (2017, p. 66). The traditional form 
“discriminates between heterosexual and homosexual couples, but even 
reformed … marriage discriminates between monogamy and non-
monogamy, between sexual relationships and other relationships, between 
permanent and temporary relationships” (p. 66). This highlights the 
problems that ineligible relationships face – they are excluded from the 
status and its benefits. Yet even if we were to make marriage available to 
every type of relationship (monogamous and non-monogamous, sexual and 
non-sexual, permanent and temporary), the fact that you need to opt in to 
attain the status and the bundle of rights and benefits means that 
relationships that have not chosen to opt in to the status are still placed 
lower in the hierarchy, not receiving the rights, benefits, or approbation of 
the status.  
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6.7 Evaluating the Arguments for Prima Facie Non-Neutrality  
I have already provided reasons for thinking that the Argument from 
Meaning, situated at the second level of concern, does not necessarily show 
the political institution of marriage to be prima facie non-neutral (in section 
6.3.2) because the institution does not necessarily have to reflect a 
comprehensive meaning. Here I focus on Chambers’ arguments that are 
situated at the third level of concern, and which claim that any political 
institutions which involve state recognition of an adult personal relationship 
(e.g. marriage, civil union and the ICGU status) are prima facie non neutral. 
I aim to show that neither the Argument from Bundling nor the Argument 
from Hierarchy are successful.  
6.7.1 Evaluating the Argument from Bundling  
There are two possible ways to read Chambers’ claim that bundling makes a 
status into a conception of the good. The first reading is that bundling, 
wherever it occurs in regulation, makes any status into a conception of the 
good. This would imply that a political institution of marriage is just one 
instance of a general form of regulation that is prima facie non-neutral. The 
second reading is that bundling rights and duties etc. that relate to 
relationship practices (but not bundling in general) makes a relationship 
status into a conception of the good. We can show that both readings of this 
claim are false.  
The first reading - that bundling always makes a status into a conception of 
the good - cannot be the claim that Chambers wants to make.  All states - 
from the paradigmatically liberal to the most illiberal theocracy - bundle. It 
is a standard and unavoidable governance technique. If this made a state 
illiberal, then all states would be illiberal. Take contract law, for instance. 
When we sign a contract - and take on the legal status of ‘contract holder’ - 
a bundle of rights and duties relating to contract law and the judicial system 
are conferred on us (in addition to those that are stated in the contract). 
There is no reason to think that bundling makes the status of a contract 
holder into a conception of the good, or that state recognition of this status 
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amounts to an endorsement of a conception of the good. Bundling is simply 
a useful and efficient legal tool.  
It must therefore be the second reading that Chambers intends – that 
bundling rights and duties, when they relate to relationship practices, makes 
a status into a conception of the good. The reason that it does this, according 
to Chambers, is because the bundle only makes sense from the point of view 
of a particular conception of the good – one which says that these 
relationship practices belong together.  
It is unclear why Chambers thinks that this is the only point of view that is 
available. State action is open to multiple interpretations, and she has 
provided no reason to think that other possible interpretations are 
unavailable. Bundling relationship practices does not only make sense from 
the point of view of a conception of the good that views the related 
relationship practices as belonging together. There are alternative points of 
view that it also makes sense from. Once this has been shown, there is 
nothing left on which to base the claim that bundling makes the status into a 
conception of the good, or that state recognition of that status endorses a 
particular conception of the good.  
Chambers acknowledges (but quickly dismisses) a possible response along 
these lines (one that shows there is an alternative interpretation of bundling). 
She notes that political liberals might claim that bundling is simply a 
“convenient but not exclusive way for people to access bundles of rights and 
duties” (2017, p. 65). In other words, bundling the rights and duties relating 
to relationship practices makes sense for reasons of efficiency, and not only 
from the point of view of a particular conception of the good (just like 
bundling the rights and duties that relate to contracts). Here I want to spell 
out this objection to the Argument from Bundling in more detail to show 
that it cannot be so easily dismissed.   
We can see that bundling the rights and duties relating to relationship 
practices makes sense as an efficient policy for the regulation of personal 
relationships. Whilst it is true that people will have different views on how 
best to bundle their relationship practices, and will in fact bundle them in 
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different ways, it is however the case that many people do in fact bundle a 
particular set of relationship practices together within one core relationship. 
This is a (contingent) sociological fact. It is therefore efficient for the state 
to provide the rights and duties for these relationship practices in a bundle, 
for those that want it. It is worth noting though that if, in time, people 
tended not to bundle these relationship practices together, then the state may 
well lose its interest in providing rights and duties through that bundle (and 
associated status), as it would not be an efficient tool to do so. 
It might be objected that this bundling of relationship rights and duties isn’t 
particularly efficient because some people who opt to acquire the bundle 
will not make use of all of the relationship rights and duties that constitute 
that bundle. Putting them together, it might be claimed, only makes sense if 
people are expected to conform. Making these rights and duties available to 
these relationships might therefore be thought to encourage the individuals 
in those relationships to start participating in those relationship practices 
that these rights and duties relate to. 
In order to make good on this claim, something more than an appeal to 
bundling is needed. There is no sense in which the bundle requires particular 
relationship practices to occur. The rights and benefits for certain 
relationship practices within the bundle (for example, parental rights or 
health benefits) will only come into play when required – when and if that 
particular relationship practice occurs. If that relationship practice does not 
occur in a particular relationship, then the right or benefit will never 
materialise. This is not a problem. There is no penalty for these relationship 
practices not occurring. For example if a couple that has gained a civil union 
or marital status do not have children, then they will not receive parental 
rights. If both partners work, and both partners have partner health benefits, 
then neither partner needs to use the other’s entitlement, but it is still there.  
In a similar vein it might be objected that bundling is not an efficient policy 
because some relationships that include many, if not all, of the same 
relationship practices are either ineligible for the status or will not opt to 
acquire the status. This again is not a strong objection. Acquiring a 
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relationship status is not the only way to acquire rights and duties that relate 
to these relationship practices. The state can (and does) recognise that these 
relationship practices can occur in other relationships (both those that are 
ineligible and those that don’t opt in). The state confers rights and duties 
that concern, for example, property owning and child rearing outside of 
marriage (and other proposed statuses) as well as within it. Those who are 
married can obtain these rights and duties with people other than their 
spouse, civil partner, etc. Those who lack any relationship status can also 
attain these rights and duties without acquiring a status. Acquiring a status is 
just one option for obtaining these rights and duties among others. It is still 
efficient to enable the many relationships that do bundle these relationship 
practices together to obtain the bundle of rights and duties that relate to 
them, if they want to.  
Having demonstrated that bundling makes sense for reasons of efficiency, 
and so not only from the point of view of a particular conception of the 
good, there is nothing left on which to base the claim that bundling makes a 
relationship status into a conception of the good, nor that state recognition 
of this status amounts to an endorsement of a particular conception of the 
good.108  
Chambers dismisses the efficiency response by introducing the Argument 
Concerning Hierarchy. She is concerned by the fact that there are two ways 
to attain an identical set of rights and duties - via a status, and not via a 
status. She claims that the state’s recognition of relationships that opt for the 
bundle “as marriages or civil unions” (or alternative) when it doesn’t 
recognise relationships that acquire the same rights and duties in the 
alternative way, is “clearly recognition in the symbolic sense: recognition 
bringing with it approbation” (2017, p. 65). We can see here that the issue is 
not to do with bundling, but with the status that the bundle attaches to. This 
                                                          
108 Each particular right and duty would also need to be justified on neutral 
grounds in order to be included within the bundle. If some particular 
‘incidents’ in current bundles cannot be justified on neutral grounds (for 
example, as would be the case if the marital bundle still included a right by 
a husband to his wife’s labour) that would be reason to remove them from 
the bundle. 
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is because, as we have seen, Chambers thinks that having an opt-in status 
enacts a hierarchy – the third way in which she thinks political institutions 
for adult personal relationships are prima facie non-neutral. 
I will argue in the next section that the Argument Concerning Hierarchy is 
also unsuccessful. As such it is an ineffective way of dismissing the 
efficiency response. It also seems to miss the point of the response. 
Chambers asks “if there are various ways to acquire rights and duties what 
else can the state be doing by attaching a special label to one of them” 
(2017, p. 65)? This is something that the state should not be doing 
“particularly if those labels are traditional and deeply resonant” (p. 66). The 
efficiency response has shown that the state isn’t necessarily attaching a 
‘special label’ – it is simply utilising an efficient and convenient regulatory 
tool. The worry that these labels are traditional and deeply resonant seems to 
imply that Chambers is assuming this label is the marital one, and that it 
conveys a comprehensive meaning. I have already suggested (in section 
6.3.2) that the marital label does not have to convey such a meaning, and 
additionally this worry would not apply if it was a civil union or ICGU label 
being used.  
6.7.2 Evaluating the Argument Concerning Hierarchy  
The first worry - that two relationships with identical relationship practices 
end up being treated differently in virtue of their choice to opt in to a status, 
or not - is addressed by the response to the bundling problem. If there is a 
legitimate reason to provide rights and duties that relate to a particular 
relationship practice, then people that perform that relationship practice 
should have access to those rights and duties. If these rights and duties are 
available both with and without the status, then they do have the required 
access.109  
                                                          
109 Chambers does argue that these rights and duties should apply by default 
(on an opt out basis) - so that no one misses out on the relevant rights and 
duties because they have failed to opt in - but I think that this is a slightly 
different point to the one being made here. 
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It might be objected that some relationships, despite having the same 
relationship practices, are unable to access the rights and duties through the 
status (because they are ineligible for that status for some reason). There 
may be a concern that these relationships are not treated equally because 
they can only access the rights and duties without the status. This would 
only be a concern if there was no legitimate (political liberal) reason for the 
eligibility restriction, and if accessing the rights and duties via the status 
brought with it exclusive, unjustifiable, benefits – i.e. if it brings state 
approval and honour. 
This is the second worry: that the status is honorific and conveys 
approbation. This worry is generated by the claim that ceremonies that 
convey relationship statuses on people are both state run and celebratory. It 
appears that the state congratulates and approves of people opting in to 
statuses because they convey this status within a ceremonial setting, which 
in turn appears to put relationships that have acquired that status higher up 
the hierarchy of relationships. This is something that both ineligible 
relationships and eligible relationships that don’t opt in face.  
This worry again seems to be making the assumption that the status being 
conferred is marital, and that the legal status has to be conferred in a 
ceremonial setting. The obvious response to this worry is to recommend that 
the state no longer utilises ceremonial settings to convey relationship 
statuses, whatever they are labelled.110  
6.7.3 The Significance of Three: Meaning plus Bundling plus Hierarchy  
Chambers presents the tri-partite argument (concerning meaning, bundling, 
and hierarchy) initially against the political institution of marriage and then 
against any other political institution that recognises some type of adult 
personal relationship. She thinks that the combination of these three aspects 
                                                          
110 For example, the legal part (signing the marriage register etc.) could be 
done in a separate non-ceremonial setting, so that it is more like obtaining, 
for example, a drivers licence. If individuals then wanted an additional (non-
legal) ceremony and celebration, they can do so.   
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within the political institution of marriage makes it particularly problematic 
for political liberals. 
The first part (meaning) is concerned with marriage in particular, and 
suggests (so long as we think marriage will tend to retain some 
comprehensive meaning) that the state should have nothing to do with the 
institution of marriage, and in particular that it should not recognise it. If it 
has reason to regulate the romantic relationship, then it should do so via an 
alternative regulatory tool.  
The second and third parts of this argument (bundling and hierarchy) are 
meant to tell against using any form of political institution (which will 
utilise a legal status and bundle of rights and duties to recognise particular 
adult personal relationships) to regulate adult personal relationships. If 
correct, this would provide a strong case for thinking that the relation the 
state currently bears to the romantic relationship is problematic, and would 
continue to be, so long as it uses a political institution to regulate (and as a 
result, recognise) it.  
The preceding discussion has shown that the concerns regarding meaning, 
bundling, and hierarchy can be addressed. As such, the political institution 
of marriage, and (particularly) alternative political institutions (which all 
entail state recognition of adult personal relationships) do not look 
incompatible with political liberalism.  This means that these political 
institutions look like viable options for the regulation of adult personal 
relationships, so long as there are independent reasons that justify the 
regulation and recognition of those relationships.  
It becomes evident that it is this latter claim that Chambers wants to 
challenge. Her issue is primarily with the state recognition of adult personal 
relationships.111 She does not think that there are liberal reasons to recognise 
adult personal relationships (of any kind, the romantic relationship 
included). To see that this is the case it will be helpful to look at the 
                                                          
111 The state recognition of other personal relationships – those not between 
adults – such as the relationship between parent and child could be 
recognised by the state still on Chambers’ view.  
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comparison that she makes with unproblematic political institutions (for 
things other than adult personal relationships) that don’t have all of three 
problem-causing features (meaning, bundling and hierarchy) at once.  
For example, the state can legitimately recognise the status of a ‘driver’ and 
confer a bundle of duties on to people with this status, via the provision of 
driving licences (a completely un-ceremonial affair). Whilst you do not need 
to opt-in to this status in order for the rules of the road to apply, you do need 
to opt in in order to be able to drive legally. This status is “minimal and 
functional, and public reasons can be provided” for it (Chambers 2017, p. 
68). The reason the state recognises the status of ‘driver’ is “not that driving 
is an inherently valuable activity or that there is some difference between a 
state recognised ‘driver’ and a mere person who drives a car; the reason is 
that the activity of driving itself is something that requires regulation if it is 
to be done safely” (p. 68). 
My evaluation of the Arguments from Meaning, Bundling and Hierarchy 
suggest that the legal marital status (or alternative status) is (or at least could 
be altered to be) a lot more like the driver status than Chambers thinks. The 
state could convey the marital (or alternative) status and the associated 
bundle of rights and duties in a completely un-ceremonial way. This could 
be justified for efficiency reasons, whilst ensuring at the same time that 
anyone participating in relationship practices that warrant certain rights and 
duties also have access to these rights and duties without the status and 
bundle (if preferred). I think the key reason why Chambers does not see this 
as a viable option is because she claims that “relationships do not need state 
recognition if they are to be performed safely or in line with justice, and the 
state does not need to stipulate who counts as being in A Relationship” 
(2017, p. 68).112 As such, she is suggesting that there is no reason for the 
                                                          
112 Chambers of course acknowledges that there are particular relationship 
practices that, for reasons of justice, need to be regulated. However, these 
can occur in all sorts of relationships (not just those eligible for certain 
statuses, and not just those that would opt in to a status). For this reason she 
claims that we need “laws against domestic violence, laws about distribution 
of property between partners in case of separation or dispute, laws about 
children” etc. that apply to all (2017, p. 68). These state directives would 
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state to recognise any adult personal relationship, let alone the romantic 
relationship.   
6.8 Conclusion  
Chapters Five and Six have explored three levels of concern regarding the 
political institution of marriage. I have argued that none of these arguments 
are successful. They give us no reason to be concerned about the state 
recognition of marriage. It therefore seems that the state is justified in 
regulating the romantic relationship via a political institution of marriage, so 
long as there is a legitimate, liberal reason for the state to regulate and 
recognise this relationship.  
We have just seen that, for Chambers, it is a concern that there is no reason 
for the state to recognise the romantic relationship that is key. In Chapter 
Seven I draw out the implications of the anti-marriage position and show 
that there is in fact an underlying concern that there is no reason for the state 
to directly regulate the romantic relationship. 113 In Chapter Eight I provide 
an argument against this claim. I aim to draw on the insights of Part One to 
show why I think there are justice-based reasons for the state to directly 
regulate the romantic relationship. I discuss whether this also means that 
there is a reason for the state to recognise this relationship, showing that this 
depends on our understanding of what precisely state recognition consists 
in, at the end of Chapter Eight.  
  
                                                          
directly regulate the relationship practices, and only indirectly regulate the 
adult personal relationships they occur in.  
113 I address the question of whether direct regulation and state recognition 
amount to the same thing in Chapter Seven, section 7.1.3 and in more detail 
in Chapter Eight, section 8.5. 
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Chapter Seven  
The Underlying Complaint against Marriage  
 
The preceding chapters have shown that there are three different levels of 
concern and a variety of different complaints against the political institution 
of marriage. They have also pointed to a range of different alternative 
proposals to replace the current political institution of marriage. Whilst this 
diversity is clearly not a problem in itself, it does leave open the question of 
whether there is a more fundamental, common and underlying complaint 
running through these arguments.  
Whilst I have suggested that each individual level of concern can be 
addressed within a political liberal framework, this doesn’t get us very far in 
answering the question of what relation the state should bear to the 
paradigmatic marital relationship (the romantic relationship). All that I have 
shown, so far, is that if there are legitimate, instrumental, public and neutral 
reasons for the state to directly regulate and recognise the romantic 
relationship, then the political institution of marriage is a regulatory 
framework that the political liberal state can consider utilising (as are 
alternative statuses such as civil unions).114  
In order to consider whether there is an underlying complaint against the 
political institution of marriage that still needs to be addressed, and to get 
clearer on what implications the debate has for my guiding question, I am 
going to reframe this side of the debate and draw out the implications of the 
anti-marriage position. I begin by noting there are similarities between the 
various arguments considered in the previous two chapters, and show how 
these similarities point to three central ideas: (1) personal relationships; (2) 
                                                          
114 Questions would still remain as to whether the political institution of 
marriage is an effective way of regulating the paradigmatic marital 
relationship. Additionally, there are further complaints against the 
institution which haven’t been considered here which focus on the purported 
in-egalitarian nature of the institution, which would need to be addressed. 
See Chambers (2017), Chapter 1.  
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the romantic relationship; (3) the distinction between direct and indirect 
state regulation. I then explain these three ideas in more detail. 
I go on to identify and provide reasons for maintaining that there are two 
key claims that fall out of the various arguments against the political 
institution of marriage: first, that some personal relationships warrant direct 
regulation (via the creation of a distinct legal category); and second, that the 
romantic relationship does not warrant direct regulation (it does not warrant 
a distinct legal category). Identifying these two claims involves drawing on 
Brake’s, Metz’s, and Chambers’ proposals for alternative regulatory 
frameworks for personal relationships, and on the discussion of the previous 
two chapters.  
I bring the chapter to a close by identifying an underlying complaint against 
the political institution of marriage: that the political institution of marriage 
creates a distinct legal category that corresponds to the romantic 
relationship, when that relationship does not warrant a distinct legal 
category. This claim, if true, would suggest that the state should not directly 
regulate the romantic relationship, and that there should not be a political 
institution of marriage.  
7.1 The Three Central Ideas  
Each of the arguments against the political institution of marriage 
considered in Chapters Five and Six exhibited a variety of different concepts 
and ideas: they characterised the political institution of marriage differently; 
they focused on different political liberal principles; and pinpointed 
different features of state action that they took to be problematic. Despite 
this variety, certain commonalities can be drawn out.  
The first commonality is that each argument treats marriage, in its current 
form, as a political institution constituted by a legal status (the marital 
status) and a (large) set of associated legal rights and duties. They each take 
this institution to provide state recognition of the romantic relationship (the 
paradigmatic marital relationship), and take issue with this. 
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Each author (Brake, Metz and Chambers) also acknowledges that there are 
legitimate political liberal reasons for the state to regulate certain personal 
relationships. They all, after all, aim to provide alternative proposals for 
such (legitimate) regulation.115 They each also would seem to accept that the 
romantic relationship might be legitimately (indirectly) regulated under their 
proposals, but they do not appear to think that the state should pay any 
particular attention to the romantic relationship.  
This appears to be, at least in part, due to the recognition of a plurality of 
conceptions of the good, which in turn leads to a plurality of views about 
which personal relationships are valuable, and how best to structure one’s 
life.. Some will choose and value romantic relationships, others will not. 
Whether or not someone chooses a romantic form of personal relationship, 
these authors appear to claim, should be of no particular interest to the state. 
Bringing these commonalities to the fore helps us to identify three central 
ideas at play within these various arguments: (1) personal relationships; (2) 
the romantic relationship; (3) the distinction between direct and indirect 
regulation. I will explain each of these in more detail below.  
7.1.1 Personal Relationships  
In this context, personal relationships typically encompass those 
relationships that we have with our friends, lovers and family members. A 
wide variety of different relationship types fall under the ‘personal 
relationship’ heading but there are some typical characteristics that most 
personal relationships are thought to involve. They will all, for example, 
“involve some degree of mutual regard, personal disclosure, and 
particularized knowledge” as well as “material and emotional mutuality” 
(Wasserman et al 2016, Section 3.1). 
In the Introduction to this thesis I introduced a way of thinking about 
relationships which broke them down into four broad categories: first, the 
people involved; second, the structure of the relationship; third, the purpose 
or function of the relationship; and fourth, the typical things that occur 
                                                          
115 I will present these accounts in more detail in section 7.3.  
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within the relationship. This analytical tool will help us to identify the 
nature of personal relationships a little further.  
First, personal relationships can be between individuals of any age and any 
sex. They include those relationships between parents and children, siblings 
of any age, as well as adult friendships and romantic relationships. Whilst 
friendships and loving relationships are generally thought to require equality 
of some sort between participants, this is not the case for many familial 
relationships, and it is disputed what kind of equality is required (whether it 
is equality of status or simply equality of respect for instance).116  
Second, personal relationships involve a minimum of two people, but there 
is no set maximum – although an individual’s capacity to maintain a 
personal relationship may limit the number they can successfully have. All 
personal relationships tend to be enduring, and are voluntary in the sense 
that they are un-coerced. We (typically) choose our own friends and lovers, 
and what type of relationship to have with them. Whilst we don’t choose 
who our family members (or at least, blood relations) are, we can 
voluntarily choose whether or not to have a personal relationship with them.  
Third, personal relationships don’t have a typical, unified purpose or 
function as such. Some (non-personal) relationships have clearly defined 
purposes and functions. For example, the purpose of the relationship 
between a shopkeeper and her customers, is centred on the buying and 
selling of goods. Personal relationships are not (necessarily) like this. They 
might involve many different purposes and functions, or they might simply 
centre around the particular other(s) in the relationship. It might only be 
because of the individual in question (rather than my need to, for example, 
buy or sell goods) that I am motivated to form a personal relationship with 
them. This could be due to a number of reasons: mutual attraction, liking, 
caring, etc.  
Once a personal relationship has been formed the participants will however 
take on particular roles, and the associated rights and obligations that attach 
                                                          
116 See Wasserman et al 2016, Section 3.1. 
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to those roles, for each other. The roles that we associate with personal 
relationships include (but are not limited to) that of a friend (whether close 
or casual), a romantic partner, a parent, and a sibling etc.117 
Fourth, different personal relationships will involve numerous different 
typical activities, depending on the type of personal relationship that it is 
and the role being fulfilled within it. Parents and children will tend to do 
different things compared to adult friends. However, these activities will 
usually involve spending time together, and doing things together.  
Generally personal relationships do tend to involve intimacy to a greater or 
lesser extent which means that the participants will know each other, and 
know things about each other. These relationships also generally involve 
emotional bonds: the participants often love each other, and care about each 
other. Both of these features mean that participants in a personal 
relationship often care for each other and come to each other’s aid and 
support in different ways (emotionally, materially etc.).  
7.1.2 The Romantic Relationship  
The romantic relationship, as identified in Part One, is a personal 
relationship in which the participants play the role of a romantic partner for 
each other. In Chapter Four I argued that this role is made up of the 
following constitutive norms:  
(1) Romantic partners should love one another, and act in ways that 
express that love.  
(2) Romantic partners should share the experiences that are central to 
their lives and accommodate these things within a joint life.  
(3) Romantic partners should take joint responsibility for the central 
aspects of each other’s well-being.  
(4) Romantic partners should trust one another deeply. 
 
                                                          
117 Recall there is a difference between biological and normative familial 
relationships (see Chapter Three) – I am concerned here with the normative.  
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It is this relationship that is typically taken to warrant the legal marital status 
(the relationship that I have termed the ‘paradigmatic marital relationship’), 
and which the institution of marriage (whether political or not) is meant to 
‘fit’.118  
7.1.3 The Distinction between Direct and Indirect State Regulation  
To put it very roughly, regulation occurs when the state imposes some sort 
of policy or rule, and some form of activity, object etc. is captured under it. 
We can identify a variety of different types of regulation. Legal rights, 
taxation, criminal laws and state sponsorship are just four varieties of state 
regulation on the long list of possibilities.119 An important distinction which 
I want to draw attention to, is between direct and indirect forms of state 
regulation (both of which can involve any type of regulation – law, tax, 
etc.), which I will explain in more detail below. 
As already stated, it is the state recognition of marriage that Brake, Metz 
and Chambers take issue with. State recognition is clearly a form of state 
regulation, but what exactly it consists in is unclear. Chambers defines the 
state recognition of marriage in the following way: “a marriage regime 
recognises marriage by applying a bundle of rights and duties to married 
people because they are married” (2017, p.142) – because they have 
attained the legal marital status. Recognition doesn’t have to involve a 
bundle of rights and duties, though. Brake’s Minimal Marriage is an 
example of state recognition that rejects the bundling feature, and can 
convey a single right or duty with the status. It isn’t obvious that state 
recognition always has to involve a status either. In Section 6.7.3 we saw 
that Chambers accepts some instances of state recognition. The examples 
she offers include the state recognition of drivers and employers. Whilst it 
might seem appropriate to say that there is a legal status of ‘driver’, where 
                                                          
118 By which I mean the institution should be shaped by the relationship, and 
not the other way around, as discussed in Section 1 of the Introduction.  
119 It is unclear whether other state actions, such as providing incentives (for 
example, building leisure centres and providing subsidised public transport 
on the weekends might incentivise people to keep fit and healthy), also 
count as ‘regulation’ but if they do then this list could be significantly 
longer. 
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there is a process by which one has to obtain a license in order to acquire 
this status, this seems less appropriate in the employer case. In this case, as 
Chambers states, “the state sets out grounds on which someone becomes an 
‘employer’” (2017, p. 68). It is the state definition of what counts as a 
‘driver’ or an ‘employer’ that looks key.  
Whilst they all object to state recognition of marriage, only Chambers 
objects to the state recognition of adult personal relationships. Brake and 
Metz both propose alternative frameworks that would provide state 
recognition – just to a different category of relationship. Due to this lack of 
clarity and consensus surrounding state recognition, and because I think it 
aids the understanding of the debate surrounding marriage, I will reframe 
this debate using the terms direct and indirect regulation.120  
Direct regulation occurs when the state creates a distinct legal category for a 
particular thing, and puts in place regulation (whether it is a law, tax, right, 
etc.) specifically for that legal category. This regulation will (among other 
things) specify what conditions something must meet in order to count as an 
instance of the legal category, and what legal rights, duties, and powers etc. 
attach to it. The following examples are not intended to be an exhaustive 
list, but rather to demonstrate the huge variety of things that are regulated 
directly.  
First, there are distinct legal categories created for particular roles that 
people can occupy. For example, there are distinct legal categories which 
correspond to political roles such as ‘judge’ and ‘citizen’. These roles are 
legally constructed, and the people that occupy them acquire particular legal 
status, powers, rights, duties etc. in virtue of occupying those roles. Another 
example is of the distinct legal categories that correspond to professional 
roles where a license has to be obtained, such as that of a ‘doctor’ or a 
‘hairdresser’. There are also other roles that don’t require licenses, such as 
                                                          
120 Whilst I think it may be the case that direct regulation just is state 
recognition, it isn’t clear that this is quite what anti-marriage theorists have 
in mind. State recognition (as they use the term) is however at least an 
instance of direct regulation. This is discussed further in Chapter Eight, 
section 8.5. 
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that of ‘employer’, that also have corresponding legal categories, and which 
feature in employment laws and regulations.  
Second, there are distinct legal categories that are created for particular 
objects. For example, the state directly regulates wine by having a 
corresponding legal category that specifies what legally counts as ‘wine’, 
and laying down the law surrounding its production and sale.121 Another 
example of the direct regulation of objects can be found in building 
regulations. These regulations will specify what counts as a ‘domestic 
dwelling’ or ‘stairs’, for example, and will stipulate the standards that the 
objects that fall under these categories have to meet. Other objects have 
corresponding legal categories in order for the state to tax them (such as 
other alcoholic drinks and cigarettes).  
Third, there are activities which have corresponding legal categories. 
Disposing of rubbish (‘tipping’) and cycling, for example. These activities 
have their own legal categories, and there are laws which stipulate when and 
where these specified activities are or are not allowed (tipping is only 
allowed in designated waste sites, and cycling is not allowed on certain 
roads or footpaths). 
Indirect regulation on the other hand occurs when something is regulated, 
but there is no corresponding legal category. For example, the activity of 
gardening and garden rakes are indirectly regulated. There are no 
corresponding legal categories of ‘gardening’ or ‘garden rakes’. However, 
this activity and object are still regulated. For instance, I cannot do my 
gardening in the middle of the night if this involves using a very loud 
chainsaw. This would constitute a disturbance of the peace, and so the 
activity of gardening is indirectly regulated by the criminal laws prohibiting 
breaching the peace. I am also not at liberty to do anything I wish with a 
garden rake. Hitting someone over the head with a garden rake would count 
                                                          
121 See, for example, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council which can be found at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1308.  
214 
 
as assault. As such, this object is indirectly regulated by laws prohibiting 
assault.  
It will be useful to clarify here that indirect regulation also occurs when 
something is regulated in virtue of falling under an umbrella category 
(which is in itself directly regulated). To illustrate this, imagine the umbrella 
category is a genus, and that there are different species that fall under it. The 
genus is directly regulated when there is a corresponding legal category. 
The species that fall under this genus are indirectly regulated by the 
regulations that pick out the genus’ legal category when there are no further 
distinct legal categories that correspond specifically to those species.   
Consider, for instance, dogs. Dogs, and activities such as breeding dogs, are 
directly regulated. Most individual breeds of dog are indirectly regulated by 
the laws and regulations that pick out the legal category ‘dog’. Some 
individual breeds are however directly regulated, and have their own 
corresponding legal category – pit bulls for instance, which are banned by 
name in the UK.  
When it comes to disputes about regulation, it is important to get clear on 
what exactly is being disputed. It is important to distinguish between 
rejecting a particular form of regulation and rejecting regulation in general. 
It might be the case that in some cases direct regulation is inappropriate and 
unjustified, whereas indirect regulation is appropriate and justified.  
Additionally, showing that there are reasons for the state not to make use of 
a particular type of regulation (law, tax, etc.) when directly regulating 
something is not (necessarily) the same as showing that there are reasons for 
the state to stop directly regulating that thing. An argument that claims, for 
example, that Class C drugs should not be directly regulated by criminal law 
is not an argument against the direct regulation of Class C drugs by other 
regulatory means (for example, via high levels of VAT). There is still a 
reason to have a distinct legal category of Class C drugs. 
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7.2 Two Underlying Claims  
I think that there are two claims which underlie the anti-marriage position. 
These claims are implications of each of the various political liberal 
arguments against the political institution of marriage, and the alternatives 
proposed in response. Each author (Brake, Metz and Chambers) thinks that 
there are some personal relationships that warrant direct regulation. This 
gives us our first claim:  
The Direct Regulation Claim: the liberal state has compelling 
reasons to directly regulate some personal relationships, and so it is 
appropriate for the state to create a distinct legal category 
corresponding to those relationships.  
The second claim maintains that the romantic relationship is not something 
that warrants direct regulation.  
The Romantic Relationship Claim: the liberal state does not have 
compelling reasons to directly regulate the romantic relationship, 
and so it should not create a distinct legal category that corresponds 
to it. 
If the Romantic Relationship Claim is true, then we can immediately see 
why a political institution of marriage is thought to be problematic. Through 
the institution, the state (apparently unjustifiably) directly regulates – and so 
creates a distinct legal category corresponding to – the romantic 
relationship. In what follows I aim to show that these two claims do in fact 
underlie the various arguments against the political institution of 
marriage.122  
7.3 The Direct Regulation Claim  
In this section I will explain which personal relationships are considered to 
warrant direct regulation by Brake, Metz, and Chambers, and why. This will 
both provide evidence for the suggestion that each of these authors can be 
                                                          
122 I do not argue for the truth (or falsity) of either claim in this chapter. I 
endorse the Direct Regulation claim, but I challenge the Romantic 
Relationship Claim in Chapter Eight.  
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understood to be making the Direct Regulation Claim, and help us to flesh 
out this claim in more detail. What becomes clear is that the state needs to 
have some compelling – political liberal – reason to directly regulate a 
personal relationship and create a corresponding legal category. 
7.3.1 Brake’s Adult Caring Relationships  
For Brake, it is adult caring relationships that warrant state recognition, and 
therefore direct regulation. Her proposed legal framework of minimal 
marriage would directly regulate these relationships. Any ‘species’ of adult 
caring relationships (close friendships, adult care networks, romantic 
relationships, etc.) would be indirectly regulated under this framework. She 
focuses on the value of adult caring relationships and claims that they are 
primary goods, and as such, subject to claims of justice. It is this that 
warrants the creation of a distinct legal category for adult caring 
relationships. 
Adult caring relationships are relationships in which the individuals “know 
one another, take an interest in one another as persons, and share some 
history” (2012, p. 174). Crucially they involve “attitudinal care” (p. 174) - 
the participants have an attitude of care and concern for each other. These 
relationships can also (but don’t necessarily) involve “material caregiving” 
which Brake takes to include things like “basic tending such as feeding and 
dressing, or activities designed to cheer or stimulate the cared-for such as 
grooming, playing games or chatting” (p. 174). These are things that are 
usually required by a dependant and which can be done by a paid caregiver.   
Brake thinks that adult caring relationships are primary goods. She claims 
that they are essential both for the development and exercise of our two 
moral powers, and for pursuing particular conceptions of the good. 
Relationships are the context in which people tend to develop their moral 
powers (it is hard to do it in isolation) and “provide psychological, 
emotional, and even health benefits that enable parties to pursue their varied 
goals” (2012, p. 177). In addition to this, she claims that adult caring 
relationships are linked to (and can possibly promote) self-respect. Being in 
a relationship with another person can help us to develop a sense of our own 
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value because they involve another person, who knows us particularly well, 
and values us for who we are. This in turn can help us to feel that our life 
plans are valuable.  
Adult caring relationships are extremely valuable to us as political persons. 
Yet, they are not the kinds of things that a state can distribute. Brake 
introduces the Rawlsian distinction between social and natural primary 
goods to explain this. She claims that adult caring relationships are natural 
primary goods, and that they are analogous to the primary good of self-
respect in this way.  
Natural primary goods include “health and vigour, intelligence and 
imagination” (Rawls 1971, p. 62). Whilst these are clearly things that a 
political person would want and need, they are not the kinds of things that 
the state can distribute (because they are natural, not social goods). Social 
primary goods on the other hand are the kinds of things that the state can 
control and distribute. “They are social goods in view of their connection 
with the basic structure; liberties and powers are defined by the rules of 
major institutions and the distribution of income and wealth is regulated by 
them” (p. 92).   
Self-respect (understood as ‘self-esteem’ on a Rawlsian picture) is a natural 
primary good. This is because it is an attitude: it includes valuing oneself 
and one’s conception of the good, as well as a “confidence in one’s ability, 
so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfil one’s intentions” (Rawls 1971, p. 
440). In virtue of being an attitude, self-respect is not the kind of thing that 
can be distributed by the basic structure (unlike income for example). 
However, there are things that the state can control and which help to ensure 
that self-respect is developed and maintained. These things are the social 
bases of self-respect – and these are considered to be social primary goods. 
The social conditions (or bases) of self-respect are “those aspects of basic 
institutions normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their 
worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence” 
(Rawls 2003, p.59). They include things such as “the institutional fact that 
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citizens have equal basic rights, and the public recognition of that fact” (p. 
60).123  
Brake claims that adult relationships are similar. They are natural primary 
goods with social bases that are social primary goods.  
Just as the social bases of self-respect are the social primary goods 
related to self-respect, so there are social primary goods related to 
caring relationships that can be distributed and objectively 
compared: the social bases of caring relationships, that is, the social 
conditions for their existence and continuation. (Brake 2012, p. 176) 
A legal framework is required to protect and support these relationships 
because even though people might form caring relationships without such a 
framework, the fact that adult caring relationships are primary goods makes 
it a matter of justice for the state to ensure that the social bases of these 
relationships are equally distributed, especially as the construction of the 
basic structure can affect the “type and distribution and the number of 
caring relationships” (Brake 2012, p. 181). In order for adult caring 
relationships to be formed and maintained, for example, the participants 
tend to need to be able to spend time together and do things together. This 
means that “institutional design should attend to the social conditions for 
such access” (p. 182) which will require things like immigration rights to 
cross state imposed borders.  
The social bases of adult caring relationships are the rights and legal 
frameworks that “designate and enable day-to-day maintenance of 
relationship” (Brake 2012, p. 176), and it is these social bases that Brake’s 
proposed minimal marriage would distribute. She proposes that this direct 
regulation of adult caring relationships would retain the use of a legal status. 
                                                          
123 Rawls makes the distinction between natural and social primary goods in 
A Theory of Justice. He does not continue to make use of this particular 
distinction in his later work, although he does still make a distinction 
between self-respect and its social conditions: In Justice as Fairness he 
makes the distinction between the attitude of self-respect, which he views as 
a “fundamental interest” (2003, p. 60n) of citizens (citizens have 
“fundamental interests in developing and exercising their moral powers and 
in pursuing their particular (permissible) conceptions of the good” (p. 192) – 
self-respect is a part of this), and the social bases of self-respect which he 
simply terms “primary goods” (p. 60).  
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Even though it would still retain the marital label, this status would now 
correspond to adult caring relationships. The set bundle of rights and duties 
that attach to the current marital status would be removed. Instead, people in 
adult caring relationships would be able to pick and choose from a range of 
rights and duties (a subset of those that usually attach to marriage) and 
decide who they would like to exchange each individual right and 
responsibility with. This system would enable individuals to be minimally 
married to more than one person, and to decide for themselves which 
marital rights and responsibilities they will exchange with each person. This 
could be done either “reciprocally or asymmetrically” (p. 157) for each 
marital right.  
To sum up, Brake’s view proposes that a distinct legal category should be 
created which corresponds to adult caring relationships. The compelling 
reason that the state has for doing so (and therefore for directly regulating 
these relationships) is that these relationships are natural primary goods, and 
have social bases which are social primary goods (which means that the 
state can and should distribute these social bases as a matter of justice). 
Minimal marriage utilises particular types of regulation (state recognition 
via a status, and un-bundled rights, duties etc.) in its direct regulation of 
adult caring relationships. 
7.3.2 Metz’s Intimate Caregiving Unions  
For Metz, it is intimate caregiving relationships that should be recognised 
and therefore directly regulated. She claims that there are “very good 
reasons for the liberal state to recognise and protect intimate caregiving” 
(2010, p. 120).124 She proposes an alternative regulatory framework to the 
current political institution of marriage which create a distinct legal category 
for this type of relationship, which she terms an “Intimate Caregiving Union 
                                                          
124 In addition to the argument presented here Metz claims that the 
arguments often put forward in defence of a political institution of marriage 
(arguments that focus on “care of children and partners, property rights, 
labour, and material resource distribution”) are in fact arguments in favour 
of the state regulating intimate caregiving in whatever relationship it occurs 
in (2010, p. 48).  
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(ICGU) Status” (p. 113). This would have a similar structure to the political 
institution of marriage (using similar types of regulation – a status eligible 
individuals can register for and a bundle of rights and duties) but all intimate 
caregiving relationships would be eligible for it. 
[An ICGU status] would afford legal recognition from which would 
flow various legal presumptions (lines of rights and responsibility), 
protection (that is, from certain types of intrusion), and material 
benefits (tax benefits). (pp. 134-5)  
An intimate caregiving relationship is characterised by Metz as having three 
defining features. The first feature is the private nature of these 
relationships. They are private in the sense that the “day-to-day interactions 
… are not subject to direct regulation by public authorities” (2010, p. 121). 
This allows for diversity within these relationships and is important because 
it enables both the giving and receiving of care to be tailored to the 
individuals involved in that particular relationship, “in accordance with their 
particular needs, desires, and … power dynamics” (p. 121). 
The second feature of intimate caregiving relationships is that they involve 
“deep (to the point of life sustaining), diverse (material, emotional, physical, 
and spiritual), particular, and non-contractual ‘terms’, ties, and motivations” 
(Metz 2010, p. 121). This highlights the complexity of these relationships, 
and in particular, the numerous ways in which people interlink themselves 
with one another – materially, emotionally, physically and spiritually.  
The third defining feature is the existence of an exchange of “diverse and 
often incommensurable goods and care – psychological, social, emotional, 
physical, spiritual … financial and material” (Metz 2010, p. 122). This 
exchange is however “unpredictably, if ever, strictly reciprocal” (p. 122). 
This means that whilst reciprocation can often be expected, it isn’t 
determined when, or in what kind, this reciprocation will occur, and it is not 
guaranteed.  
Why should such relationships be of particular interest to the state? Metz 
notes the particular value of such relationships for both the individuals 
involved in them, and for the society that they are found in. For example, 
intimate care aids an individual’s development and flourishing in numerous 
221 
 
ways, and the relationships that it occurs in provide the space for people to 
discover “new and possibly better ways of living” (2010, p. 124) that others 
could then adopt.125  
However, as we saw in Chapter Five it is not the value of intimate 
caregiving that provides reasons for treating the relationships that involve it 
as suitable for direct state regulation and recognition on Metz’s account. 126  
This is because the value of such relationships cannot give us a good enough 
reason to differentiate them from other caring relationships (such as 
friendships) which are also valuable in a similar way, and yet are not 
thought to require direct state regulation.127 Rather, as briefly explained in 
section 5.3.2, it is the particularly risky nature of intimate caregiving that 
provides the justification for this type of state involvement.  
It is the vulnerability that these relationships can lead to which differentiates 
them from other valuable caring relationships. Intimate caregiving 
relationships are “characterised by greater degrees of material and physical 
vulnerability, dependency, and risk than typical, nonintimate caregiving 
friendships” (2010, p. 126). 
All caregiving is risky. This is because when we provide care for someone, 
we use our own physical and material resources. These are the same 
resources that we might have otherwise used to care for ourselves. As such, 
providing care can leave the carer in a position of “physical and material 
vulnerability” (2010, p. 126).  This is clear in the case of providing care for 
vulnerable people, such as children or the elderly, where no reciprocal care 
or exchange of resources would be expected from the care receiver. Once 
the carer has used up her resources on the care receiver, that is it. Metz 
thinks that caregiving is also risky between equals however. This is because 
of the nature of the reciprocation in intimate caregiving relationships. Whilst 
                                                          
125 These are similar to the benefits Brake highlights for adult caring 
relationships.  
126 In Chapter Five, section 5.3.2, I introduced Metz’s account of risky 
intimate care in my response to Brake’s Public Reason Argument.  
127 Metz and Brake disagree on this point (Brake’s minimal marriage would 
be available to adult friendship networks).  
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it may generally be expected that some sort of reciprocation will occur, it 
may not be in kind and could occur at a much later date. As such, 
the unmonitored, unpredictable, and often incommensurable nature 
of caregiving means it involves serious material, physical and 
psychological risk, even among [equally] able-bodied, and able-
minded adults. (2010, p. 126) 
This already substantial risk of vulnerability is further exacerbated in 
intimate caregiving relationships. This is because the caregiving that occurs 
in such relationships is “unpaid, unrecognised, and undervalued, and not 
seen as producing ‘marketable’ skills” (Metz 2010, p. 126). This indicates 
that Metz is particularly concerned about “systematic vulnerabilities” (p. 
127). Not only does intimate caregiving make us vulnerable as a result of 
lacking the resources required to look after ourselves in particular instances 
of needing care; but it also makes us vulnerable in relation to social 
structures within our society which do not recognise or value caregiving, 
and this can cause long-term harm. For example, intimate caregiving can be 
a full-time occupation, meaning that caregivers cannot enter the workforce, 
but also do not have any access to other forms of financial support. The 
experience of caregiving would also be seen as irrelevant if the caregiver 
was to then attempt to enter the workforce, making it harder to find 
employment.   
The liberal state has an interest in intimate care being done well (if it is done 
privately in intimate caregiving relationships then the state does not have to 
provide it). It also should want the “benefits and burdens” of intimate 
caregiving (the advantages and risks identified above), which it contributes 
to producing, to be “distributed justly” (Metz 2010, p. 127). In order to do 
this it should provide some level of insurance against these identified risks. 
Metz thinks that it is the state that is the appropriate body to provide this 
insurance because, in a liberal society, it is the state that is “charged with the 
task and tools of protecting citizens from physical harm and securing a 
framework for the just distribution of the costs and benefits of political life” 
(p. 127).  
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Her proposed ICGU status would directly regulate (and recognise) intimate 
caregiving relationships. It does this by creating a distinct legal category 
that corresponds to these relationships. On her proposal all intimate 
caregiving relationships would be eligible for the ICGU status, and a set 
bundle of rights, duties etc. would attach to it.128 Particular ‘species’ of 
intimate caregiving relationships (romantic relationships, parent-child 
relationships etc.) would be indirectly regulated by the ICGU status.  
It is clear from Metz’s account that she considers vulnerability of 
individuals as something that the state should be particularly concerned 
about. But vulnerability to what exactly? Not all vulnerabilities are of state 
concern. To illustrate, notice that whilst Metz includes the exchange of 
“psychological, social, emotional, physical, spiritual … financial and 
material” goods and care in her characterisation of intimate caregiving 
relationships, she only includes the resulting “material, physical and 
psychological risk” as potential reasons for state involvement in those 
relationships (2010, p. 126). Presumably, however social, emotional and 
spiritual resources are used up through intimate caregiving in a similar way 
to the physical, material and psychological resources, and are also subject to 
un-guaranteed reciprocity in personal relationships. This leads to the 
question of why material, physical and psychological vulnerabilities are 
considered to be of legitimate state concern, whilst other (for example, 
social, emotional and spiritual) vulnerabilities are not.   
Looking back to Chapter Five (Section 5.1) we can see why this is the case. 
Physical, material and psychological resources are clearly going to be 
included in the list of things needed to develop and exercise a conception of 
justice and a conception of the good, and to pursue a particular conception 
of the good. They are primary goods. People need to have a basic level of 
health, a certain level of income and wealth, and self-respect in order to 
function as free and equal citizens. The state is therefore, as a matter of 
                                                          
128 She views this as a better alternative to the political institution of 
marriage because it can recognise and support all intimate caregiving 
relationships, and avoids the purported use of an ethical status (the concern 
highlighted by Metz’s Neutrality Argument in Chapter Six). 
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justice, concerned about the equal distribution of these resources. It can (and 
should) distribute income and wealth, and the social conditions for health 
and self-respect, according to the two principles of justice.  
If physical, material and psychological resources are threatened by 
particular personal relationships, then this provides a reason for the state to 
mitigate against this, to ensure a just distribution of social primary goods is 
achieved or maintained. However, as mentioned above, it is not a simple 
lack of physical, material and psychological goods that concerns Metz, or 
that warrants direct state regulation and recognition. Metz wants to create a 
distinct legal category for intimate caregiving relationships because of their 
particular riskiness, which she identifies as the risk of individuals being 
exposed to systematic vulnerability. 
When we consider intimate caregiving in isolation we can recognise its 
risks. We give up material, physical and psychological resources, and might 
not have those resources reciprocated, leaving us potentially vulnerable. 
However, it might be thought that these risks could be relatively easily 
mitigated by the individual, and that the state does not need to directly 
regulate intimate caregiving in order to ensure a just distribution of these 
resources. Individuals after all should have access to employment, and so 
should be able to generate the means to pay for material and physical 
resources if needed. It might be assumed that individuals also have other 
caring relationships in which they could be the care receiver – making up 
the lost resources (including psychological resources). It might also be 
thought that autonomous individuals should be able to recognise these risks, 
and be responsible for mitigating them in some way. In other words, the 
primary goods should already be secured via other laws and regulations of 
the basic structure, and the state does not need to do anything further.  
What Metz’s account of intimate caregiving relationships highlights is that 
this is the wrong perspective to take when considering such relationships. 
Intimate caregiving does not simply occur in isolated relationships, 
unaffected by the outside world. Intimate caregiving relationships exist in 
our social world, and are affected and influenced by its social and political 
225 
 
structures. What Metz highlights, is that these influences and affects lead to 
further vulnerability: vulnerability that is not due to intimate caregiving 
alone, but due to the fact that it occurs alongside other social and political 
structures and norms.  
We have seen that Metz lists four reasons why intimate caregiving is 
particularly risky, and which contribute to it leading to systematic 
vulnerability: it is unpaid, unrecognised, undervalued and it is not viewed as 
producing marketable skills. We can see that this isn’t due to the intimate 
caregiving in itself. This is due to social and political structures and norms 
surrounding both caregiving, and such things as employment and what is 
viewed as valuable and marketable within society. It is not due to the nature 
of caregiving in itself that causes systematic vulnerability (as is the case 
with the immediate lack of resources), but rather it is due to the social facts 
surrounding caregiving. If caregiving was ‘paid’,129 recognised, valued and 
viewed as producing marketable skills in our society then it would not lead 
to systematic vulnerability. This is something that the individual themselves 
cannot mitigate, as they cannot easily change the social and political 
structures and norms causing this vulnerability.  
It is due to social and political structures that intimate caregivers - who are 
already doing valuable work - have to look for other employment in order to 
gain income. It will be harder for intimate caregivers to find this 
employment because the skills that they have developed through their 
intimate care are not viewed as marketable. If intimate caregivers do 
manage to find employment, the intimate care that they do will be 
undervalued and unrecognised – as such, it will not count as a legitimate 
reason for paid leave, for example. It is due to the interaction of all of these 
                                                          
129 Exactly how, and when, care should be ‘paid for’ in intimate caregiving 
relationships would have to be carefully worked out. It might not always be 
appropriate as it might threaten or change the nature of the personal 
relationship (payment instigates contractual features into a typically non-
contractual relationship). However, some sort of financial state benefit, or 
the entitlement to some of the income earned by other relationship 
members, might avoid this concern. The recognition and valuation that care 
is the type of thing that can have market value outside of these relationships 
is however vital.  
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different things that intimate caregivers are acutely, and systematically 
vulnerable.  
I have cashed out this explanation of vulnerability in terms of Rawlsian 
primary goods. There are of course those who disagree with the Rawlsian 
focus on social primary goods as the currency of egalitarian distributive 
justice. The “Capabilities Approach” for example suggests that we shouldn’t 
be solely focused on resources (like social primary goods), but rather think 
about how these resources contribute to what an individual can achieve, 
something which is also affected by “objective possibilities, the natural 
environment, and individual capacities” (Gosepath 2011, Section 3.8). 
Whilst the proper currency of egalitarian justice is debated, whatever 
currency you subscribe to, I think you would be hard pushed to claim that 
systematic physical, material and psychological vulnerabilities were not a 
matter of legitimate state concern, especially considering the harm that an 
individual could come to without these resources (or at least without access 
to these resources, or to what these resources enable).  
To conclude, then, the preceding discussion demonstrates that, according to 
Metz, the existence of systematic material, physical and psychological 
vulnerability is a compelling reason for direct state regulation.130 She has 
shown that intimate caregiving unions can create systematic material, 
physical and psychological vulnerability, and this is why they warrant direct 
regulation. The particular type of direct regulation that she proposes is her 
ICGU status which would also provide recognition (on her account). 
7.3.3 Chambers’ Relationship Practices  
For Brake and Metz it has been easy to identify what personal relationship 
they consider to warrant direct regulation, because they each propose 
                                                          
130 There is a growing literature in legal theory on vulnerability, led by the 
work of Martha Fineman (2008). This challenges the liberal assumption that 
citizens should be conceptualised as autonomous beings, and highlights the 
fact that we are all vulnerable and dependent in many ways, suggesting that 
our legal and political theories need to recognise this. This literature 
develops a specific meaning for the term and concept of ‘vulnerability’ 
which I am not using here.  
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alternative regulatory frameworks that provide direct regulation for a 
particular class of personal relationships (adult caring relationships for 
Brake, and intimate caregiving relationships for Metz, warrant 
corresponding legal categories). Things aren’t quite so clear cut when it 
comes to Chambers because her alternative proposal of a marriage-free state 
defends direct regulation of “relationship practices” (2017, p. 147).  
A relationship practice is: 
an activity or area of life which is carried out in a personal 
relationship … [including] property ownership, financial 
interdependence, emotional interdependence, care, parenting, 
cohabitation, next-of-kinship, and sexual intimacy. (Chambers 2017, 
p. 147) 
In the marriage-free state (where only private, non-legal, marriage 
ceremonies would be allowed) these relationship practices would be directly 
regulated through an alternative type of regulation -  a series of piecemeal, 
practice-based, default (opt-out) “state directives” (2017, p. 144) which each 
pick out a separate legal category corresponding to the separate relationship 
practices. The personal relationships that these practices happen to be a part 
of would be indirectly regulated by the state directives that directly regulate 
the relationship practices.131. 
In her book, Chambers doesn’t provide fully worked out arguments for why 
each of the identified relationship practices (property ownership, parenting, 
caring, etc.) warrant direct state regulation.132 She acknowledges that for 
each there would need to be individual arguments to “identify each area of 
state interest and to specify what the just regulations should be” (2017, p. 
148).  We can however see from her work that systematic physical, material, 
                                                          
131 This indirect regulation is more like the regulation of gardening, than the 
regulation of most individual breeds of dog. 
132 Chambers acknowledges and endorses Brake’s and Metz’s claims that 
the state should be involved in regulating caregiving because it is “a primary 
good essential to human flourishing that nevertheless brings with it risks and 
vulnerabilities” (2013, p. 135), but rejects both ICGU statuses and minimal 
marriage as the model for regulating care. We can see from the list of 
relationship practices that care is just one practice among many that 
Chambers thinks warrants direct regulation. 
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and psychological vulnerability is again (as with Metz) of key concern, and 
would provide a sufficient reason for direct state regulation.  
We can see this in particular in an example from the Law Commission of 
England and Wales which concerns the relationship practice of financial 
interdependence. She presents the example whilst arguing against status-
based models of regulation which entail state recognition. Her concern is 
that such models of regulation would still leave people vulnerable in 
unacceptable ways.   
Take the position of cohabitants who have children and have been 
living together for a long time. The mother stays at home to look 
after the children and has no real prospects of re-entering the job 
market at a level that would enable her to afford the child-care that 
her absence from home would require. … In order to obtain any 
long-term economic security in case of the relationship ending, she 
would first have to persuade him that he should take steps to protect 
her position. It might well be that he is quite happy with the status 
quo, which favours him.  
Even if she were able to overcome this initial hurdle and 
persuade her partner that something should be done, they would then 
have to decide what steps were appropriate. It might be thought that 
the obvious answer is that they should marry. But research suggests 
… that many cohabitants think it wrong to marry purely for legal or 
financial reasons. The alternative would be for them to declare an 
express trust over their home or enter into a contract for her benefit. 
However, such arrangements may be complex and require legal 
advice. The couple may simply conclude that the issue is not 
sufficiently pressing to take any further, that they have other 
spending priorities. (Chambers 2017, p. 152)133 
We can clearly see that the potentially vulnerable position that the woman 
(and presumably children) would be left in is of central importance here. 
The particular worry is financial vulnerability. The woman is currently 
financially dependent on her husband, and if the relationship ended, she 
would be “left without financial protection” (Chambers 2017, p. 152) – 
protection she would only have (on the current status-based model) if she 
was married and divorcing.  
                                                          
133 Chambers takes this example from the Law Commission of England and 
Wales (2007) Cohabitation: The Financial Consequences of Relationship 
Breakdown LAW COM No. 307, p. 33. 
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This is an example of systematic vulnerability. It is the woman’s financial 
dependence, within our particular society that is structured in a particular 
way so that she will have poor job prospects, that leads to her vulnerability. 
She is systematically financially vulnerable because the job market is set up 
in such a way that she would not be able to re-enter it at the level required in 
order to be able to afford the childcare she would need. She wouldn’t be 
able to re-enter it at the required level because she has stayed at home and 
looked after her children – an activity that is unpaid, undervalued, 
unrecognised, and not seen to produce marketable skills. Her vulnerability is 
systematic because it is not solely down to the fact that she cohabits and 
parents full time, but because the social structures in which she does these 
things prohibit her from being able to mitigate against this vulnerability. 
This systematic financial vulnerability is something that she needs to be 
protected from by the state.  
The other relationship practices listed by Chambers could also plausibly 
lead to systematic material, physical and psychological vulnerability. 
Property ownership, emotional interdependence, care, parenting etc. are all 
things that have the potential to go badly for those involved. There could 
however be other reasons, for Chambers, which also justify direct state 
regulation of relationship practices, which have not been identified here.  
Despite this focus on relationships practices (rather than personal 
relationships), I still think it is the case that Chambers would accept the 
Direct Regulation Claim, and claim that some personal relationships warrant 
direct regulation. In particular, I think she would accept the claim that the 
parent-child relationship warrants direct regulation. We can see that this is 
the case because the parent-child relationship appears to meet the conditions 
that she stipulates for state recognition (which I take here to be at least an 
instance of direct regulation). 
There are (at least) three possible ways to justify state recognition according 
to Chambers. We can extrapolate these from the following statement which 
claims that adult personal relationships meet none of these three conditions:  
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Relationships do not need state recognition if they are to be 
performed safely or in line with justice, and the state does not need 
to stipulate who counts as being in A Relationship (2017, p. 68).134 
We can assume, therefore, that state recognition of something is justified 
when one of three things is true: first, when state recognition is required in 
order for that thing to be done safely; second, when state recognition is 
required in order for that thing to be performed in line with justice; and 
third, when the state needs (for public, political reasons) to be able to 
stipulate who counts being in a particular relationship.  
The state has compelling reasons to stipulate who counts as being in a 
parent/guardian – child relationship. The state needs to know who is 
responsible for which child’s well-being so that it can, for example, direct 
state benefits and prosecute child-neglect appropriately. In order to do this it 
has to stipulate what counts as a parent-child relationship, and so creates the 
corresponding legal category.  
Chambers does also argue that the non-legal (private) marital relationship in 
the marriage-free state might require direct regulation. I will defer 
discussing the reasons for this – which seem particularly focused on the 
social institution of marriage – to Section 7.4.3, to show why this does not 
amount to a claim that the romantic relationship should be directly 
regulated. The central thought however is that this direct regulation is 
required for reasons of equality.  
To sum up, Chambers thinks that when it comes to adult personal 
relationships the primary focus should be on relationship practices, and it is 
these that her proposal would directly regulate. Despite this, the Direct 
Regulation Claim still underlies her view, as there are certain personal 
relationships that still warrant direct regulation.  
7.3.4 Summary: The Direct Regulation Claim  
Having gone through each of Brake’s, Metz’s, and Chambers’ proposals we 
are now in a position to see that each can be understood to accept the Direct 
Regulation Claim: that the liberal state has compelling reasons to directly 
                                                          
134 Chambers is referring to adult personal relationships here.  
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regulate some personal relationships, and so it is appropriate for the state to 
create a distinct legal category corresponding to those relationships. The 
discussion has shown that there are a number of different, individually 
sufficient, reasons for thinking that a personal relationship warrants direct 
regulation.  
Brake focused on the idea that some personal relationships are natural 
primary goods, with social bases that are social primary goods. Metz 
showed that some personal relationships can lead to systematic, material, 
and psychological vulnerability. I showed that Chambers would likely 
accept that it is necessary for the state to stipulate what counts as a 
particular personal relationship in some specific cases.  
 7.4 The Romantic Relationship Claim  
Moving on, the second claim that I take to underlie the arguments against 
the political institution of marriage is the Romantic Relationship Claim. In 
this section I aim to demonstrate that Brake, Metz and Chambers all treat 
the paradigmatic marital relationship, qua romantic relationship, as 
something which does not warrant direct regulation. There is nothing in 
particular about the romantic relationship itself, on their views, that warrants 
direct state regulation and the creation of a distinct legal category.  
To be clear, each author recognises that the romantic relationship could (and 
often does) warrant indirect regulation. For Brake the romantic relationship 
can be seen to be a ‘species’ of adult caring relationships. Minimal marriage 
directly regulates adult caring relationships, and indirectly regulates the 
romantic relationship. It is similar for Metz: the romantic relationship is a 
species of intimate caregiving relationship, and so is indirectly regulated by 
the ICGU status. For Chambers, the story is slightly different, but the result 
is the same. The romantic relationship is not a ‘species’ of some ‘genus’ of 
relationship that is directly regulated. However, there are direct regulations 
of relationship practices that end up indirectly regulating the romantic 
relationship because those practices occur within this relationship (just like 
gardening is indirectly regulated by laws concerning breaches of the peace).  
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7.4.1 The Contested Value of Amorous Dyadic Relationships  
As we have just seen, Brake argues for minimal marriage – a legal 
framework that directly regulates adult caring relationships. The romantic 
relationship is a ‘species’ of adult caring relationship, and so would be 
indirectly regulated by minimal marriage. However, it does not warrant its 
own distinct legal category for Brake. That is precisely what Brake is 
arguing against.  
We saw in Chapter Five that Brake is concerned about the restriction to 
romantic couple relationships found in the current political institution of 
marriage. This institution does create a distinct legal category that 
corresponds to the romantic relationship. The Public Reason Argument 
claims that this restriction cannot be justified by appeal to public reason. 
Any justification would have to appeal to the value of amorous dyadic 
relationships and this, the argument claims, is an inappropriate and non-
public reason. This is because the value of amorous dyadic relationships is 
contested. Not all people will agree that the romantic couple relationship is 
valuable, or particularly valuable, because this relationship is not a part of 
all conceptions of the good.  
On Brake’s account personal relationships warrant direct regulation when 
they are natural primary goods, and have social bases that can be properly 
considered as social primary goods. The romantic relationship is not, qua 
romantic relationship, a natural primary good with social bases that are 
social primary goods. It is not something that all citizens would reasonably 
want in order to develop their moral powers and to pursue their distinct 
conceptions of the good. There are other adult caring relationships that 
could play this role. On this picture the romantic relationship is just one 
species among many that citizens should be free to choose when forming 
adult caring relationships.  
Brake focuses on the value of caring relationships. As such she does not 
provide us with any reason to think that the romantic relationship is the type 
of relationship that would lead to systematic material, physical and 
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psychological vulnerability, in virtue of being a romantic relationship, 
either.  
For these reasons, I think it is reasonable to say that the Romantic 
Relationship Claim underlies Brake’s view.  
7.4.2 The Benefits (for Marriage) of Disestablishing Marriage  
We saw, in Chapter Six, that Metz is concerned with the state being 
involved with the formal, comprehensive social institution of marriage 
because it involves the state in regulating its citizens’ beliefs and violating 
the principle of neutrality. She also claims that the social institution of 
marriage would in fact benefit from being ‘disestablished’ (being separated 
from the state).135   
Marriage, according to Metz, integrates individuals into their community. 
Acquiring the marital status involves an alteration of self-understanding and 
an instillation of social norms which is made possible by the public 
recognition and regulation of these social practices and social narratives by 
an ethical authority (for example, a religious leader).  
When the institution of marriage is also political the state plays the role of 
an ethical authority. This is problematic for marriage because the state is an 
ineffective ethical authority. In order for the marital status to alter self-
understanding and instil social norms the ethical authority needs to come 
from and represent the community of shared belief which gives the status 
meaning. The political liberal state is not suited to do this.  
Whilst Metz is concerned with the ability of the state to play this role in the 
social institution of marriage, she is clearly unconcerned about the nature of 
the relationship that the social norms surrounding marriage encourage and 
determine. Within Western liberal democracies (which have a tradition of 
marriage) it seems likely that this relationship will look a lot like the 
paradigmatic marital relationship, i.e. the romantic relationship. This lack of 
concern suggests that she does not think the romantic relationship, in virtue 
of being a romantic relationship, will lead to any further systematic material, 
                                                          
135 See Metz (2010), p. 119 and pp. 134-150. 
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physical and psychological vulnerability than other intimate caregiving 
relationships.  
Metz also argues that the value of intimate caregiving does not, in the case 
of intimate caregiving relationships, give sufficient justification for state 
recognition (Metz 2010, p. 126). We can safely assume therefore that she 
does not think that the romantic relationship is a natural primary good with 
social bases that are social primary goods. 
As such, it seems reasonable to infer that she does not regard the romantic 
relationship as something that warrants direct regulation. It is adequate, on 
her view, for them to be indirectly regulated by her ICGU status.  
7.4.3 Focusing on Practices not Relationships  
In arguing against the political institution of marriage (and alternatives), and 
in proposing default state directives for separate relationship practices, we 
can see that Chambers does not consider the romantic relationship to 
warrant a distinct legal category.  
Whilst the focus is on relationship practices, she does suggest that the non-
legal (private) marital relationship in the marriage-free state might require 
direct regulation. As noted above the reasons for this seem particularly 
marriage-specific, and do not look as though they would be reasons to 
directly regulate the romantic relationship.  
Chambers states that “the marriage-free state is based on the values of 
liberty and equality, and these, especially equality, require the state to take 
an interest in the content of private marriages” (2017, p. 171). There are 
three ways in which private marriages might offend against equality. First, 
private marriages might be “over-inclusive” by allowing “potentially 
troubling marriages” to occur (Chambers 2017, p. 171). This could provide 
a reason for the state to still restrict things such as “forced marriage” in 
order to prevent harm. Second, private marriages might be “under-
inclusive” (p. 171) by unfairly discriminating who has access to the non-
legal marital institution. Chambers claims there are reasons not to exempt 
for example, religions, from standard anti-discrimination laws. Third, 
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private marriages might be “internally inegalitarian” because “a marrying 
institution, such as a religion, might normatively impose unequal standards 
within a marriage”, such as gendered norms (p. 171). If these norms are 
“deeply inegalitarian or oppressive” (p. 187), and powerful, then the state 
has a reason to take an interest in them and potentially regulate them.  
Whilst Chambers appears to think that these reasons will provide 
justification for the direct regulation of private marital relationships (those 
that have acquired the non-legal status), they do not seem to be reasons that 
would extend to romantic relationships qua romantic relationships because 
they are all explicitly concerned with the non-legal institution of marriage.  
7.4.4 Summary: The Romantic Relationship Claim  
The preceding discussion shows that it is not unreasonable to think that 
Brake, Metz and Chambers all subscribe to the Romantic Relationship 
Claim. Whilst they all acknowledge that the romantic relationship can be 
indirectly regulated, none of them think that the state has a compelling 
reason to directly regulate the romantic relationship, and so it should not 
create a distinct legal category that corresponds to it.   
7.5 The Underlying Complaint against the Political Institution of 
Marriage  
The aim of this chapter has been to determine whether there is an underlying 
complaint against the political institution of marriage, and to make it clearer 
what implications the various arguments against marriage have for the 
question concerning what relation the political liberal state should bear to 
the paradigmatic marital relationship qua romantic relationship (the guiding 
question for Part Two).  
The identification of the Direct Regulation Claim and the Romantic 
Relationship Claim enables me to identify the underlying complaint against 
the political institution of marriage.  
The Underlying Complaint against the Political Institution of 
Marriage: the political institution of marriage directly regulates, and 
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creates a distinct legal category corresponding to, the romantic 
relationship when it has no compelling reason to do so.  
The anti-marriage position can therefore be understood to be claiming that 
the current direct regulatory relation that the state bears to the romantic 
relationship via the political institution of marriage is inappropriate. Direct 
regulation is inappropriate when the relationship does not warrant it.  
I shall suggest how the political liberal can respond to this underlying 
complaint in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Eight  
Responding to the Underlying Complaint against Marriage 
 
Part Two of this thesis has been concerned with the question of what 
relation the state should bear to the paradigmatic marital relationship (the 
romantic relationship). Currently the state directly regulates the romantic 
relationship (and has a distinct legal category corresponding to the romantic 
relationship), via the political institution of marriage. In the previous chapter 
I identified what is thought to be problematic about this: the underlying 
complaint against the political institution of marriage is that the state has no 
compelling reason to directly regulate the romantic relationship (which it 
does through the political institution of marriage). How should the debate 
move forward in light of this complaint? 
If Brake, Metz, and Chambers are correct, and the underlying complaint is 
right to assert that the romantic relationship should not be directly regulated, 
then the current relation that the state bears to this relationship is 
inappropriate. The state should not directly regulate something that does not 
warrant it. Indirect regulation of the romantic relationship is however 
appropriate, and particular instances of the romantic relationship would be 
indirectly regulated by the frameworks proposed by Brake, Metz, and 
Chambers.  
It has not yet been shown, however, that the underlying complaint is true. It 
has not been shown that the paradigmatic marital relationship, qua romantic 
relationship, does not warrant direct regulation. My aim in this chapter is to 
argue that the underlying complaint is in fact false. The romantic 
relationship does warrant direct regulation. 
For those who wish to fully defend the state’s recognition of marriage, my 
argument in this chapter would be a first step for a line of defence that has 
not been fully explored.136 It would, however, only be a first step. Showing 
                                                          
136 The defences in the literature tend to focus on the specific complaints 
made against the political institution of marriage. For example, Simon May 
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that direct regulation of the romantic relationship is warranted does not 
show that this direct regulation should be achieved through the political 
institution of marriage. Although I have argued, in Chapters Five and Six, 
that the political liberal concerns about the political institution of marriage 
can be met, there are other concerns about this institution that need to be 
addressed,137 and alternative forms of direct regulation available that might 
be considered preferable (an alternative ‘status’ and bundle perhaps, or even 
a state directive that explicitly picks out the romantic relationship). These 
would need to be explored and evaluated.  
In this chapter I argue that there are good reasons to directly regulate the 
romantic relationship, (contrary to the Romantic Relationship claim 
identified in Chapter Seven). Drawing on the work of Part One, I suggest 
that the romantic relationship can be a unique source of systematic physical, 
material and psychological vulnerability. This gives the state a compelling 
reason to directly regulate this relationship and create a distinct legal 
category that corresponds to it.  
This provides a strong, direct challenge to Brake, Chambers, and Metz. It 
demonstrates that the romantic relationship is a species of adult caring 
relationships and intimate caregiving relationships that warrants its own 
distinct legal category, contrary to what Brake and Metz claim. It also 
challenges Chambers’ focus on relationship practices when it comes to 
regulating adult personal relationships. It shows her proposal misses 
something that warrants its own distinct legal category.  
It is not however clear precisely what type of direct regulation would be 
best. As will be shown, the romantic relationship warrants direct regulation 
in virtue of the social norms that constitute the relationship, and in virtue of 
                                                          
(2016) responds to neutrality arguments, Christopher Bennet (2003) 
responds to differential treatment arguments and Ralph Wedgwood (2016) 
responds to public reason arguments. My arguments in Chapters Five and 
Six, and in Toop (2018), follow a similar pattern.  
137 In particular, egalitarian concerns (for example, that the political 
institution of marriage treats women, non-heterosexuals and non-married 
people unequally), such as those highlighted by Chambers (2017), Chapter 
1.  
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the social conditions (including economic and legal conditions) that interact 
with the relationship. Determining how best to mitigate against the 
systematic vulnerability caused by these social norms and conditions will be 
highly complex and demand careful and extensive work that goes beyond 
the scope of the present work.  
However, the key point is that there is a reason for the state to put some type 
of direct regulation in place, to ensure those who are made vulnerable by the 
romantic relationship are not significantly disadvantaged by that 
vulnerability. It might be the case that the political institution of marriage is 
the most appropriate way of doing this. Or perhaps an alternative that still 
creates a distinct legal category that corresponds to the romantic relationship 
but disassociates itself from the term ‘marriage’ will be preferable. It might 
even be the case that at some point in the future the romantic relationship 
will cease to lead to systematic material, physical and psychological 
vulnerability, at which point it will cease to require direct regulation. Social 
conditions and norms are malleable, and can change over time. As such, any 
proposal made now, and which is deemed to be appropriate now, is likely to 
become unsuitable in the future. This means the question of how to directly 
regulate the romantic relationship (through which precise types of 
regulation) will be ongoing. 
It is in light of this complexity - which I explore further in my concluding 
chapter - that I do not attempt to make any concrete proposals for an 
alternative framework that would directly regulate the romantic relationship, 
nor to provide a full defence of the political institution of marriage.  
8.1 A Quick Recap: The Romantic Relationship and Direct Regulation  
Part One identified the paradigmatic marital relationship (in our Western 
society) as the romantic relationship. In Chapter Four I built up an account 
of the romantic relationship as one in which the participants play the role of 
a romantic partner for each other. The role of a romantic partner includes 
certain obligations: to love one another, and act in ways that express that 
love; to share the experiences that are central to one’s life, and to 
accommodate those things within a joint life; to take joint responsibility for 
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the central aspects of one another’s well-being; and to trust one another 
deeply.  
I suggested that this relationship-role is akin to social roles, in the sense that 
they can be understood to be situated within the social world, and as 
forming a part of a three-tiered structure, sitting within a social institution or 
category, and specifying appropriate patterns of behaviour. Understanding 
relationship roles in this way highlights that they are societally and 
temporally relative. The context of a particular society, at a particular time, 
will determine what roles exist and what behaviour is expected in order to 
fulfil those roles. In other words, roles can change. In addition to this, they 
are interpretive: individuals interpret roles, and what they require, 
differently (within set parameters).138 This means that the same role can be 
played and fulfilled in different ways. This encompasses the insight that 
whilst we have a general idea about what the romantic relationship entails, 
the relationships that fall into this category can look remarkably different. 
Chapter Seven explained the difference between direct and indirect 
regulation. Direct regulation occurs when the state creates a distinct legal 
category for a particular thing, and puts in place regulation (whether it is a 
law, tax, right, etc.) specifically for that legal category.  
The previous chapter also identified the Direct Regulation Claim – that the 
state does have compelling reasons to directly regulate some personal 
relationships – and explored what those compelling reasons might be. One 
such reason, drawn from the work of Metz in particular, is when a personal 
relationship leads to systematic physical, material and psychological 
vulnerability.  
 I will argue that the romantic relationship leads to systematic material, 
physical and psychological vulnerability – systematic vulnerability that no 
other species of intimate caregiving relationship leads to. I claim first that it 
is a uniquely risky intimate caregiving relationship, and then show that there 
are other features of the romantic relationship that also lead to material, 
                                                          
138 See Chapter Three, section 3.4.3, and Hardimon (1994), p. 355, for a 
discussion of interpretive roles. 
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physical and psychological vulnerability – in particular the love and the 
expected relationship maintenance. I then argue that this vulnerability is 
systematic, which means that the vulnerability is exacerbated by social and 
political structures, and so individuals are unable to easily mitigate against it 
themselves. This enables me to claim that the paradigmatic marital 
relationship, qua romantic relationship, warrants direct regulation.  
8.2 The Romantic Relationship is a Uniquely Risky Intimate Caregiving 
Relationship 
In order to show that the romantic relationship warrants direct regulation in 
virtue of being a uniquely risky intimate caregiving relationship, I first need 
to show that it is a ‘species’ of intimate caregiving relationship. I then need 
to show that there is reason to create a distinct legal category for this 
‘species’ (rather than allowing it to be merely indirectly regulated). I do this 
by showing that it is uniquely risky because it is a relationship in which one 
makes oneself particularly vulnerable to harm, and because it involves a 
duty to provide intimate care.  
8.2.1 The Romantic Relationship is an Intimate Caregiving Relationship 
Metz characterised intimate caregiving relationships as private, as involving 
a range of non-contractual arrangements, and as containing the 
unquantifiable exchange of a diverse range of goods and care (2010, pp. 
121-122). We can see that the  romantic relationship is a species of this sort 
of relationship because: first, the day-to-day interactions within this 
relationship are private; second, the role of a romantic partner entails taking 
joint responsibility for each other’s well-being, and providing care and 
support in relation to the central aspects of the other person’s life; and third, 
this relationship involves reciprocal duties, not contracts, which can be 
fulfilled (and interpreted) in a huge variety of different ways.  
Individuals within a romantic relationship will make use of physical, 
material and psychological resources in order to fulfil the role of a romantic 
partner, which includes providing intimate care. Taking joint responsibility 
for the central aspects of each other’s well-being is likely to involve 
providing physical and material support and care for the other person. It will 
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certainly involve emotional and psychological care. Each partner has to 
consider the other person - and not just themselves - when making 
decisions. They need to be aware of the affect that their actions will have on 
the other. They are also at risk of being negatively affected by the decisions, 
actions and emotions of the other person. This involves the use of 
psychological resources, which are important for autonomy and self-respect. 
All of these resources are risked because they might not be reciprocated in 
kind or easily replenished.  
Metz has convincingly argued that intimate caregiving relationships lead to 
systematic material, physical and psychological vulnerability, caused by the 
social and political structures that they exist within.139 This justifies the state 
directly regulating (the ‘genus’ of) intimate caregiving relationships. 
Showing that the romantic relationship is an intimate caregiving relationship 
therefore proves that it is a ‘species’ of this genus and that it would be 
indirectly regulated by any regulation put in place in order to directly 
regulate intimate caregiving relationships (such as Metz’s ICGU status).  
I think that we can go one step further and show that the unique nature of 
the romantic relationship affects the nature of the vulnerability that 
participants face as a result of intimate caregiving. First, because the 
caregiving is performed in a relationship in which one makes oneself 
particularly vulnerable to harm; and second, because providing intimate care 
within a romantic relationship is a part of a duty – there is a sense in which 
we are obligated to do it, and to make ourselves vulnerable.140 For these 
reasons, I think we can claim that the romantic relationship in itself warrants 
direct regulation. The state should create a distinct legal category that 
corresponds to this relationship. Indirect regulation is not adequate.   
8.2.2 Vulnerability to Harm  
The role of a romantic partner requires us to share the experiences that are 
central to our lives, to accommodate these things within a joint life, and to 
take joint responsibility for the central aspects of each other’s well-being. 
                                                          
139 See Chapter Seven, section 7.3.2. 
140 At least for as long as we are in the relationship.  
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Jointly these features make the romantic relationship into a uniquely risky 
intimate caregiving relationship.  
The duty to share the central aspects of our lives and identities makes 
romantic partners particularly vulnerable to each other. This intimate 
knowledge enables the care that is given to be particularly tailored but it 
also means that our romantic partners know exactly how to hurt us, in a way 
that attacks the most central parts of our lives and identities – whatever 
those may be.  
The role of a romantic partner also includes the duty to take joint 
responsibility for one another’s central aspects of well-being. This means 
that a romantic partner should not use the intimate knowledge to harm, but 
rather to benefit us. However, this is not guaranteed. Romantic partners 
argue and fight and this intimate knowledge can be used to hurt each other 
effectively, even if it is later regretted and atoned for. The reality of some 
romantic relationships is that they do not live up to the ideal – the role is not 
fully fulfilled. Some people abuse the intimate knowledge they are entrusted 
with and the position of power this puts them in. Romantic relationships 
also come to an end, and it is then that the intimate knowledge can be used 
to create real damage.  
Providing intimate care in a relationship in which one is this vulnerable to 
harm makes that provision even more risky. Not only are material, physical 
and psychological resources spent, their reciprocation not guaranteed, and 
the vulnerability this causes hard to mitigate against due to social and 
political norms and structures, meaning that the caregiver is at risk of not 
being able to look after themselves; in addition, the caregiver is at risk of 
significant harm, and of not being able to protect themselves from it. 
8.2.3 The Duty to Provide Intimate Care 
Providing intimate care within a romantic relationship is a part of a unique 
romantic partner role-obligation: to take joint responsibility for the central 
aspects of each other’s well-being which includes comforting, helping and 
supporting each other within one’s joint life. This role obligation, along with 
the others specified in Chapter Four, make up the unique role of a romantic 
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partner. This means that people within romantic relationships (playing the 
role of a romantic partner) have an extra, binding, reason to provide intimate 
care for their partner and to make themselves vulnerable doing so within a 
relationship that puts them at an acute risk of harm. This makes it harder for 
romantic partners to stop providing intimate care when it becomes too 
burdensome, and this is due to social norms (the role and the associated 
pattern of required behaviour).  
Role obligations are special, as opposed to general, duties. They are owed to 
specific people, rather than to people in general. There is a fair amount of 
debate surrounding whether and how they obligate us, but this does not 
impede the point being made here.141 It seems that we generally accept the 
notion of role obligations in our everyday moral life, and take their 
prescriptions as binding. As Sciaraffa notes: “We are all familiar with the 
way in which social roles … confront us with clusters of duties that purport 
to bind us” (2009, p. 107). We intuitively feel (whether or not it has yet 
been proven to be the case) that role obligations are morally binding. They 
provide us with decisive reasons to act in the way that the role specifies.  
There are a number of different ways in which we can be thought to become 
obligated by role-obligations. I do not aim to argue for any particular 
account, but simply want to point out that it is not only intuitively plausible 
that there are binding role obligations – there are good reasons for thinking 
that these role obligations can bind us in some way.  
Role obligations, in themselves, are thought to be “normatively inert” 
(Sciaraffa 2009, p. 108). As described in Chapter Three, “to say that action 
X is a role-duty is to say that there is a social practice that is sustained by a 
widespread belief that there is a requirement to conform to the practice” (p. 
109). The existence of role obligations does not, on its own, provide 
“justifying reasons to conform to the practice” (p. 109). Something extra has 
to happen.  
                                                          
141 See Jeske (2014) for an overview of special obligations. See Section 4 in 
particular. See also Hardimon (1994), Sciaraffa (2009), and Simmons 
(1996).  
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There are three options proposed for this ‘something extra’. We become 
obligated to fulfil our role obligations when: i) we voluntarily undertake to 
perform the role duty; or ii) the role duty is the best way of discharging a 
natural duty (for example, the general duty of beneficence); or iii) we 
identify with the role that we are playing.142  
All three options plausibly occur in romantic relationships. So whichever 
account we accept, we can claim that romantic partners are obligated to 
perform their role-obligations. First, whilst they might not explicitly 
promise or consent (the paradigm acts of voluntarily undertaking to do 
something) to perform the role duties, they do perform and engage in 
actions, by maintaining a relationship, that lead to legitimate expectations 
that these duties will be fulfilled. These type of expectation-raising actions 
are thought to be voluntary acts of the relevant kind.143 Second, natural (or 
general) duties of beneficence and gratitude owed to our romantic partners 
plausibly look as though they might be best discharged through the role-
duties of a romantic partner – they include duties to promote well-being and 
to do this in a reciprocal way. 
Third, I think it is reasonable to say that if we identify with any role, then 
we identify with being someone’s romantic partner. Hardimon characterises 
role identification as occurring when one recognises that one occupies a 
particular role, and “conceive[s] of oneself as someone for whom the norms 
of the role function as reasons” (1994, p. 358). Sciaraffa characterises role 
identification differently:144  
When an agent identifies with a role, she identifies with a 
comprehensive goal based on the role - that is, she pursues a 
                                                          
142 The “standard view” (Sciaraffa 2009, p. 107) holds that there are two 
possible grounds of role duties – voluntary actions and natural duties (see 
e.g. Simmons 1996). The third possible ground – identification - has been 
proposed by e.g. Hardimon (1994) and Sciaraffa (2009). 
143 See Sciaraffa (2009), p. 108. 
144 Sciaraffa (2009) proposes this alternative in response to an objection, 
from Simmons, to Hardimon’s role-identification account. Simmons is 
concerned that Hardimon’s account only provides a motivating reason rather 
than a justificatory reason for complying with role obligations. Sciaraffa’s 
account is meant to be able to provide a justificatory reason.  
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comprehensive goal that generally requires that she conform to the 
role’s duties. (2009, p. 110) 
Whichever view we take, romantic partners are likely to identify with their 
role as a romantic partner – they will see themselves as someone for who 
the norms of the romantic partner role function as reasons and they will 
have the comprehensive goal of being a romantic partner for X which 
requires conforming to the role of the romantic partner for X.  
The role-obligation to take joint responsibility for the central aspects of your 
romantic partner’s well-being therefore gives romantic partners a decisive 
reason to provide intimate care, even if it makes them particularly 
vulnerable. Whilst there isn’t a duty to remain in the romantic relationship, 
releasing themselves from the duty to take joint responsibility, by ending the 
relationship, isn’t commonly a particularly salient or attractive option. 
Romantic relationships are likely to be important to their participants, and 
they will have reasons to remain in them, even if they are demanding. In 
addition, ending the relationship exposes one to the particularly acute 
potential of harm identified in section 8.2.2.  
This means that it is harder for romantic partners to give up intimate 
caregiving when it becomes too risky, and harder for them to mitigate 
against the vulnerability that this causes. This is because of a social practice 
that relates specifically to the romantic relationship (the role and pattern of 
required behaviour). Whilst someone who provides care outside of a 
romantic relationship might have a variety of reasons for providing intimate 
care for someone, they do not necessarily have the additional, binding and 
motivating reasons that the romantic partner role obligations bring.  
It might be objected that there are other relationships and relationship roles 
that involve the duty of intimate caregiving. However, the romantic 
relationship is unique in having this obligation as a part of the duty to take 
joint responsibility for each other’s well-being. It is also unique in having 
this duty combined with the particular level of romantic intimacy - specified 
by the obligation to be open and honest about the central aspects of each 
other’s lives - which can lead to the acute level of harm already identified in 
section 8.2.2.  
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8.2.4 A Note on the Political Implications 
The preceding two sections aimed to show that there are features of the 
romantic relationship that make it a uniquely risky type of intimate 
caregiving relationship. There is a form of vulnerability to harm that 
romantic partners uniquely open themselves up to, and the relationship role 
that they are playing makes it harder for them to mitigate against this, and 
the other risks of intimate caregiving. This suggests that the romantic 
relationship warrants direct regulation in its own right.  
It might be thought that something like Metz’s ICGU status would still be 
appropriate for directly regulating the romantic relationship, as it is still 
essentially the intimate care that warrants state protection. In order for the 
romantic relationship to be directly regulated, a distinct legal category 
would need to be created that corresponds to the romantic relationship. 
There would need to be specific rights and duties that related to the specific 
risks of that relationship (as it is defined by the legal category), and a unique 
status as well – an ICGU-plus status perhaps. This would involve all of the 
rights and duties that an ICGU status involves (those typically associated 
with the current marital status) plus those that particularly mitigate against 
the significant risk of harm found in romantic relationships (so the bundle 
that attaches to the status for romantic relationships is larger). These might 
include stricter protections for people ‘divorcing’ to ensure that the intimate 
knowledge gained is not used to harm; and rights to financial and other 
assistance (for example, nurses/counselling) to ensure the ‘able’ partner is 
cared for in times of severe need, when the other partner is unable to 
reciprocate any caring resources at all (for example, if they are severely ill).   
This proposal would clearly need to be further worked out in order to be a 
viable option. There is however an immediate concern – namely that it 
misses the fact that the romantic relationship warrants direct regulation for 
reasons other than those specifically relating to intimate care. I turn to this 
further claim in the next section.  
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8.3 The Romantic Relationship Leads to Non-Care-Based Systematic 
Vulnerability 
Whilst care is an integral part of the romantic relationship, it is not the only 
part, and I think there are other ways in which material, physical and 
psychological resources are used and risked. I will first identify, in this 
section, how these resources are risked by loving another person, and 
through the maintenance of the romantic relationship. In section 8.4 I will 
then show that the vulnerability that these features lead to is systematic – 
that it is not easily mitigated against by individuals within romantic 
relationships because of the social and political structures in place within 
our society. This will then enable me to claim that the romantic relationship 
warrants direct regulation for non-care-based reasons.  
8.3.1 The Riskiness of Love  
Baier’s (1991) account of love - a Complex Emotion Account - highlights 
how we risk physical and psychological resources (which could also lead to 
the risking of material resources) simply by loving. She acknowledges the 
numerous and immense benefits that love can bring, but focuses on the not 
insignificant risks that it also entails, for both the lover and the beloved.  
Baier’s account of love highlights the complex way in which lovers are 
emotionally interconnected and interdependent. This is directly relevant to 
the way in which love is risky.  
Both the relations of interdependency and our responses to them, 
when we will their continuation, are fraught with risks – risks of 
mutual maiming, of loss of heartbreak, of domination, of betrayal, of 
boredom, of strange fashions of forsaking, of special forms of 
disease, and of disgrace. (1991, p. 448) 
There are two types of risk that love can bring: dangerous emotions 
(including those that affect a person’s psychological well-being and 
autonomy, and those that feed aggression); and physical risks (such as 
exposure to disease).  
Baier first identifies the dangerous emotions that love can bring for the 
lover:  
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paralysing grief or reckless despair at the loss or death of loved ones, 
retreat into a sort of psychic hibernation when cut off from ‘news’ of 
them, crippling anxiety when they are in danger, helpless anguish 
when they are in pain, crushing guilt when one has harmed them, 
deadly shame when one fails them. (1991, pp. 433-434) 
These are dangerous because they can affect the lover’s psychological well-
being, and her ability to be autonomous. When one is paralysed by grief for 
instance, one’s well-being is detrimentally affected, and one’s ability to 
function as an autonomous human being is severely diminished. 
Love can also bring “aggression feeding” emotions such as jealousy, hate 
and fear, which are dangerous not only for the lover, but for the beloved as 
well (Baier 1991, p. 433). Such emotions fuel aggression, and so put both 
the lover and the beloved at risk of physical harm in addition to the 
detrimental affect these emotions can have on our psychological well-being. 
The beloved is also at risk of “overprotection, of suffocation, of loss of 
independence, toughness and self-reliance” (p. 434). These features of love 
clearly put the beloved’s autonomy and self-respect at risk. It seems 
plausible that this could lead to material loss of independence too, or at least 
make one more susceptible to it (for example, financial dependence).  
It is not only the risk of dangerous and aggression-feeding emotions that 
Baier is concerned about. The second type of risk that love brings is 
physical. The loved one’s “embrace may maim one, the diseases she carries 
may kill one, and one may know that they are killing one” (p. 443). She 
doesn’t elaborate on the idea that we are at risk from the embraces of our 
loved ones, but we can see it is a risk to take into account. We allow our 
loved ones to physically come much closer to us than others. We put 
ourselves in a vulnerable position if they are much stronger than us. We 
trust them not to use this strength, but accidents can happen, especially in 
the heat of the moment, or when fuelled by jealousy or anger.  
Baier does elaborate a little further on the risks of diseases. She has in mind 
the diseases and health risks that relate to the sexual nature of love - in 
particular venereal diseases, genetically inherited diseases, and the risks of 
dying in childbirth. However, the non-sexual physical intimacy of love can 
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also put us at risk of catching other infectious diseases, and put us at risk of 
physical harm as noted above.  
It might be suggested that these dangerous emotions and physical risks will 
only appear when the love is somehow non-ideal. Or it might be pointed out 
that the role of a romantic partner - and the obligations this entails - should 
be able to go some way towards mitigating against these dangerous 
emotions and physical risks.  
I don't think that this is the case. The dangerous emotions are appropriate to 
love, and the emotional and physical responses to them are also a part of 
love. Romantic relationships occur in our everyday social world where there 
are other people who might be attracted to the beloved, where circumstances 
may take the beloved away, and where they are subject to the normal risks 
of harm that everyone is subjected to. The dangerous emotions that the lover 
is exposed to when the beloved is hurt, in danger, or faraway look like 
appropriate responses to the pain, fear and unknown emotions of the 
beloved. They are appropriate because the role involves the joint 
responsibility for the beloved’s well-being. The aggression-feeding 
emotions of jealousy, hate, and fear also seem appropriate if they are a 
response to the beloved feeling affection towards another, being hurt by the 
beloved, or seeing them fearful.  
The role of a romantic partner might temper how we react to the dangerous 
and aggression-feeding emotions that arise, but it won’t stop them from 
arising. Additionally, whilst they tell against acting on these emotions, they 
will not physically prohibit someone from doing so, especially if the 
emotions are particularly strong, as they often are in romantic love. The 
notion of a ‘crime of passion’ highlights how easy it is to do the worst thing 
possible to the ones we love, and suggests that it may sometimes be (partly) 
out of our control.145  
                                                          
145 This is linked to the point raised in section 8.2.2 – not only do we come 
to know the other intimately through providing intimate care, we also love 
them, and this adds to the riskiness of being subject to significant harm.  
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The physical risks that Baier highlights are also a part of the role of a 
romantic partner. Physical intimacy (sexual and nonsexual) is seen to be 
part of the behaviour that fulfils the role of a romantic partner – it helps 
them to take care of one another, increases the intimacy and knowledge 
between them, and can foster trust and love.  
As with intimate care, romantic love is something valuable that nevertheless 
brings with it substantial risks: risks that make those in romantic love 
psychologically, physically, and potentially even (indirectly) materially 
vulnerable. The question however remains whether this vulnerability is 
systematic, and therefore whether it gives the state a compelling reason to 
directly regulate the romantic relationship.  I will turn to this question in 
section 8.4.  
8.3.2 The Resources Required for Relationship Maintenance 
All relationships, including the romantic relationship, need to be 
maintained. Relationship maintenance requires physical, material and 
psychological resources. Whilst caring for the other will contribute to 
maintaining the relationship, there are other (non-care-based) aspects of 
relationship maintenance as well – things that go into fulfilling the role of a 
romantic partner and ensuring that the relationship continues over time.  
Exactly what this entails will differ from romantic relationship to romantic 
relationship, but it seems reasonable to assume that it will involve physical, 
material and psychological resources. Consider a day in the life of a 
longstanding romantic couple. In order for their relationship to be 
maintained they need to have somewhere to conduct that relationship and so 
the participants may well do things such as cooking, cleaning, and earning 
money to maintain a shared home.  
In an ideal world, the maintenance of the relationship will be equally shared 
between participants in it. As such, whatever resources are used by one 
individual, should be recompensed by another participant taking on a 
different relationship-maintenance task. If one participant uses up a 
particular resource in doing one task, the other should have a surplus 
because they have been completing a different task, requiring different 
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resources. However, as has been highlighted, romantic relationships and 
love are often not ideal. It could be the case that one (or both) partners are 
left physically, materially and psychologically vulnerable because of the 
resources they have used towards the maintenance of the relationship.  
The participants have however voluntarily chosen to be part of this 
relationship, and reap the benefits of being in such a relationship. There are 
also other means of replenishing or saving resources, such as through 
employment, or hiring a cleaner. It might therefore be suggested that having 
a romantic relationship is a risk that is voluntarily undertaken, that is 
typically balanced out by the benefits of being in a romantic relationship, 
and which can be easily mitigated by the individuals involved. If this is the 
case then relationship maintenance would not provide an (additional) reason 
for direct regulation. Whether this is the case remains to be seen.  
8.4 Are the Identified Vulnerabilities Systematic? 
In Chapter Seven it was argued that we cannot focus on intimate caregiving 
relationships, and the vulnerability they entail, in isolation from the social 
world that those relationships occur in. Social and political structures and 
norms surrounding the intimate caregiving relationship influence and 
exacerbate the physical, material and psychological vulnerability caused by 
these relationships. This makes the vulnerability systematic, and gives the 
state a reason to create a distinct legal category for those relationships.  
Having identified two additional non-care-based ways in which the romantic 
relationship can lead to material, physical and psychological vulnerability, it 
now needs to be seen whether the social and political structures and norms 
within our society contribute to or enhance this vulnerability. Is there 
something about our social and political structures and norms that make it 
hard for individuals to mitigate against the physical, material and 
psychological vulnerability caused by love and the maintenance of a 
romantic relationship? If there is, then the vulnerability is systematic, and 
the romantic relationship warrants direct regulation for non-care-based 
reasons, in order to mitigate against this systematic vulnerability.  
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8.4.1 The Systematic Vulnerability of Love 
As we have seen, love, understood as a complex emotional interdependence, 
can lead to physical and psychological vulnerability. This is due to the 
dangerous and aggression feeding emotions and the risk of physical harm 
(either motivated by the aggressive emotions or from physical contact and 
infection). The vulnerability is not caused by using up physical and 
psychological resources which then might not be reciprocated, but rather it 
is due to the exposure to harm that love can bring.  
As such, the concern is not the replenishment of lost resources, and so the 
means available for an individual to mitigate against this type of 
vulnerability would not be through things such as employment. What could 
an individual do to protect themselves against the vulnerability of love? 
There appear to be two salient options: first, they could try to not have 
romantic relationships that involve this type of risky love; or second, they 
could try to eradicate the particular risks that arise. Neither option looks 
attractive, but more importantly, neither option is readily available to 
individuals within our society because of social structures and norms that 
are in place.  
The first option is obstructed by the fact that most of us want to have, and 
maintain, a romantic relationship. This is influenced (at least in part) by the 
fact that romantic relationships are highly valued in our society, and the fact 
that there is a social norm of searching for, having, and maintaining a 
romantic relationship. We are taught this norm through the family structure, 
through recognised celebrations such as Valentine’s Day, through media 
and literature. It is the norm that Brake identifies and terms as 
“amatonormativity” – the “disproportionate focus on marital and amorous 
love relationships as special sites of value” as well as the associated 
“assumption that romantic love is a universal goal” (2012, p. 88). To not 
choose to search for, have, or maintain a romantic relationship is to go 
against a weighty social norm. It would be possible (such norms can be 
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flouted and rejected), but it would be costly. You would be subject to a 
certain amount of social pressure and scrutiny.146  
The second option is obstructed by the fact that we - as a society - have 
structured the norms of love so that they involve this type of vulnerability. 
Love is influenced by the relationship it is found in. When that relationship 
is a romantic relationship, it is influenced by the role of a romantic partner. 
This role is formed of social practices and norms – it tells us what is 
required of romantic partners. This role dictates that romantic partners share 
the central aspects of their lives, and take joint responsibly for the central 
aspects of each other’s well-being. This in turn influences (as noted in 
Chapter Four) the deep level of emotional interdependence (or love) 
between romantic partners and what emotional (and physical) responses will 
be considered appropriate. There are also typical patterns of behaviour that 
are taken to fulfil this role. As seen in section 8.3.1, the dangerous emotions 
and physical risks are appropriate responses in love. They are a part of what 
it is to romantically love someone. We cannot have romantic love without 
being exposed to these risks, and this is (at least in part) due to the social 
norms that make up the role of a romantic partner, and which dictate what 
behaviour is taken to fulfil that role.  
This shows that there are social practices and norms within our society - 
both external (amatonormativity) and internal (the role and required pattern 
of behaviour) to the romantic relationship - which contribute to the 
vulnerability that romantic partners face because they romantically love 
each other. This makes the vulnerability systematic.  
There are two potential objections to the claim that the existence of these 
identified social structures and norms leads to systematic vulnerability. 
First, it might be pointed out that the role of a romantic partner is 
                                                          
146 Brake claims that amatonormativity is a problematic social norm that 
contributes to unjustified discrimination against non-amatonormative 
relationship types. She hopes that her proposed minimal marriage would 
work to eradicate this particular social norm. I do not take a stand here on 
whether this social norm is problematic in this way, but merely highlight 
that it is a salient feature of our social world.  
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interpretive – particular individuals can interpret and play the role in 
different ways, and take different patterns of behaviour to fulfil the role. As 
such, perhaps not all romantic relationships will involve deep emotional and 
physical intimacy, or the risks that this entails. Individuals will decide what 
is central to their lives and their relationship, and might view the risks as too 
high, limiting the intimacy involved. 
This is true, but, as seen in Chapter Three, there are restrictions on how far 
this interpretation can and will be taken – limits placed by the role itself, and 
by other social norms in place within our society. Taking the role itself first, 
whilst people can have different interpretations of what behaviour the role 
requires and find different ways to fulfil a role, their behaviour is still 
constrained by the role – which requires intimacy and joint responsibility for 
each other’s well-being. 
Secondly, there are other social norms within our society that will influence 
what people typically take to be central to their lives, and how they fulfil the 
role of a romantic partner. In a society that values the raising of children for 
instance, this is likely to form the central part of an individual’s life, and so 
sexual intimacy is likely (if the couple want to have biologically related 
children). There are also social norms about the level of disclosure that 
occurs in romantic relationships – there is a presumption that you should not 
keep anything (significant) from your romantic partner. This means that 
romantic partners will likely know each other intimately and so will be 
subject to the risks identified. It therefore seems reasonable to expect the 
risks associated with love to be present in many (although not all) romantic 
relationships, and this is because of the role of a romantic partner and the 
social norms at play in our social world. 
The second objection suggests that the particular social norms and structures 
that I have identified are not strictly political. Whilst it is a concern of the 
state’s if basic structure institutions and laws - such as employment 
structures and laws - contribute to physical, material and psychological 
vulnerability, this is because these structures are a part of the political 
sphere, where justice is paramount. The social norms surrounding romantic 
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love however, it might be argued, are not a part of the basic structure, and so 
no concern of the state.  
The question of whether or not the state should be interested or involved in 
the social norms and structures relating to romantic relationships - or 
whether they should be considered a part of the basic structure - is a tricky 
one. I do not aim to definitively settle the question here, but I suggest that 
there are good reasons to treat these social structures and norms as political.  
The first reason for treating them as political is that they clearly contribute 
to psychological and physical vulnerability. These things (for example, self-
respect and health) are considered to be under the state’s purview because 
they are primary goods. The social bases of these primary goods are the 
resources that the state (via the basic structure) is meant to distribute 
according to the principles of justice. Anything that affects the just 
distribution of these goods becomes political. 
The second reason is that the romantic relationship could be considered to 
be a part of the family – an institution that is often (correctly) considered as 
a part of the basic structure because of its (now) recognised influence on all 
aspects of our lives (including political and economic). Usually only spousal 
roles would be considered to fall under this institution – but seeing as the 
romantic relationship has been identified as the paradigmatic marital 
relationship (the relation the institution is meant to be built around) then it 
seems like a prime candidate for being counted as a part of this institution, 
and so properly a part of the basic structure. This means that these social 
norms can be considered to make the vulnerability of romantic love 
systematic.  
8.4.2 Relationship Maintenance Leads to Systematic Vulnerability 
The maintenance of a romantic relationship requires the use of material, 
physical and psychological resources. As with intimate caregiving 
relationships, the reciprocation of these goods is not guaranteed within a 
romantic relationship, leaving the participants potentially open to material, 
physical and psychological vulnerability. Is this vulnerability also 
systematic? 
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It might be suggested that the maintenance of a romantic relationship 
doesn’t require that many resources and that these resources could be 
replenished by the individual through the usual means: for example, through 
employment, and other personal relationships. However, there are ways in 
which social and political structures and norms within our society make this 
mitigation of vulnerability more difficult in romantic relationships, and in 
fact contribute to the vulnerability caused. 
For example, consider the fact that the average salary is not enough to 
support more than one person: this means that all participants in a 
relationship will need to work, as well as contribute to the day to day 
running of a household, in order to have somewhere (for example, a home) 
in which to conduct their relationship. This could (and often does) lead to 
tensions over whose responsibility it is to do household chores, childcare 
etc. This means that it is difficult for those in romantic relationships to 
balance the need to maintain their relationship whilst also mitigating the 
vulnerabilities they face. Additionally, if one person is left to do the bulk of 
this type of relationship maintenance work (typically this has been the 
woman because of social norms relating to gender), whilst also being 
required to work to gain income, then they are left in a more physically, 
materially, and psychologically vulnerable position because of these social 
structures and norms.  
Other workplace structures and norms also influence people’s ability to 
maintain relationships and insure against the vulnerability this can lead to. 
Many relationships, in order to be maintained, require the participants to 
live near each other. If promotions at work are only available if you are 
prepared to move to another location, then this will likely threaten the 
maintenance of a romantic relationship (especially if there isn’t provision 
for a partner to move as well).  
These social structures and norms will particularly affect those in romantic 
relationships, because they will make maintaining the romantic relationship 
particularly hard. The role of a romantic partner includes the duty to share 
each other’s central experiences and to accommodate them within a joint 
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life. Fulfilling this duty is likely to require more relationship maintenance, 
and to be more adversely affected by these social structures and norms, than 
for example close friendships which require only that friends make space for 
each other’s central experiences.  
These social structures and norms that our present within our society look as 
though they do contribute to and exacerbate the vulnerability caused by the 
need to maintain a romantic relationship, and so that vulnerability looks 
systematic.   
8.4.3 The Romantic Relationship Warrants Direct Regulation for Non-
Care-Based Reasons 
The love and relationship maintenance that are a part of the role of a 
romantic partner lead to physical, material and psychological vulnerability, 
both through a risk to harm and through a potential loss of resources. This 
vulnerability is exacerbated by social structures and norms that make it hard 
for individuals to avoid and mitigate against it. This means that the 
vulnerability is systematic. As identified in Chapter Seven, if a personal 
relationship leads to systematic physical, material and psychological 
vulnerability, then this gives the state a compelling reason to directly 
regulate it. This means that there are compelling non-care-based reasons for 
the state to directly regulate the romantic relationship in addition to the care-
based reasons.  
8.4.4 The State Should Directly Regulate the Romantic Relationship 
The preceding discussion has shown that the state has compelling reasons - 
both care-based and non-care-based reasons - for directly regulating the 
paradigmatic marital relationship, qua romantic relationship. This means, 
that contrary to what Chambers, Brake and Metz claim, the state can (and 
should) create a distinct legal category that corresponds to the romantic 
relationship. Each of their alternative proposals identify relationships and 
relationship practices that also warrant direct regulation, but what their 
proposals miss is that the romantic relationship requires its own distinct 
corresponding legal category.  
259 
 
Whilst I have shown that direct regulation of the romantic relationship is 
warranted, I have not shown that the current (or any) political institution of 
marriage is the best, or most appropriate way for the state to directly 
regulate this relationship. As highlighted in Chapter Seven, there are a huge 
variety of types of regulation that the state can make use of (laws, taxes, 
statuses, etc.). Showing that direct regulation is required, does not in itself 
say anything about what type of regulation should be used.  
I don’t aim to answer the question of exactly how the state should directly 
regulate the romantic relationship in my concluding chapter, rather, I aim to 
highlight the complexity of working out the answer to such a question in 
general, and the need to pay attention to various social and political 
structures in particular.  
8.5 What About State Recognition?  
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the anti-marriage theorists 
phrase their objection to marriage as an objection to the state recognition of 
marriage. I noted in Chapter Seven that it is unclear precisely what state 
recognition consists in, and so favour understanding the debate in terms of 
direct and indirect regulation. Nevertheless, in order to make it clear how 
my argument fits into this debate, it will be helpful to address two further 
questions. First, does my claim that the romantic relationship warrants direct 
regulation amount to a claim that it warrants state recognition? Second, if it 
does amount to a claim that the state should recognise the romantic 
relationship, then does this mean I have provided a defence of the political 
institution of marriage? As I will explain in the following two sections, the 
answer to the first question is that it depends on the definition of state 
recognition, and the answer to the second, is no, I have not.  
8.5.1 State Recognition as Direct Regulation 
If state recognition just is direct regulation – the creation of a distinct legal 
category – then showing that the romantic relationship warrants direct 
regulation amounts to a claim that it warrants state recognition. However, 
this still does not (in itself) amount to a defence of the political institution of 
marriage. It does not show that the political institution of marriage is 
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unproblematic, or that it is the (best) way for the state to provide recognition 
of the romantic relationship. Just as I said above in Section 8.4.4, there is a 
further question to settle about what type of regulatory tool should be used. 
Showing that state recognition (understood as direct regulation) is warranted 
would not immediately tell us what that recognition should look like – just 
that it needs to be there. The political institution of marriage would be one 
option on the table. There could be others: romantic relationship contracts; 
an ICGU plus status for romantic relationships; or even state directives that 
pick out the romantic relationship specifically.  
There will be advantages and disadvantages for each option which the 
liberal state would need to consider and weigh up. Relationship contracts 
provide a good example of this. In response to feminist concerns about a 
political institution of marriage, thinkers such as Marjorie Maguire Shultz 
(1982), Lenore Weitzman (1983), and Martha Fineman (1995; 2006) 
proposed relationship contracts as an alternative.147 Whilst proponents of the 
contract model claim that this model will better promote “freedom, equality, 
neutrality, and diversity” than other options (Chambers 2017, p. 118), their 
proposals have been met with sharp criticism. Concerning equality for 
instance, it has been pointed out that contracts don’t necessarily do anything 
to challenge existing power relations, and so inequality (relating to gender 
in particular) is likely to persist as those with more power (men) can 
determine the terms of the contract (see, for example, Pateman 1988).148 
These are arguments about what type of regulation the state should use in its 
legitimate task of recognising (understood here as directly regulating) 
certain personal relationships. The arguments against the political institution 
of marriage considered in Chapters Five and Six are the same. If they are 
successful (and I have argued that they are not) then they would not show 
                                                          
147 See Chambers 2017, pp. 119-20 for a brief summary of these three 
authors’ views. 
148 Note that Brake, Metz and Chambers all reject contracts for regulating 
personal relationships. See Brake (2012) Chapter 7; Metz (2010) Chapter 5; 
and Chambers (2017) Chapter 4. 
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that the state should not recognise the romantic relationship via another type 
of regulatory tool.   
8.5.2 State Recognition as Status plus Attached Legal Incidents 
If by state recognition the anti-marriage theorists mean something more 
specific than the creation of a distinct legal category, then I have not shown 
that the romantic relationship warrants state recognition. Only that it 
warrants direct regulation (the creation of a distinct legal category). But then 
the anti-marriage theorist’s arguments against state recognition (in this more 
specific sense) do not necessarily tell against my claim that direct regulation 
of the romantic relationship is called for, either.  
What could this more ‘specific’ meaning of state recognition be? One 
salient option is that state recognition refers to the existence of an opt-in 
legal ‘status’ that can be attained (if one is eligible), which has certain 
rights, duties, and powers etc. that attach to it. The political institution of 
marriage, minimal marriage and the ICGU status all involve state 
recognition in this sense (but of different things – the romantic relationship, 
adult caring relationships, and intimate caregiving relationships 
respectively). On this understanding, state recognition is one specific type of 
direct regulation (with other types of direct regulation not providing state 
recognition). 
My argument in this chapter – that there is reason to directly regulate the 
romantic relationship – does not show that there is reason to directly 
regulate the romantic relationship in this specific way (i.e. in a way that 
involves state recognition in this more specific sense). In Chapters Five and 
Six I addressed, and responded to, arguments from Brake, Metz and 
Chambers which take issue with this specific type of direct regulation for 
the romantic relationship (in the form of the political institution of 
marriage). As such, I think that the political institution of marriage is 
currently still an option on the table for the liberal state to use when it is 
considering how to directly regulate the romantic relationship. I do not 
argue that it is the best option. There are still further objections to the 
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political institution of marriage, and alternative direct regulatory options, to 
be considered.  
8.5.3 A Point in Favour of Statuses 
Whilst I do not purport to provide a full defence of the political institution 
of marriage, there is a reason to think that some sort of status is a good tool 
for directly regulating relationships. Both Metz and Brake recognise the 
benefits of using a status in their alternative proposals. Relationships have 
certain features that make this type of regulation appropriate: “status – a 
predetermined bundle of rights and responsibilities – can provide protection 
from egregious inequality by building equality protections into its terms, 
without violating privacy or undermining norms of non-contractual 
reciprocity” (Metz 2010, p. 132). Relationships can be risky, but they are 
also unpredictable and each one is unique. They are also a matter of 
personal choice. Requiring individuals to register their relationship in order 
to acquire the status therefore ensures that “adults’ liberties to choose the 
terms of their relationships” are protected (Brake 2012, p. 185).  
If this is right, then where I think Brake and Metz go wrong, is in their 
failure to realise that the romantic relationship also requires its own status. 
Indirect regulation of this relationship (whether that is via minimal marriage 
or an ICGU status) is not enough. The duties that make up the romantic 
relationship, and the behaviour that is taken to fulfil these duties, all 
combine to make this relationship distinctly risky. How romantic partners 
fulfil these duties will however alter throughout their relationship. It is not 
something that can be spelled out in advance. The tool that the state uses to 
directly regulate this relationship needs to be able to accommodate this. A 
status, with an associated set of legal incidents, allows the state to do this. It 
doesn’t require romantic partners to explicitly set out how they will fulfil 
their duties in advance, but it does provide protection from vulnerability 
(through the attached legal incidents), and it does allow them to determine 
with whom they are in a romantic relationship (by registering for the status). 
Once a romantic relationship has acquired this status, certain rights and 
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duties will then only come into play as and when they are appropriate, but 
they are there in case they are needed.  
Chambers is right to be concerned that there are people who in engage in 
relationship practices without being in an adult caring relationship, an 
intimate caregiving relationship, or a romantic relationship. There may 
therefore be good reason to directly regulate certain relationship practices 
by default state directives – to ensure that no one engaging in those practices 
outside of these relationships is left vulnerable. That this is the case does not 
however show that there is no reason to directly regulate the romantic 
relationship, nor that it is inappropriate to have (in addition to those state 
directives) a status and associated legal incidents for the romantic 
relationship which would address the particular systematic vulnerability that 
this relationship can lead to. As with Brake’s and Metz’s proposals, what I 
have shown is that indirect regulation of the romantic relationship is not 
enough. 
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Conclusion 
The Complex Question of How the State Should Relate to the 
Paradigmatic Marital Relationship 
 
1. Final Summary 
I began this thesis by identifying a shift in the way that we think about the 
marital relationship and the institution of marriage. We have moved away 
from thinking that the institution of marriage should shape the marital 
relationship, and now think that the institution should ‘fit’ the marital 
relationship, as it is understood independently of the institution. 
Noticing this shift highlighted the need to focus on the nature of the private 
relationship that is usually taken to warrant the marital status, and to explore 
how understanding the nature of this relationship could impact the current 
political liberal debates surrounding our political institution of marriage. 
This immediately indicated that this area of investigation could pose a 
challenge for maintaining a clear public/private divide within society – a 
traditional liberal tool for maintaining equality, liberty and political stability.  
I approached this topic via two guiding questions. First, what is the 
paradigmatic marital relationship? Second, how should the state relate to the 
paradigmatic marital relationship? Part One focused on the first question, 
and Part Two on the second.  
Part One identified the paradigmatic marital relationship in our Western 
liberal society as the romantic relationship. It then explored what the nature 
of this relationship is, and what makes it distinct from other loving 
relationships. I argued in Chapters One and Two that we cannot find what 
makes the romantic relationship distinct by looking in isolation at the love 
that occurs within this relationship. None of the accounts of love considered 
(Union Accounts, Robust Concern Accounts, Valuation Accounts and 
Emotions Accounts) could show that romantic love is distinct without 
appealing to an aspect of the relationship that the love is found within. This 
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demonstrated that an account of the relationship itself - the pattern of 
behaviour and interaction over time - was also needed.  
Chapter Three demonstrated why a role-based account (as opposed to a 
behaviour-based account) of a romantic relationship was required. Only a 
role-based account would enable us to encompass the vast variety of 
behaviour that is exhibited in different romantic relationships whilst 
providing a way to distinguish romantic relationships from other, similar, 
long-standing loving relationships (in particular close friendships). This 
highlighted the social nature of the romantic relationship and showed how it 
is made up of social practices and norms.  
Chapter Four took on the task of providing a role-based account of the 
romantic relationship. A romantic relationship is one in which the 
participants play the distinctive role of a romantic partner. In this chapter I 
built up a picture of this role: it is made up of a unique set of constitutive 
norms, which romantic partners are required to fulfil:  
(1) Romantic partners should love one another, and act in ways that 
express that love.  
(2) Romantic partners should share the experiences that are central 
to their lives and accommodate these things within a joint life.  
(3) Romantic partners should take joint responsibility for the central 
aspects of each other’s well-being.  
(4) Romantic partners should trust one another deeply.  
Having identified the paradigmatic marital relationship as the romantic 
relationship, and having provided an account of this relationship, Part Two 
then took on the question of how the political liberal state should relate to 
this relationship.  
In most Western liberal societies the state relates to the romantic 
relationship in a direct, regulatory manner, via the political institution of 
marriage (a legal status with an associated bundle of legal rights and duties). 
I took, as my starting point, various political liberal arguments that 
challenge the political nature of this institution. In Chapters Five and Six I 
identified three levels of concern, and argued that each could be dismissed. 
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This suggested that the political institution of marriage isn’t as problematic 
for political liberals as claimed. However, my arguments did not show that 
the political liberal state should relate to the paradigmatic marital 
relationship via this political institution. This is because it had not been 
independently shown that the political liberal state should directly regulate 
or recognise the romantic relationship.  
In Chapter Seven I discovered that it is in fact this precise claim - that the 
state should directly regulate the romantic relationship - which various 
opponents to the political institution of marriage challenge. In this chapter I 
showed that we can find two claims underlying the anti-marriage position. 
First, there is the Direct Regulation Claim which states that the liberal state 
has compelling reasons to directly regulate some personal relationships, and 
so it is appropriate for the state to create a distinct legal category 
corresponding to those relationships. Second, there is the Romantic 
Relationship Claim which states that the liberal state does not have 
compelling reasons to directly regulate the romantic relationship, and so it 
should not create a distinct legal category that corresponds to it. If these two 
claims are true, then the underlying complaint against the political 
institution of marriage is that the state, through this institution, unjustifiably 
directly regulates – and so creates a distinct legal category corresponding to 
– the romantic relationship.  
In Chapter Eight I responded to this underlying complaint, and argued that 
the Romantic Relationship Claim is false. The romantic relationship does 
warrant direct regulation. This is because it leads to systematic physical, 
material and psychological vulnerability in virtue of being a particularly 
risky intimate caregiving relationship, and in virtue of the romantic love 
present and relationship maintenance required. Social and political norms 
and structures contribute to this vulnerability and this highlights how 
personal relationships (and the romantic relationship in particular) refuse to 
sit neatly on one side or the other of the public/private divide.  
Whilst I have shown that the romantic relationship warrants direct 
regulation, and that the political institution of marriage is not as problematic 
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for political liberals as some think, I still have not provided a defence of the 
current (or reformed) political institution of marriage. In order to do this I 
would need to show that the political institution of marriage is the best way 
for the state to mitigate against the systematic vulnerability identified, and 
that there are no other problems with this institution.  
To bring this thesis to a close I want to highlight just how difficult it is to 
answer the question of how the political liberal state should directly regulate 
the romantic relationship. I haven’t made any concrete proposals for a 
regulatory framework (although I have mentioned some points in favour of 
utilising a status and associated legal incidents) for this reason. In order to 
highlight the complexity I draw on the work of Iris Marion Young (1990; 
2006) and present two insights that seem particularly pertinent, and which 
also make clear just how much this topic challenges the neat liberal 
public/private divide.  
2. Two Relevant Insights  
The two insights which seem particularly relevant to the question of how the 
state should relate to the paradigmatic marital relationship (the romantic 
relationship) are as follows:   
Structural Insight: when we are considering matters of social justice 
we need to pay attention to the variety of social structures and 
institutional contexts that influence a particular issue. 
Distributive Insight: when we are considering matters of social 
justice we need to be careful that we do not obscure important issues 
of justice by over-extending the concept of distribution.  
These insights are found within the literature that criticises and challenges a 
purely distributive notion of social justice – one that restricts the concept of 
social justice “to the morally proper distribution of benefits and burdens 
among society’s members” (Young 1990, p. 15).149 The two insights 
                                                          
149 This literature favours a concept of social justice that focuses on 
eliminating “institutionalised domination and oppression” (Young 1990, p. 
15). 
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correspond to two criticisms that Young makes against the “distributive 
paradigm” (p. 15). First, that it focuses on the distribution of resources and 
social positions and so fails to evaluate the “social structure and institutional 
context that often help determine distributive patterns” (p. 15); and second, 
that it has a tendency to inappropriately widen the “concept of distribution” 
so that it encompasses “nonmaterial goods [such] as power, opportunity, 
and self-respect” which misrepresents these goods “as though they were 
static things, instead of a function of social relations and processes” (p. 
16).150 
I do not aim to comment on whether the criticisms and challenges are 
warranted, nor on how well proponents of this distributive view do, or 
could, incorporate these insights.151 Rather, my aim is simply to demonstrate 
that these two insights look particularly relevant to the question at hand. 
Whilst it has been shown that direct regulation of the romantic relationship 
is warranted, it has not been shown what type of regulatory tool should be 
used to achieve this direct regulation. These insights highlight just how 
complex a task this really is.  
2.1 The Structural Insight  
The first problem that Young identifies with the distributive paradigm is that 
its exclusive focus on distributive matters causes it to miss other non-
distributive matters of justice that require equal attention: namely social 
structures and institutional contexts. These are “any structures or practices, 
the rules and norms that guide them, and the language and symbols that 
mediate social interactions within them, in institutions of state, family, and 
civil society, as well as the workplace” (1990, p. 22). We can immediately 
see that the traditional liberal public/private divide is being challenged by 
                                                          
150 The second concern arises in response to the fact that some distributive 
theorists do recognise the structural issues Young highlights in the first 
concern, but attempt to address these via the distributive method.  
151 Young acknowledges that Rawls treats the basic structure as the subject 
of justice, but still thinks that he has too strong an emphasis on distribution - 
an emphasis that cannot capture all of the structural concerns of justice 
(2006, p. 91).  
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Young. She highlights that the reality is much more messy – something 
which the case of personal relationships highlights even further.  
These institutional contexts and social structures (which cross the 
public/private divide) are all relevant to questions of justice because they are 
the “background conditions” (Young 1990, p. 22) under which people live. 
They affect what people are able to do, and they affect how resources are 
distributed – “what there is to distribute, how it gets distributed, who 
distributes, and what the distributive outcome is” (p. 22). We therefore need 
to pay attention to them when considering matters of social justice.152  
Take, for example, the “division of labour” (Young 1990, p.23; 2006, p. 93) 
within our society. We might notice that there is a pattern whereby, for 
example, menial labour is primarily done by ethnic minorities and highly 
paid professionals tend to be white, and ask whether this pattern is unjust. 
An answer to this question might focus solely on how jobs are allocated, 
and on determining whether everyone has an equal opportunity to access 
high paid jobs. If everyone has fair equality of opportunity, then the pattern 
is just, on this picture. The concern is that this focus could miss key issues 
of injustice. It doesn’t question, for example, “the structure of the 
occupational distinctions, the definition of tasks within them, and the 
relationship among people occupying differing positions within a 
production, distribution, or service enterprise” (2006, p. 93). Ensuring 
everyone has equal access to all positions is all well and good, but if there is 
something unjust about the structure of occupational distinctions, for 
example, then we need to make sure they are addressed as well. The 
distributive focus on equality of opportunity has a tendency to miss these 
concerns.  
Another familiar example highlights this point: the division of labour 
whereby women tend to take on the majority of caregiving labour (of 
                                                          
152 Elizabeth Anderson is someone else who also highlights that “social 
relations and norms, and the structure of opportunities, public goods, and 
public spaces” (1999, p. 319) affect what people are able to do and achieve 
within society, and so need to be evaluated when questions of (egalitarian) 
social justice arise. 
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children and other dependents), whilst men tend to be the primary income 
earners. This is a pattern that tends to limit “women’s opportunities to 
develop other capacities and achieve public recognition, and often makes 
them vulnerable to poverty” (Young 2006, p. 93). Young is critical of the 
Rawlsian approach that would attempt to either make caregiving more 
equally shared (by both genders), or unequal caregiving compensated for. 
She is critical of this approach because it doesn’t question “the structural 
division between private domestic care work and public wage and salaried 
work” (p. 93): a structural division that has “far-reaching implications for 
the worth of different kinds of labour, employer and labour market 
expectations of the shape and length of the working day, and the form and 
status of sex segregation and gender stereotyping in more public paid 
occupations” (p. 93). This example highlights how just one structural 
feature can have far-reaching effects in a variety of areas – all of which can 
lead to issues of justice.  
Another key area of justice that Young claims cannot be properly 
accommodated by the distributive paradigm is that of “normalisation” 
(2006, p. 95).153 Normalisation concerns the social processes by which 
certain persons and behaviours come to be viewed and treated within society 
as ‘normal’ and valuable, leading to the devaluation, stigmatisation and 
discrimination of those who do not conform to these norms.  
These social processes can be found in the various “institutions, discourses, 
and practices” within society (Young 2006, p. 95). They consist of things 
like social conventions, and the way people and behaviours are portrayed in 
literature and the media. These social processes “elevate the experience and 
capacities of some social segments into standards used to judge everyone” 
(p. 95). They distinguish what persons and behaviours should be regarded as 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. What is considered ‘normal’ as a result of these 
processes is also seen to be the most valuable.  
                                                          
153 Young has previously referred to this particular issue as an issue of 
“culture” (1990, p. 23). 
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In addition to this, the stigmatisation and disadvantage of the ‘abnormal’ is 
often enforced and reinforced by “institutional rules and practices” (Young 
2006, p. 95). For example, within the workplace there are traditional male 
lifestyle norms at play which means that employers assume that their 
employees do not juggle both paid work and caring duties for their families. 
This has the consequence of often putting “workers at a disadvantage for 
taking time off due to family illness” (p. 96). Another example is of ethnic 
and racial minorities who can “find themselves regarded as deviant in 
relation to convention or politeness, articulateness, or the appearance of 
honesty and trustworthiness” (p. 96). Appearing to be polite, articulate, 
honest and trustworthy are important when it comes to securing jobs and 
positions that involve a certain level of authority and responsibility. Being 
perceived as ‘deviant’ in relation to these things therefore adversely affects 
these peoples’ chances of securing such positions.  
2.2 How the Structural Insight relates to Regulating the Romantic 
Relationship 
In her examples Young highlights a number of social structures, processes 
and norms that contribute to social injustice. This highlights the huge 
variety of social structures and norms that can influence social justice in 
many, far-reaching, ways. Some of these structures, processes and norms 
are directly relevant to the question of how to directly regulate the romantic 
relationship because they also contribute to the vulnerability faced by those 
within this type of relationship.  
The structure that divides caregiving and paid employment, and the 
masculine norms of the workplace, for instance, are structures and norms 
that contribute to the systematic vulnerability of intimate caregiving.154 
They exacerbate and cause physical, material and psychological 
vulnerability for anyone in an intimate caregiving relationship because they 
cause or contribute to care-work being underpaid, undervalued, and viewed 
as not producing marketable skills, which in turn makes it harder for those 
                                                          
154 See Chapter Seven, section 7.3.2. 
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providing this care to make up any physical, material or psychological 
resources lost through intimate caregiving.  
The discussion in section 8.4 highlighted other structures and norms that 
also contribute to the systematic vulnerability that occurs within the 
romantic relationship. For example, those that determine average salaries 
(so that they only support one individual), and those that influence what 
people will take to be central to their lives. The reason that child rearing, 
care work and careers are often part of a romantic joint life is because they 
are viewed as important and valuable within our society. It is the norm for 
them to be viewed in this way and for them to feature in romantic 
relationships.   
The point of highlighting the impact of these various structures and norms is 
to show that the question of how to directly regulate the romantic 
relationship is highly complex (and to explain why it has not been addressed 
further). When we come to build a proposal for how the romantic 
relationship should be directly regulated we need to pay attention to the 
social structures and institutional contexts that contribute to the vulnerability 
that arises within the relationship. This will require evaluating, and 
potentially altering social structures and norms, as well as institutional 
contexts across the whole of society (and not just those that neatly fit into 
the political sphere). It seems unlikely that a single, dedicated political 
institution (or alternative regulatory framework) will be enough to fully 
combat the systematic vulnerability that has been identified.  
This point stands for the question of how to directly regulate other personal 
relationships and relationship practices as well. Consider Metz’s and 
Chambers’ proposals which recognise the structural causes of vulnerability 
in relation to intimate care and other relationship practices, and highlight the 
need for concern in this area. They both argue for a structural change – an 
abolition of the current political institution of marriage, and the formation of 
a new regulatory framework (an ICGU status or default state directives for 
particular relationship practices) for certain personal relationships. These 
proposals need to be evaluated in terms of how well they address the issue 
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identified with the structural division of care and paid labour. It seems 
(intuitively at least) that there is reason for the state to attempt to do more to 
directly address this identified structural problem. 
Brake also highlights structural issues of justice. She identifies an issue of 
normalisation when she draws attention to amatonormativity. Having a 
romantic, dyadic relationship is viewed as the norm in our society. Brake 
claims that those who conform to this norm are privileged, and those who 
do not conform are stigmatised and disadvantaged. They face “systematic 
discrimination” (2012, p. 89) because they are ineligible to receive marital 
rights and benefits, and their relationships are regarded as socially 
unimportant and judged negatively (because they don’t live up to the valued 
norm).   
Brake is concerned about the disproportionate focus on the romantic 
relationship, and the discrimination that non-romantic relationships receive. 
There are various social processes that contribute to this: the numerous love 
stories within our culture that valorise the search and attainment of romantic 
love; the media reporting on marriages and divorces in positive and negative 
lights respectively; workplace norms; and (according to Brake) having a 
political institution of marriage that is only available to romantic, dyadic 
relationships. Brake focuses on this final structural feature and attempts to 
address the problem by proposing that we alter this (and only this) 
institution. Her aim is to stop the institution of marriage from contributing to 
amatonormativity by opening it up to all adult caring relationships. The 
problem with her proposal (in addition to missing the fact that the romantic 
relationship warrants some form of direct regulation) is that it does not do 
enough to address amatonormativity. It does not address the other social 
processes that contribute to the norm that she sees as problematic, at least 
not directly. If we radically alter the political institution of marriage in the 
way she envisions, so that all adult caring relationships can receive minimal 
marriage rights, this will not eradicate the social and workplace norms that 
also contribute to amatonormativity. If amatonormativity contributes to 
social injustice then more needs to be done to combat it. 
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2.3 The Distributive Insight 
The Distributive Insight stems from the second problem that Young 
identifies with the distributive paradigm: it overextends the concept of 
distribution.  
In response to the charge that the distributive paradigm ignores certain 
structural issues of social justice, proponents have claimed that they can 
(and do) both notice and address these issues. In order to do this they apply 
the concept of distribution to non-material goods. The thought is that any 
structural issue can be addressed by ensuring that there is a just distribution 
of, for example, rights, opportunities, and power. Rawls for instance is 
concerned with the just distribution of “rights and duties related to decision 
making, social positions, power, and so on” (Young 1990, p. 24). 
Portraying social goods like rights, opportunities and power, in this way is 
problematic for two initial reasons. First, it misrepresents these goods as 
things that can be distributed and quantified, when they are better 
understood, claims Young, as “a function of rules and relations” (1990, p. 
25). Second, Young is worried that it encourages us to think about social 
justice solely in terms of “end-state patterns” when “social processes” are 
also relevant (p. 25).  
As a result this over-extension of the concept of distribution risks obscuring 
important issues of justice. We should not only be concerned about what 
and how much people have (individually, and in comparison to others). We 
should also be concerned about 
what people are doing, according to what institutionalised rules, how 
their doings and havings are structured by institutionalised relations 
that constitute their positions, and how the combined effect of their 
doings has recursive effects on their lives. (Young 1990, p. 25) 
These are not things that can be captured by a concept of distribution – they 
are social processes.  
These concerns are highlighted well by considering particular social goods 
like opportunities and self-respect. Opportunities to do things (in this 
context) are “states of affairs that combine the absence of insuperable 
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obstacles with presence of means - internal or external - that give one a 
chance of overcoming the obstacles that remain” (Young 1990, p. 26). A 
just distribution of material goods will be important for ensuring people 
have opportunities (they are a particular type of means), but that is not the 
only important thing. Being able to do things is also affected by the “rules 
and practices that govern one’s action, the way other people treat one in the 
context of specific social relations, and the broader structural possibilities 
produced by the confluence of a multitude of actions and practices” (p. 26). 
Opportunities are therefore not (wholly) distributable nor quantifiable. 
Self-respect, which we have seen Rawls includes on his list of primary 
goods, is another social good that Young thinks it is wrong to characterise 
as a distributable thing. This is because it “is not an entity or measurable 
aggregate, it cannot be parcelled out of some stash, and above all it cannot 
be detached from persons as a separable attribute adhering to an otherwise 
unchanged substance” (1990, p. 27). Instead, it is an “attitude” that one has 
towards one’s own “entire situation and life prospects” (p. 27). 
Young recognises that it is the social conditions of self-respect that Rawls 
treats as distributable (rather than the attitude of self-respect in general). She 
concedes that some of the conditions of self-respect may be distributable 
material goods, but claims that there are also “many nonmaterial conditions 
that cannot be reduced to distributive arrangements” (1990, p. 27) because 
they are relations and processes rather than things. For example, the social 
conditions for a person to have self-respect will include “how they define 
themselves and how others regard them … how they spend their time … [as 
well as] the amount of autonomy and decision making power they have in 
their activities” (p. 27). These things cannot be distributed, and so they 
cannot be properly addressed by the distributive paradigm.  
2.4 How the Distributive Insight Relates to Regulating the Romantic 
Relationship 
The Distributive Insight cautions us that it is possible to obscure important 
issues of justice by construing matters of justice in a solely distributive 
manner. Here I want to highlight how this insight is particularly relevant to 
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the question of how to directly regulate the romantic relationship (and other 
personal relationships). This is because the issues of social justice that the 
paradigmatic marital relationship can lead to clearly concern social goods – 
precisely the kinds of goods that Young is concerned about extending the 
concept of distribution to cover.   
The romantic relationship has been shown to lead to systematic material, 
physical and psychological vulnerability. It does this in virtue of being a 
particularly risky intimate caregiving relationship, involving romantic love, 
and requiring relationship maintenance. Whilst it is clear that the concept of 
distribution can apply to material goods, it is less clear that it can be 
appropriately applied to physical and psychological goods. These goods will 
include things like physical health as well as psychological well-being and 
self-respect. None of these are straightforwardly things that can be 
distributed and quantified. Whilst it might be claimed that the social bases 
of these things can be distributed and quantified, the example of self-respect 
above should make us cautious about claiming this without careful 
investigation.   
The point is that we need to be careful about applying the concept of 
distribution to these goods when we are considering how to directly regulate 
this relationship. When we build proposals for new (or reformed) regulatory 
frameworks we need to make sure that we do not obscure important issues 
of justice that need to be addressed by characterising the goods that they 
will be concerned with as distributable things. So far as other personal 
relationships that need to be directly regulated involve similar systematic 
physical and psychological vulnerability, the same cautionary note will 
apply. 
The case of self-respect above highlights this point well, and is directly 
relevant to the question of directly regulating the romantic relationship. If 
we want to ensure that individuals within a romantic relationship can 
maintain their self-respect then we need to consider, in addition to whether 
they have a just amount of relevant material goods, how they define 
themselves and how others regard them, how they spend their time, and the 
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amount of autonomy and decision making power they have in their 
activities. These things will not necessarily be secured solely via the 
regulatory framework for the romantic relationship – they are affected by 
other social and political structures as well. This again highlights the need 
for a complex and holistic approach to the question of how these 
relationships should be regulated by the state.  
The Distributive Insight is not only relevant to the question of directly 
regulating personal relationships that are construed as leading to systematic 
physical and psychological vulnerability. It also directly challenges Brake’s 
proposal of minimal marriage which views the social bases of adult caring 
relationships as (distributable) social primary goods. Brake views adult 
caring relationships in a way that is analogous to how Rawls views self-
respect. Young’s criticism of extending the concept of distribution to self-
respect looks likely therefore to apply directly to extending it to the social 
bases of adult caring relationships as well.  
Like self-respect, adult caring relationships are not entities or measurable 
aggregates, and they cannot be parcelled out of some stash, or detached 
from persons as a separable attribute adhering to an otherwise unchanged 
substance. For self-respect, this is because it is an attitude. For adult caring 
relationships, it is because they are relationships (a pattern of behaviour and 
interaction over time). Attitudes and relationships are not things.  
Brake clearly recognises this, yet (analogously with Rawls and self-respect) 
thinks that the social conditions of adult caring relationships are 
distributable things. Whilst some distributable material goods might be a 
condition of being able to form adult caring relationships (having a place to 
conduct the relationship, economic security to focus on maintaining the 
relationship etc.), there are also many nonmaterial conditions that cannot be 
reduced to distributive arrangements, as was the case with self-respect. 
These include many of the things Brake views as minimal marriage rights – 
such as next of kin and visitation rights.  
Brake could argue that we can understand things like next of kin rights as 
distributable entities. Young highlights why it is problematic to view these 
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type of rights (akin to the right of free speech rather than rights to a fair 
distribution of material things) in this way. If there is a situation where some 
people have this type of right when others don’t then this does not mean that 
“some people have a certain ‘amount’ or ‘portion’ of a good while others 
have less” and extending the right to everyone does “not entail that the 
formally privileged group gives over some of its right” (1990, p. 25). This 
highlights the disanalogy between rights and material goods. Rights are not 
things, they are relationships: “they are institutionally defined rules 
specifying what people can do in relation to one another” (p. 25). 
Construing them as distributable things risks distorting this important fact.  
To summarise, in an analogous way to self-respect, no adult caring 
relationships, and not all of the social bases of adult caring relationships can 
meaningfully be conceived as goods that individuals possess; they are rather 
relations and processes in which the actions of individuals are embedded. 
This suggests that it may not be helpful to think about adult caring 
relationships as primary goods with distributable social conditions. It’s more 
complex than that.  
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this final section has been to show that when we come to 
consider how the state should directly regulate the paradigmatic marital 
relationship (the romantic relationship) we will need to look at a much 
bigger picture than just the relationship itself - we will need to pay attention 
to the variety of social and political structures and norms that contribute to 
making this relationship one that warrants direct regulation - and this might 
mean crossing the traditional public/private divide. The social and political 
structures and norms that cause this relationship to lead to systematic 
material, physical and psychological vulnerability are various and far-
reaching. This might well mean that we will need to consider the whole 
variety of regulatory tools that the state can utilise, and not necessarily just 
legal statuses, rights and benefits.  
One final point that I want to make is that it has been the focus on the nature 
of the paradigmatic marital relationship that has enabled me to show this. If 
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the institution of marriage is meant to fit the romantic relationship, then we 
need to spend more time thinking about what this relationship needs. 
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